Towards
an Anthropology of
'The Wall':

The Cases of
Berlin, and
Israel and Palestine

Summary

Through the case studies of the Berlin Wall and the Wall in Israel and Palestine, theories regarding the origin, role, and effect of state-built separationist Walls are reached. These find that, most particularly, Walls are sites of manifestations of power, that seek to control the movement of populations to protect the position of the powerful under threat. Through concretising policy and discourse in this manner, Walls also however open spaces and potential for resistance to domination. Analysis of the forces that support and contest Walls deconstruct the opposition between 'local' and 'global', and undermine concepts of homogenous, bounded communities.

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List of Abbreviations

GDR   German Democratic Republic

FRG   Federal Republic of Germany

IDF   Israeli Defence Force

PLO   Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PA   Palestinian Authority

ICJ   International Court of Justice

Preface

The purpose of this dissertation is to seek an understanding of the origin, function and working of 'Walls', by which is meant the state-built Walls that continue for hundreds of miles and are designed to control whole populations. The main problems to be discussed therefore include the history and context of the ethnographies selected, the Berlin Wall and the Wall in the West Bank of Palestine, in the context of the anthropology of power, resistance, and place-making. Anthropology of borders, violence and policy are also central to the analysis.

The principle sources are various. For the Berlin material, I am indebted to the work of anthropologists John Borneman (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1988), Andrew Glaeser (2000) and Daphne Berdahl (1999a, 199b) for their rich and detailed ethnographies, although other ethnography and literature have also been extensively used. In the Israel and Palestine material, particular mention must go to Glen Bowman (1998, 2003, 2004) and Avram Bornstein (2002), both of whom took the time to email me in answer to my questions. The work of Lucinda Bucaille and Tom Selwyn has also been of great importance in formulating my thinking in the dissertation. A host of humanitarian organisations' reports and internet media sources have been vital in researching such a current topic. All research has been library, rather than field, based.

Figure 1 - The Great Wall of China

Introduction

1.1 Towards an Anthropology of the Wall

Twenty years ago, the Berlin Wall and the Great Wall of China were the only man made structures visible to the naked eye from the moon. Today, there is less left of the Berlin Wall than of Hadrian's Wall in northern England, built over two thousand years ago. However, now another structure can be seen from space – another Wall[1], this time in the Israeli-occupied territories of Palestine. Nor is this the only contemporary manifestation of these concrete structures, that traverse hundreds of miles and are designed to restrict the movement of whole populations, in the world today. Walls have been erected between Mexico and the United States, between North and South Korea, and between Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus, to name only a few. In this paper I wish to ask the questions; how do Walls arise? What are their effects? What may they tell us about the ways in which human beings understand and act in the world? How do they impact on or reflect processes of conflict and reconciliation, connection and disconnection between peoples? What supports them and what breaks them down? What does it mean when a Wall is dismantled or destroyed?

I explore the answers to these questions through the two cases of the Berlin Wall and the Wall in Israel and Palestine. Through historical analysis of these two ethnographic situations, a broader 'anthropology of the Wall' is approached. But what does 'an anthropology of…' anything mean? Dresch and James write that the defining feature of being an anthropologist is not merely simply that title, but is 'listening for the unsaid, looking for the visually unmarked, sensing the unrepresented, and thus seeking for connections among parts of the obvious which locally remain unstated' (2000: 23). Thus we may understand anthropology as a discipline that seeks to do these things; to see beyond what is taken for granted, enabling us to question the normative models that shape our interpretation and to conceptualise alternative ways of being in the world. With so many of these huge, divisive Walls, it becomes easy to think of separation and segregation as ordinary, even inevitable, and Walls as a logical end-result of this. The Berlin Wall was seen as anomalous because it divided German from German, while often the Wall in the West Bank is objected to (by Palestinians, Israelis or the international community) only for the humanitarian and human rights abuses it perpetuates, rather than because it divides people. Yet as Ferguson and Gupta point out, cultural difference (and therefore the Walls in which it is, in every sense, petrified) is

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[1] I capitalise 'Wall' and 'Walls' throughout this paper to indicate that I am discussing these huge structures, rather than the more ordinary, everyday walls of the buildings around us.

a product of a shared historical process that differentiates the world as it connects it… but if we question a pre-given world of separate and discrete "peoples and cultures," and see instead a difference-producing set of relations, we turn from a project of juxtaposing pre-existing differences to one of exploring the construction of differences in historical process. (1992: 16)

This approach to 'cultural difference' has revolutionised the way anthropology conceptualises its traditional subject; societies and cultures. Walls seem to create the discrete, 'local' communities that anthropology once took for granted; – literally 'bounded' by concrete and barbed wire. This appears to fly in the face of recent thinking on concepts such as increasing globalisation, mobility, hybridity and a post-modern flux of identity and de-territorialisation in an increasingly interconnected world. However, the very act of building a Wall assumes an 'other', and its construction is a reaction to a perceived or actual threat from that 'other'. Walls must thus be researched, not as the proof of innate cultural difference, but as the perfect opportunity to study its creation in process. To what extent do Walls *cement* or *construct* cultural difference, and who or what propels this process? As Ferguson and Gupta continue;

Anthropology has known that the experience of space is always socially constructed. The more urgent task… is to politicize this uncontestable observation. With meaning making understood as a practice, how are spatial meanings established? Who has the power to make places of spaces? Who contests this? What is at stake? (1992: 11)

Walls represent a physical manifestation of the social construction of space, and of a dominant group's attempt to control people through the restriction of space. Once this is recognised, Ferguson and Gupta's questions become a guiding force in an attempt to understand the genesis, effects and destruction of Walls; and the themes of meaning making, power and resistance must be central.

In this paper I engage with various areas of anthropological theory, including that on space-making (most particularly concepts of the 'local' and the 'global') and on the geopolitical and socio-cultural boundary, and on the social science of power and resistance. Shore and Wright's anthropology of policy has also been a central concept, as these Walls are a product of specific state polities, and also in that they enable the state to maintain greater control over the people who live within (or without) its borders and thus implement further policies. Finally, the anthropology of violence, in particular as theorised by Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois and by Nordstrom and Martin, serves to further illuminate the role and functions of Walls at the centres of conflicts.

When Dresch and James write that a feature of being an anthropologist is 'seeking for connections' (2000: 23), it is important that we do not restrict this to our subjects of study. In this paper I seek for the connections between the different agents involved in the 'local' contexts of Walls, but also for the connections between different aspects of anthropological

theory; and the ways in which Walls challenge, advance or further it. I also seek for the connections which make the seemingly so 'local' Wall (so visible, so solid) connected to 'global' actions, relations and power structures, even to my own life.

