Political Dynasties and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence from India
Abstract:
Political dynasties exist in many democratic countries at different levels of government. How do such dynasties affect public policy? In particular, do they promote clientelism? We study these questions in the context of India where we map familial ties among politicians in the state legislature of 8 major states. Our theory predicts that the presence of dynastic candidates increases lobbying and clientelism by the wealthy. Our empirical analysis focuses on asset accumulation of candidates and local implementation of the largest workfare public program in the world (MNREGA). We find that state assembly constituencies with political dynasties competing exhibit higher wealth among their top contestants, and that areas exposed to dynasties receive less MNREGA employment.
Bio:
https://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/people/454/mitra-anirban
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