The very concreteness of Walls makes them an intriguing focus of study. As a physical manifestation of power, politics and policy, Walls provide a link between discourse and practice. They thus provide a perfect field site for the anthropologist interested in the workings of discourse, and how words affect, or construct., the world. Having such a visible, local presence, they make local and global relations of power, hegemony and resistance visible and thus facilitate our understanding of the interrelations between these often slippery and hard to identify objects.

1.2 <u>Seeking for Connections</u>

Over the last ten or twenty years, anthropology has been re-conceptualising the way it has approached its traditional object of study, societies and cultures. Instead of the bounded community, coherent and marked from those groups around it by socio-culturally maintained 'boundaries' (Barth 1969), anthropology has sought to understand the ways in which human groups are formed in processes of connection and disconnection, in a world where 'familiar lines between 'here' and 'there', centre and periphery, colony and metropole, become blurred' (Ferguson and Gupta 1992: 10).

This has been mirrored in a transformation of the anthropology of the border, moving from taking international borders as natural entities that divide discrete nations and cultures, to socially and politically constructed concepts that none the less have vast implications for those who live around them or have to cross them. In his review of the vast anthropology on the United States-Mexico border, Alvarez provides the useful categories of the 'literalists' who have 'focused on the actual problems of the border, including migration, policy, settlement, environment, identity, labor, and health' and the 'a-literalists' who 'focus on social boundaries on the geopolitical border and also on all behaviour in general that involves contradictions, conflict and the shifting of identity' (1995: 449).

As part of the shift in anthropology, and the social sciences more generally, there has been some tendency to emphasise notions of cultural 'hybridity' and the creativity of the 'borderlands';

> borderlands should be regarded not as analytically empty transitional zones but as sites of creative cultural production that require investigation.. Such cultural border zones are always in motion, not frozen for inspection (Rosaldo 1989: 208, 217).

Anthropology has also, however, recognised that exchanges across borders are often characterised by uneven power relations and conflicts as much as 'creative cultural production' (ibid); that borderlands are 'not just places of imaginative interminglings and happy hybridities' (Lavie and Swedenburg, 1996: 15, via Berdahl 1999b: 9). It is perhaps no coincidence that one of these anthropologists – Ted Swedenburg – has done considerable work in Israel and Palestine (1990, 2004).

Wilson and Donnan (1998) have pointed out that the focus on boundaries as a means of social classification does not pay enough attention to the ways in which identities and boundaries are externally defined by, and articulate with, larger social, political and economic processes. Thus the anthropology of the border has many themes in common with anthropological

approaches to concepts of 'local' and 'global' and the power relation between them. Abu-Lughod (1990) has criticised anthropology for its treatment of power as external to the local polity which is seen as the source of residual freedoms. Anthropology also, she argues, has tended to romanticise resistance. Foucault (1980) finds power to operate through discourse, and is thus present everywhere.

> Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads, they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power. (Foucault 1980: 99)

Yet discourse's effects are not found only in language, but are inscribed in the physical world around us, in social institutions, in our relations, inscribed upon our bodies themselves. But if our bodies are invested with relations of power, how are we to conceptualise the agency of the individual? As Said has put it, 'how then to recognise individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means passive or dictatorial, general and hegemonic context?' (1978: 8). Bourdieu's concept of the habitus is one such attempt to determine the relation between people's practices and the contexts in which those practices occur. As Webb *et al* explain, the habitus may be understood as 'on the one hand, the historical and cultural production of individual practices – since contexts, laws, rules and ideologies all speak through individuals, who are never entirely aware that this is happening – and, on the other hand, the individual production of practices, since the individual always acts from self interest.' (2002: 21). As de Certeau (1984) critiques however, acting outside of the 'rules of the game' is not unthinkable, but only un-articulatable, and he points out to Bourdieu the difficulty of ever really knowing a practice. De Certeau proposes the concept of the strategies of power and the tactics of resistance, where strategy belongs to the dominant and controls space and tactics are the working of the other, forever insinuating into and around the space controlled by the dominant.

How may this theory assist us in approaching an anthropology of the Wall? The way in which Walls may, ironically, assist us in re-conceptualising the bounded or isolated local community has already been discussed. The anthropology of the border is a particularly fruitful way to think about the context and history of the Wall in Palestine's West Bank, as the Green Line between Israel and Palestine has been a significant factor shaping and structuring economic and social relations between Israelis and Palestinians[2], and the Wall

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[2] Controversially, the Wall does not run along the Green Line, but cuts into the West Bank, annexing Palestinian land. However, this will be discussed later (see 3.2 'Embodiment').

must be recognised as only one, most recent, form of this previously relatively porous geopolitical boundary. Questions regarding the 'hybridity' of borderlands and borderlanders must be reassessed in the light of territorial and identity struggle, and the barriers presented by the Wall.

As a tangibly local situation supported and contested through global relations, Walls work to deconstruct the dichotomy between 'local' and 'global', just as they, equally ironically, can be shown to be created in processes of connection rather than isolation. Recognising that power is never external to a situation is vital in conceptualising the Wall as a manifestation of relations and discourses between groups in different situations of power. This also must shape our understanding of the location, working, and spatialities of resistance, as these are reconfigured in accordance with the change in the political geography created by the erection or dismantling of a Wall. How do these relations of power affect individuals, and their capacity for agency within social structures? The theory of Foucault, Bourdieu, de Certeau and Abu-Lughod may help us to build our anthropology of the Wall (and of the resistance to them); yet Walls may also serve to redefine our theoretical constructions. These theoretical issues are explored in depth through the ethnographies of Berlin, and Israel and Palestine.

1.3 <u>Method and Challenges</u>

This paper is a library dissertation. I have used a variety of interdisciplinary resources, including political science, history, geography, archaeology, sociology, literature, poetry, film, internet and print media, non-governmental organisational and human rights reports, and law reports, as well as anthropological theory and ethnography.

The rise of the reflexive school in anthropology (Clifford and Marcus 1986, Fardon 1990) has meant a growing realisation of the fact that an ethnographer never just records but constructs that which she writes about. Thus an awareness of one's own positionality is of great importance in all anthropology. The problematics of my positionality have been slightly different in the two ethnographic examples presented here, those of Berlin, and Israel and Palestine.

The history of the division of Berlin, manifested in the Wall from 1961 to 1989, is also a history of one of the fronts of the Cold War between communism and capitalism. Throughout the West, there has been a feeling that in 1989 the capitalist system 'won' the Cold War, and had thus been historically proven to be the normal, natural course of social evolution. This has shaped and structured the unification process in Germany, politically, legally, and socially, and the asymmetrical process wherein West German social forms have generally dominated the Eastern has been a source of much discontent in the former GDR. Academic approaches that echo the exoticisation of the East, and depict it as the deviant 'other' to the West contribute to the problem of the continuing politics of difference in unified Germany. I have thus felt it was important for me to take into account my positionality as a Westerner, raised in a capitalist society, and I have endeavoured to be aware of my biases in the narration of the case material.

The challenges facing the ethnographer of Israel and Palestine are perhaps even greater. The situation is highly politicised, and to pretend to a neutral view would be unrealistic (as indeed for any ethnography). This problem manifests itself doubly, through my own biases and through those of my sources. As Bowman writes, 'Israeli and Palestinian scholars tend themselves to be foot-soldiers in the nationalist struggle and as a result the substantial bodies of available academic work on the area and its situation tend to be either openly or covertly partisan. This provides a serious methodological problem' (1998: 800).

The problems conducting ethnography in highly politicised situations of violence and conflict extend also to issues of ethical representation. As Nordstrom and Martin point out,

anthropologists and other social scientists are confronting the challenge of portraying violence without encouraging or rationalizing it. We are, as Michael Taussig (1987) has suggested, searching for a position from which we can speak and write against repression… what ethnographic voice do responsible researchers give to the perpetrators and to the victims of socio-political violence? (1992: 3)

Again, I have tried to be conscious of my constraints as someone who does has never been involved in conflict and is inexperienced in the workings of violence. I have sought to interrogate my own political biases, and to be aware of those of my sources.

The rapidly changing situation in Israel and Palestine also presents a methodological challenge, as one tries to keep up to date with daily developments. The fact that the Wall in the West Bank is still relatively new, construction having been started in June 2002, means that there is very little academic work upon it yet (a notable exception being Glen Bowman's piece 'About a Wall' [2003]). I have therefore used much internet and print media, as well as the reports of humanitarian organisations, as my case material for this section.

The subject of my paper seems to lend itself perfectly to fieldwork, yet I have had neither the time nor the funding to conduct it. While I may defer from Michel Butor's comment of 1988, 'you have to touch the Wall to believe it is a reality' (Baker 1993: 719), I also accept that never having been to either Berlin or Israel and Palestine will also affect the ways in which I think about the Wall. I can only leave these expeditions to a later date, although I can truly say that researching these two ethnographies has inspired me to wish to travel to both field sites.

Figure 2 - 1989 - The 'fall' of the Berlin Wall.

1.4 <u>Overview</u>

The metaphor of construction is used to structure this paper. The two chapters of Berlin and Israel and Palestine are further divided into sub-sections; 'foundations', 'embodiment', 'deconstructions', and in the case of Berlin, 'remains and reconstructions'. This schema has the obvious benefit of suggesting the Wall itself, serving to remind us constantly that Walls are built and broken by human beings, at the quotidian and the state level, and are not to be reified into mythic structures with any sort of hegemony on meaning (even, perhaps, while they aspire to this). In post-structuralist theory, construction refers to the ways in which language create and define one's world view, through the provision of available categories of thought, and the practice of the critic who unravels these processes of the creation is deconstruction. Thus our schema assists in our task of assessing the relation between discourse and the empirical world, and in our unpicking of the various meanings of the Wall. However, the image of construction and deconstruction must not be taken to suggest clear chronological continuity. These stages overlap, or may come out of the order in which they are discussed here. For instance, metaphysical Walls are contested and deconstructed by some actors both before physical Walls are erected and long after they are demolished.

The foundations section on Berlin assesses the extent to which the division of Germany into the socialist East Germany (German Democratic Republic or GDR) and the capitalist West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany or FRG), and the rival attempts of these two states to construct different spatialities of East and West Germanness had been successful prior to the erection of the Wall in 1961, in order to see whether the Wall was a marker of social or political difference. The next section, on 'embodiment' of the Wall in Berlin, explores how the Wall created the social environments for the implementation of difference policies, and how it became embodied in the different habituses of East and West Berliners living under different systems. The extent to which East Germans were persuaded by the policies of the socialist state is also discussed. 'Deconstructions' investigates the extent of and capacity for resistance against the Wall, either directly upon it or through other less spatial practices. Finally 'remains and reconstructions' looks at what happened to the physical Wall after German unification in 1990, and discusses the concept of the *Mauer im Kopf*, the 'Wall in the head', which is held in Germany to still divide Easterners and Westerners.

The chapter on Israel and Palestine begins with a brief narrative of the historical context. 'Foundations' then traces the changing permeability of the geopolitical border of the Green

Line and of the social boundary between Israelis and Palestinians. The section on 'embodiment' comprises of a policy analysis of the security discourse of the Israeli government that justifies the Wall, while exploring alternative meanings of 'violence' and 'security'. 'Deconstructions' again analyses resistance to the Wall, and the way in which power and resistance must be seen to be simultaneously both 'local' and 'global'.

Finally, in the conclusion, I bring the ethnographic case studies together to approach 'an anthropology of the Wall'.

Figure 3 - Berlin Wall Graffiti - 'Missing you every day is a hard thing.. but you are..'

The Berlin Wall

2.1 Foundations

'The Foundations of the Wall were laid in late 1945…'
Baker 1993: 711

'Saturday night, August 12th, 1961, was like any other summery Saturday night in Berlin' (Merritt 1985: 3). People enjoyed the warm evening, visited relatives and friends in East or West, watched television at home, or enjoyed a beer in a local bar. Maybe they talked about politics a little more than usual – but this had been the case for weeks, months even, as every Berlin paper recorded the rising tension between the communist East and the capitalist West, as the East lost literally thousands of refugees daily through the open border at Berlin.

History dates the erection of the Berlin Wall to the early morning of the 13th August 1961. At 1.11am the East Berlin news agency flashed a bulletin to the world, and at 2.15am members of the East German security forces started to break up the pavements at the Friedrich-Ebert Straße with pneumatic drills; at the Potsdamer Platz concrete posts were put up along with rolls of barbed wire. By the evening the border was closed (Grant 1999). It was not actually until a few days later, 'when no effective Western retaliation materialised [that] they replaced the temporary barrier with a cement wall' (Craig, via Baker 1993: 713).

How had this situation come about, where it was possible to divide one city and one people with barbed wire and concrete? Firstly and foremostly, it must be recognised that the Berlin Wall was a product of the 'stalemate' phase of the Cold War; while neither side was prepared to budge from their position in Berlin, held since the division of the city between the Allied occupying powers at the end of the Second World War, nor was either side prepared to enter what could be a nuclear war in Europe. As Merritt states, 'the physical barriers that rose in the grey hours of that Sunday morning merely capped a process of division underway since World War II' (1985: 4). Such attitudes, decided at the highest levels of international diplomacy, were also felt to some extent by the everyday people of Berlin. However, while a political scientist such as Merritt may wish to explore the processes of alliance and conflict at the international state level, the anthropologist is concerned to trace the ways in which

> 'exralocal economic, political, and social processes intersect with the individual lives of people in a community, for it is "in the actions of individuals living in time and place" that these forces are embodied, interpreted, contested, and negotiated' (Berdahl 1999: 3, referencing Abu-Lughod 1991: 156).

In this case, the anthropologist is interested to trace the extent to which Berliners felt that the Berlin Wall 'merely capped a process of division'; how far Berliners felt divided by, or remained united despite, the Cold War and the differing social and political systems of East and West Germany. Thus we may approach the question of how the metaphysical foundations of the Berlin Wall were laid through the territorialisation of space and identity in the two Germanies[3] between 1949 and 1961, and suggest some answers as to whether the Berlin Wall's erection that summer night was to cement or to construct difference between Germans.

The anthropologist John Borneman is one of few (publishing in English) to have researched and written extensively on Berlin, having conducted fieldwork both before and after German unification. Borneman's focus has been predominantly on nationalism and identity formation. He states that;

> during the Cold War, these two states – autonomous, asymmetrical mirror images of one another – competed for legitimacy in signifying and representing the nation. They were involved in what Hegel (1953) called a "struggle to the death": seeking recognition (*Anerkennung*) of self without having to recognize the other in turn. Although publicly denouncing and threatening to overcome the social and territorial other, they were, in fact, intent on producing cultural difference – for the production of different nations was a precondition for their claim to legitimate statehood! (Borneman 1992a: 45)

The production of cultural difference, in this case, serves the state. It is thus the state – the Eastern GDR and the Western FRG – that is intent on creating a Wall through different meanings of being; being communist, being capitalist, being German. The state policies of 'othering', using the tools of education, manipulation of history, social institutions and other means of trying to instil a model of the perfect citizen, represent a modern approach to the control of populations. Individuals constitute themselves in terms of the norms through which they are governed, so that although '"imposed" upon individuals, once internalized, [these norms] influence them to think, feel and act in certain ways' (Lukes 1973: 15, via Shore and Wright 1997: 9). A citizen who has internalised the communist GDR norm, or the capitalist FDR norm, will thus 'self-govern', reducing the need for physical control by the state. (Most particularly, in this case, the good communist will not seek to flee the state for the capitalist 'other' via Berlin.) In this Foucaultian interpretation, the state wishes to conceal the working of its power and control by the production of a discourse – not what 'is true' but what 'counts as true' – that legitimises its political power and reduces the need for physical

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[3] Germany was divided into four areas of supervision after the Second World War; French, British, American and Soviet Union. Berlin, located in the Soviet Zone, was further divided into four Sectors. In 1949, as the Cold War mounted, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) announced itself as a state, followed a month later by that of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for the Soviet Zone.

coercion. As Foucault puts it, 'the role of political power… is perpetually to re-inscribe this relation through a form of unspoken warfare; to re-inscribe it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and every one of us' (1980: 90). Resistance to these meanings must therefore be seen as loyalty to older ways of classifying the world; an older 'habitus' (Bourdieu 1977).

One method through which the GDR attempted to create a discourse to 'other' and de-legitimise the FRG (while simultaneously legitimising itself) was through the means of classifying recent German history of National Socialism under Hitler, defining Nazism as the child of capitalism (through periodising it co-terminously with the growth of capitalism in Germany). 'By claiming that fascism is a problem of capitalism, and not necessarily of German history alone, the GDR universalised and abstracted the Third Reich' (Borneman 1992a: 51), thus absolving itself of guilt. This categorisation served to demonise the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the capitalist West generally. The success of the modern state depends, to an extent, upon the extent to which discourse is able to manufacture the appearance of truth, that is; the extent to which people will live their lives according to the norms produced by the dominant discourse. How far were these state discourses accepted by the German people, and did they really serve to manufacture loyalty to one or other state?

Borneman writes of the generation born around the time of the Second World War, who grew up in the GDR, and were educated and socialised under socialism, also of the generation before, struggling to come to terms with Germany's Nazi history and encouraged to comprehend the events of the twentieth century through the categories of 'fascist' 'capitalist' and 'communist'. He writes of an East German woman named Heidi, born in 1944, who 'fully identified with the perceived need to secure the border and protect the nascent state' (1998: 165) – and he emphasises that she was not alone in this. Similarly, Funder (2003) records the story of an intelligent young woman, Julia, who in the 1960s felt that the need to protect the economy of East Germany through restricting escape to work in the West under capitalism was a legitimate action for the state to take until working socialism was fully established.

> 'I wanted to explain to people overseas about the GDR – that Communism was not such a bad system. I didn't want to leave. We watched a lot of western television and I knew about unemployment, about homelessness, about hard drugs. And prostitution – prostitution! I mean how is it people think they can just buy a person? That was incredible to me' (2003: 97).

Julia's words remind us of what is often forgotten in the West; the benefits of living in the GDR. Almost total employment, crime-free streets, massive state support and infrastructure

providing free crèches, health and education, and subsidised social services such as transport and some accommodation (Berdahl 1999, Glaeser 2000, Funder 2003). They also indicate the extent to which the GDR propaganda about the fascist West, the successor of Nazism, where the free market and a laissez-faire state had created a brutal world in which anything, or anyone, could be bought, were internalised by some Germans.

Finally however, one must question the success that the GDR and the FRG attained in 'the production of different nations' in the period before 1961. Those who 'believed' in the communist system and state were forced to do so by ignoring its negative aspects, and suspending their belief to a future utopia. Some feeling of difference in political affiliation and social organisation had not overridden a sense of 'Germanness' in the population of Berlin. As Barth pointed out, there may be quite significant differences between members of one ethnic group, yet they still identify together due to the fact that the practices that mark the *boundary* are ones that they share (1969). For the Germans, sixteen years of being encouraged to construct history, belonging or social values differently had not interfered with a shared sense of culture, nation or language, for as Borneman points out, 'belonging to a nation, or nationness, is after all more a set of practices than an official image or self-representation' (1993: 289). While German standards of living may have been diverging somewhat, as Westerners grew richer, had more choice and consumerism, and Easterners' standards of living deteriorated and became more monochrome due to a lack of product variety, they still enjoyed the same practices – as shown in the first paragraph of this analysis: on the night of the 13th August, Easterner and Westerner alike were engaged in similar pursuits.

The fact that the GDR was forced to build the Wall at all demonstrates that many people did not hold allegiance to the East German state, an East German identity, or communist ideology, as they chose in their thousands to flee the state for West German wealth and freedom, where they were welcomed as the state's own people. The resort to what constitutes mass imprisonment indicates a failure on the part of the state's discourse to convince, to manufacture legitimacy as the 'true' Germanness, or as superior to capitalism, and for citizens to constitute themselves accordingly.

Reactions to the physical erection of the Wall show that its mental foundations did not go very deep. The people who desperately tried to escape in the first days and weeks after the Wall went up gave a new meaning to the 'anti-fascist protection barrier' – an image of state coercion, division and forced control, a divide resisted and rejected by many Easterners. In East and West, Berliners took to the streets in solidarity, protesting against separation. East

German demonstrations were smaller than in the West, due more to the fear of reprisal than to a support of division. But the shouts of the 400 people who did gather speak for themselves; 'And you call yourselves Germans? We demand free elections! Berlin has always been united..' (Ross 2004: 33).

The Wall was not an embodiment of difference between the German peoples of East and West, but an embodiment of a power relation between those two states, in particular, 'an increasing asymmetry in economic power' (Borneman 1992b: 4), but also an imbalance in the persuasiveness of the states' rival discourses. The imbalance in economic power and thus in living standards undermined the GDR's attempt to manufacture new loyalty to a Communist East German identity over a more general 'Germanness'. The Wall thus represents a power relation between East and West, but also a crack down on internal resistance; restricting the space for protest. As Borneman states, the Wall was built by East Germany 'to provide a protected space for its utopian experiment' (1992b: 4). The concretisation of power in the Wall as a means of controlling space and movement also necessarily shifts and reconfigures resistance, both to the regime and to the discourse of difference and separation. In the next section, the ways in which the physical presence of the Wall embodied and changed meanings in East and West Germany will be explored.

Figure 4 - 'The Leap to the West' – a news picture taken shortly after the first barbed wire fences went up between East and West Berlin, that quickly caught the international imagination and was shown around the world. This young Eastern soldier was caught on camera escaping to the West while it was still possible to do so in this way.

2.2 <u>Embodiment</u>

> *'I've noticed the same ignorance in Dresden or Leipzig; the further you are from the border, the more casually each half-people imagines itself whole. In response to the question of what it is like to live in a city surrounded by concrete and barbed wire, I've long since come to answer like most Berliners: I really don't see the Wall anymore, even if it is the only structure on earth, apart from the Great Wall of China, that can be seen from the moon with the naked eye.'*
> **Peter Schneider 1984: 7**

It has been argued that the Berlin Wall did not cement pre-existing difference between East and West Germans in 1961. Therefore, the 'embodiment' of this section is not of pre-existing difference in the shape of a Wall (but, originally, of political conflict at the state level). In 1989, as the grip of Communism weakened in Eastern Europe and East Germany, Germans in Leipzig and East Berlin spearheaded a peaceful revolution, leading to German unification in 1990. Yet, as soon as 1993, Borneman was able to write,

> the slogan *'Wir sind das Volk'* ('We are the people') which in the fall of 1989 had evoked so much *Verbruderung* (fraternal sentiment) in rallying the people to unite against the leadership, had become somewhat of an embarrassment… Moreover, the perception of a distinct *Ossi* and *Wessi*[4] is now as taken for granted as was the prior assumption of a single *Volk*' (1993: 288).

The section on 'embodiment' thus explores how these two different identities were created, even while *at the same time* people were resisting categorisation as Easterner and Westerner and proclaiming their unity. 'Embodiment' is, in this case, the process through which the Wall became embodied in Berliners, forming different habituses in East and West; how it shaped spatial meanings of identity.

Tate has written that the difference that became apparent between Germans after 1989 was 'the inevitable consequence of the radically different forms of socialisation practiced in the two postwar German states' (2001: 5). These 'radically different forms of socialisation' comprise a continuation of the mission of the two German states described in 'Foundations'; 'producing cultural difference – for the production of different nations was a precondition for their claim to legitimate statehood!' (Borneman 1992a: 45). Now, however, the East German state had created conditions in which it could push through reforms intended to reach a state of true socialism, as it had greater capacity to control its citizens. It was also felt that living and working in a truly socialist society would itself create loyalty to the regime, thus, in a circular logic, it was of great importance that these socialist reforms were to be implemented

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[4] Slang post-unification terms for Easterner and Westerner.'

(Merritt 1985: 203). The importance of the Wall both *as* policy and as a means of *implementing* policy must be investigated as the main way in which the two German states tried to create different identities and loyalties in their people in the years between 1961 and 1989. As Shore and Wright ask, 'how do policies 'work' as instruments of governance, and why do they sometimes fail to function as intended?.. How do policies construct their subjects as objects of power, and what new kinds of subjectivity or identity are being created in the modern world?' (1997: 1).

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between life on the Eastern and the Western sides of the Berlin Wall was the level of direct state intervention in or management of the lives of its citizens. In East Germany, the state reached into almost every singe aspect of life, from work to social services to free time to living arrangements. In all of these areas, the presence of the Wall worked to limit outright social dissent, enabling the GDR Government to push through Communist reforms that had been failing pre-1961 due to mass emigration. For instance, strong opposition had meant that collectivisation of agriculture had been impossible before the border closure. Despite continuing unpopularity, 'the collective agricultural system was finally stabilized in the mid-1960s' (Ross 2004: 38).

Collectivisation of agriculture was accompanied by a drive to increase the industrial production of the GDR, in line with Communist ideology. The discourse of glorification and importance of work did have some persuasive power, as testified by the words of those who were shocked by the unemployment that came after unification; one East German woman told ethnographer Daphne Berdahl; 'For our understanding [unemployment is] the worst thing there is. We were raised to be socialists, and we were taught that work is what separates humans from animals.' (Berdahl 1999a: 199). The importance of labour in the GDR state was reflected in the level of social activity arranged around it, as the state sought to supplant the private sphere. The workplace was often also the location of a crèche, clinic and shop, and sometimes also a community centre or meeting place; it was 'thus not only the centre of everyday sociality, it was also a symbolic space of community and national belonging' (Berdahl 1999: 194). Thus the political and economic need of the GDR state to increase productivity, and therefore improve living standards, in order to convince its population of the inherent superiority and worth of socialism coincided happily with the socialist rhetoric of 'strength through work', and policy was couched in that discourse. Despite some popular absorption of such socialist ideals however, industrial production remained low in East Germany, partly due to remaining labour shortages, and partly to the lack of worker incentives resulting in foot dragging. This was reflected in lower wage levels and a lower

standard of living than in the West, where the policies of market capitalism had been economically successful (Ross 2004: 35).

Again we see the coincidence between economic policy and socialist party rhetoric in the GDR's policy towards women, which was;

> 'oriented, from the start, not only to integrating women fully into the labor force, but also to advancing them into the ranks of skilled labour… On the other hand, West German policy was structured around using women as a reserve labor pool and sending them back to the home when no longer needed' (Borneman 1992b: 59).

This had a major impact on social life in the East, as a much greater number of women worked than in the West. Concurrently, the social system in the East was geared toward providing the structural conditions necessary to enable women to work, including extended pregnancy leave and state-subsidised day-care activities in virtually every city (Bleiker 2000: 43). Women were also afforded extensive reproductive rights in East Germany, holding exclusive authority to decide on the termination of a pregnancy up to twelve weeks, unlike the law in West Germany (Bleiker 2000: 43). Borneman notes also that East Germany 'opened the educational system to women a generation before the West German regime did' (1998: 162). Despite the recognition that 'the East German society was strongly influenced by traditional patriarchal values' (Bleiker 2000: 44), and of course the negative impact of the ever-present restrictions on social freedoms such as dissent or free speech, most analysts agree that women in East Germany held more personal independence and equality in work and social life with men than their counterparts in the West.

The GDR state also organised activities to entertain people's free time. Youth in particular were targeted, through the establishment of the Free German Youth (for ages fourteen to twenty-four) and the Young Pioneers (for ages six to thirteen) in 1946 and 1948 respectively. While many parents were initially reluctant to see their children in uniform and neckchiefs again so soon after the Nazi period, (Funder 2003: 165) in fact membership in the state-run youth groups quickly expanded. In 1961 Free German Youth members made up 50.3% of all youth; by 1978 they totalled 69.9% (Borneman 1992b: 163). These youth groups were used for the promulgation of Marxist philosophy, community spirit and the production of loyal socialists. In contrast, youth groups in West Germany were not organised by the state and lacked an official ideological slant.

A socialist emphasis on the importance of the proletariat resulted in a much greater inclusion of children from working class backgrounds in the East than in the West. In 1967 38.2% of children in advanced schools and technical colleges were of working class origin, compared

to 5.7% in West Germany; working class East Germans 'tended to acknowledge that they benefited in their life trajectories from these affirmative action – or, minimally, class-neutral, - programs. Without the official programs, they said, they would never have had access to higher education.' (Borneman 1992b: 166). The demographics of East and West Germany were changed by this diversification in access to education.

One of the more visible differences between life in East and West Germany was the absence of a consumer society in the GDR, due to the Communist ideology of 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs' (Marx 1874), and due also to lower wages and standards of living in the East. Moran records how East Berliners entering the West in 1989 for the first time were 'staggered by the casual opulence… Western visitors to the East were equally disoriented by the discovery of another country with… wide avenues with few cars, the empty shops, and the grimy buildings' (2004: 226). The inability of the Wall to stop Western media such as television and radio from reaching the GDR meant that many Easterners were highly aware of this gap in living standards, and it comprised an additional source of dissent against the regime. Perhaps most emblematic is the Trabant, the only car model available in East Germany, manufactured and supplied by the state. People waited on lists for years and years for a Trabant, which when it arrived was an erratic, fuel-hungry and highly polluting automobile, in marked contrast to the powerful and reliable cars being produced in the West under the impetus of market competition. (Berdahl 1999a: 196).

The different societies, and 'different forms of socialisation practices' (Tate 2001: 5) in East and West, were perceptible down to the smallest level. In the film *Goodbye Lenin!* (2002) the East German protagonists buy new clothes as soon as the Wall falls, getting rid of their acid-wash blue jeans, standard issue shoes and plain, stout jackets. West Berlin writer Peter Schneider in 1984 even wrote of a particular East German smell; 'fuel mix, disinfectants, hot railroad tracks, mixed vegetables, and railroad terminal' (1984: 12). Yet in the same work he also writes of the experience of seeing Berlin from the air, and 'the duplication of public landmarks.. [that] prefigures a city in which the same taste has brought forth the same things twice' (1984: 4). We may read into his statements the strange mixture of identification felt by East and West Berliners in the 1980s, of being fundamentally the same, and yet fundamentally different.

In September 1961, East German Chancellor Ulbricht wrote to Khruschev that;

> … the West-orientation has been shattered and there is no longer any alternative but to orient
> oneself towards the workers-and-peasants-regime in the GDR and towards the socialist camp.
> Those who had been hoping for the reunification of Germany through some inconceivable

agreement between the Four Powers or 'concessions from both sides' were now forced to draw some conclusions on these matters. (via Ross 2004: 40)

After 1961, a more conformist culture did develop in the GDR, as the two protest options of 'exit' and 'voice' (Hirschmann 1993: 173-202) were effectively removed through the closure of the border and the ever-watchful eye of the East German Secret Police, the Stasi. However, Ulbricht's confidence that people would truly orient themselves 'towards the workers-and-peasants-regime.. and the socialist camp' was misplaced. Socialist rhetoric and policy could not undermine the existence of continuing economic hardship, the awareness of a different way of life on the other side of the Wall, dissatisfaction with the authoritarian measures of the Stasi and the state, and a continuing grievance against the separation from family, friends, and the other half of the 'German nation'. Ultimately, the GDR policy of containing its population behind the Wall and trying to control them through socialist propaganda and immersion was unsuccessful. People continued to dissent throughout the era of the GDR, eventually resulting in the revolution of 1989.

However, what the policies did achieve was a diversion of the two societies. How did this situation occur, considering that people were not wholly convinced by the state's policies? As Shore and Wright point out, 'policy increasingly shapes the way individuals construct themselves as subjects. Through policy, the individual is categorized and given such statuses and roles as 'subject', 'citizen', 'professional', 'national', 'criminal' and 'deviant'. From the cradle to the grave, people are classified, shaped and ordered according to policies, but they may have little consciousness or control over the processes at work.' (Shore and Wright 1997: 4). Thus, while dissenting from some of the aims and ideals of the state, people in East Germany were nevertheless the subject of its policies, and the available social categorisations and judgements developed accordingly – just as in West Germany the people were the subject of the FDR's policies and philosophies of market capitalism, economic progress and individualism as the norms of being.

Bourdieu's concept of the habitus can help us to mediate between the two polarisations of total belief in and total dissent from the normative model of society promulgated by the dominant group – in this case the SED party in control of the state. The habitus is 'the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations.. [which] produces practices' (Bourdieu 1977: 78). It operates at an intermediate level, between an individual's choice to abide by social 'regularities' (or rules, or dominant discursive constructions of the norm), and our intuitive compulsion to do so. The habitus concerns rituals of everydayness 'embodied' in the individual, by which a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own

obviousness. Thus, for Bourdieu, action is always informed by a *sense* of agency, yet the motivations for action are structurally determined.

Moran writes that

> Western visitors to the city were often surprised at the quotidian mundanity of the Wall, at the fact that this concrete eyesore with death strips, watchtowers and armed guards could exist side by side with ordinary shops and offices. Although this was partly to do with the accidental way in which the Wall cut across the most routine activities of Berlin life, it is also clear that the Wall was made possible by its integration into these daily routines. (2004: 221)

The way in which the presence of the Wall structured social life in East and West Germany created different habituses on different sides of the Wall, through the routines of everyday life that were affected by its physical presence and by the social institutions and policies it enabled. Through its 'integration into these daily routines' the Wall became embodied in the habitus of Berliners, and thus (to an extent) was 'made possible' as it structured not just the city but the available ways of living and thinking. Moving away from Moran slightly however, it is worth noting that a vital bastion of the Wall was the support of the USSR. Once this support was withdrawn in Gorbachev's principle of 'new thinking' (recognising explicitly that each nation had the right to determine its own policies) (Bleiker 2000: 34), as Habermas described it; 'the presence of large masses gathering in squares and mobilising on the streets managed, astonishingly, to disempower a regime that was armed to its teeth' (1990: 7).

Habitus allows the individual to dissent as it combines, 'on the one hand, the historical and cultural production of individual practices – since contexts, laws, rules and ideologies all speak through individuals, who are never entirely aware that this is happening – and, on the other hand, the individual production of practices, since the individual always acts from self interest.' (Webb *et al* 2002: 21). The habitus may thus be understood as the physical, unconscious learning of the social structures; the visible results perhaps of the Foucaultian model referenced earlier; 'the role of political power… is perpetually to re-inscribe this relation through a form of unspoken warfare; to re-inscribe it in… the bodies themselves of each and every one of us' (1980: 90). It has already been indicated that Berliners resented the Wall. What practices did they engage in that registered this dissent, that resisted official state discourse, and how did this contribute to toppling the Wall?

2.3 <u>Deconstructions</u>

' "studying through": tracing ways in which power creates webs and relations between
actors, institutions and discourses across time and space'
Shore and Wright 1997: 14

GDR state discourse held that the Wall was a contribution to world peace, 'a foundation stone for the success of our policy of relaxation and peaceful co-operation' (Honecker, secretary of the national defence council and later president of the GDR, via Baker 1993: 713). In SED (East German Communist Party) rhetoric, the Wall was an 'anti-fascist protection barrier' (Flemming 2000: 16), not to keep Easterners in, but to keep the Western influence out. On the first anniversary of its construction, the SED Party paper announced that, 'now that a year has passed, we can establish that the protection wall that we built against the aggressors has proved itself to be tenable and has secured the peace' (Baker 1993: 713).

Yet the fact that the guards who held the Wall faced inwards towards East Berlin, and that it was East, not West, Berliners who were prevented from crossing or even approaching the Wall, gave the lie to the claim that the Wall was to keep the East safe from the West. Although the social structures enabled by the Wall's presence did have an effect on the habituses of East Berliners, they were not convinced by all party rhetoric or by the regime's claim to authority. In this section the ways in which Berliners registered their protest are explored, both against the Wall's structure, and against the social structures that it created. The Wall is a physical manifestation of GDR state policy and attempts to control people. It thus makes power visible, tangible, manifest in a particular location. This raises interesting questions regarding the spatialisation of the practices of resistance that worked to destroy – or deconstruct – the Wall. Is resistance the undergrid of power, or does resistance seek to 'occupy, deploy and create alternative spatialities from those defined through oppression and exploitation' (Pile 1997: 3)? Answering these questions involves interrogation of such concepts such as the 'local'/'global' division and anthropological theories on the nature of power and resistance.

The first way one imagines resistance to the Wall is through acts that sabotage the its very physical presence, and its hegemony on meaning as blank barrier, such as climbing/escaping it or painting it. Although the number of people trying to escape over the Wall fell and levelled out after the mid- 1960s and most East Berliners developed a philosophy of '*bequemes Schweigen* (convenient silence, or keeping quiet for an easy life)' (Moran 2004:

217), the fact that people continued to try to escape shows a continued refusal to accept the Wall as a legitimate division, as well as reflecting the harshness of life in the GDR.

Some other breaches of the Wall testify to Berliners' refusal to accept the new spatialisation of their city into separate parts. Peter Schneider records the story of *Der Mauerspringer*, the Wall jumper, an otherwise ordinary West Berliner who obsessively registered his individual protest at the building of the Wall by climbing over it whenever he felt like it, without a care for the obvious risks of being shot or blown up, enjoying the fuss of being arrested and then released again, finally becoming an equal embarrassment to authorities on both sides (1984). Another true story in Schneider's *Der Mauerspringer* tells of three East Berlin teenagers who ingeniously found a way of getting out over their side of the Wall, but only so that they could nip across to see the latest films showing in West Berlin's cinemas. They had no notion of escaping, quietly making their way back home after each outing and then wondering what the fuss was about when they too finally got arrested (1984). Such stories show the resilience of Germans in continuing to conceptualise Berlin as one city despite years of separation. Further, they show a refusal to accept the Wall physically or ideologically, or its capacity to stop them living their lives as they wished.

The Wall was the central emblem of the Cold War, and thus also stood as an emblem of the regime that had built it. Therefore to graffiti the Wall was perhaps the ultimate act of sabotage, inscribing visible and permanent protest. This was not an act that was open to those in the East, who were unable to even approach the Wall that the Westerners faced, from 1973 being held back by a barbed wire fence, an easterly Wall, and a 'death strip' with trip wires, observation towers, lighting and guard dogs, before they reached the westerly Wall (Baker 1993: 716). Being able to paint the wall was one of the ways the 'absolute, insurmountable barrier' became an art gallery to Westerners, and performing the act was a way for them to show solidarity with Easterners. Although some graffiti was done on the early faces of the Wall, this tended to be relatively simple and unsophisticated; for example 'GDR = KZ' (concentration camp) (Waldenburg 1990: 11). It was the popularisation of the spray can that revolutionised graffiti on the Wall, from the early 1980s onwards creating the wildly coloured surface that is remembered in the Western world today (Waldenburg 1990: 12). 'Overcoming the Wall by painting the Wall' was the crucial ambition of much of the graffiti, as the name of an exhibition at the Checkpoint Charlie museum in 1984 indicates (Baker 1993: 721). The final, blank ugliness and hegemony on meaning presented by the ultimate signifier of the Wall's militarised face could be transformed – deconstructed – by the act of making it into a backdrop for other signs; signs of protest, of resistance. As Guarini elegantly suggests; 'what

was denied in the East was expressed in graffiti in the West – playfulness, fantasy, poetry, dreams, irony, jest. In short, liberty' (1991: 8). (See Plate 2).

In 1986 a group of expelled East German dissidents painted a white line several kilometres long through the middle of the graffiti-covered Wall (Baker 1993: 721). The white line symbolically wiped out the transformation of the Wall into a brightly decorated art gallery, chastising those who treated the Wall as a tourist attraction when people were suffering on the other side. By 1988, the white line had disappeared under new layers of paint (Waldenburg 1990: 13), creating a palimpsest of contested meaning. One important point that this raises is that there is and was no 'community opinion' – of East and West Berliners, Germans, Europeans, socialists or capitalists, or artists, historians, or anthropologists. Nevertheless, these terms are used as shorthand for common or majority opinion of that community. Although this division frustrates analysis, it does make a case for 'discord value', which will be discussed later (see 'Remains and Reconstructions').

As already indicated, to graffiti the Wall was not an option open to East Germans. Nor should it be underestimated how dangerous and difficult it was to try to cross the Wall – 189 people were killed trying to do so in the twenty-eight years that it stood (Flemming 2000: 14). On a metaphorical level, escape and graffiti may stand for the options of 'exit' and 'voice' which had been denied East Germans by the closure of the border and the harshness of the police regime in the GDR (c.f. Hirschmann 1993: 173-202). The capacity for open protest in the GDR was almost non-existent, due to the constant surveillance and the brutality of the Stasi (Funder 2003). Despite this, as Borneman points out, the notion of 'totalitarianism – of complete state regimentation of everyday life – … is inadequate to account for the complexity of experience in the GDR… It omits the intricate tactics of resistance and evasion, complicity and secrecy that characterized (in uneasy combinations and alterations) the everyday life of the people' (1992b: 164). How did people register this protest more subtly, away from the site of the Wall as symbol of the regime? Following Scott (1985), it is more productive in the case of the GDR to search beyond the grander gestures of resistance (the attempted escapes, the 1989 revolution) and focus upon the *everyday* forms of resistance; foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage; the 'weapons of the weak' (1985: xvi).

There were numerous symptoms of discontent and subtle opposition in the factories ranging from 'a wave of alleged industrial sabotage in the third quarter of 1961 to an increase in "Blue Mondays" and unauthorized breaks' (Ross 2004: 36). In fact, opposition in the factories was so strong as to often undermine the reforms that were being implemented. Factory floor

pressure and the unwillingness of supervisors to lose valuable workers led to new campaigns being 'largely gutted by a plethora of informal deals at the factory level' (Ross 2004: 27). This indicates the extent to which methods such as foot-dragging, dissimulation and sabotage can be highly successful as a mode of protest against unwanted reforms, as workers try to 'avoid claims on their surplice and defend their rights to the means of production' (Scott 1985: xiv). Such actions indicate not just a 'local' protest against hard work, but a 'larger' one against the very economic system in the GDR, the social structure held up by the Wall.

There has been much debate within anthropology on the extent to which one may separate the 'local' and the 'global', challenging traditional anthropological thinking which constructed the 'local' as the original, centred, natural, authentic and as opposed to the new, external, artificially imposed and therefore inauthentic 'global'. For instance, Peter has pointed out that 'global' media are a constitutive part of 'local' lived experience, thus collapsing the distinction (1999: 75-92). While a Wall may seem to be the ultimate statement of cutting off the local from the global and creating a discrete, literally bounded community, in fact closer analysis of the various relations of power that supported and contested the Berlin Wall demonstrate the opposite. For example, the GDR state was never able to prevent its citizens watching western television and media and maintaining links with the outside world that way. Even the seemingly ultimately 'local' act of physically writing on the Wall can not be reduced to one part of the local/global binary; much of the graffiti on the Wall was in English, the work of internationals wanting to inscribe their protest at the division of the city and the world into two blocks, or even just wanting to record their name on a central emblem of the late twentieth century.

Remembering Abu-Lughod's caution against romanticising resistance, we must be aware that not all graffiti can be interpreted as a political statement. Further, when trying to differentiate between the 'resistant' and the 'non-resistant' inscriptions, one realises that there is a fundamental methodological challenge in the task of recognising resistance, in a graffito or in any act. We must be wary of attributing protest simply because we wish to find it, and concede that the anthropologist cannot always know the meaning of a practice.

The fall of the Wall in November 1989 must similarly be interpreted as a deconstruction of the division between local and global. The Wall was contested for the full twenty-eight years that it stood. It was resisted by West Germans and the capitalist Western world in general as a threat to the system, and as a prison enclosing Germans against their will and violating their human rights. It was overtly or covertly resisted by many or most East Germans for the economic and social constraints under which it forced them to live. It was supported by SED

party that controlled the state apparatus, by the Stasi and other elites who benefited from the power structure, such as the police, the judiciary, the academia. Most powerfully perhaps, it was supported as a socialist state by the military might of the USSR. It was the détente in the Cold War and the change in Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev that undermined the foundations of the Wall. The Wall first started 'crumbling' not in Berlin at all, but in Hungary in September 1961, as 15,000 GDR citizens fled socialism through the newly open border to Austria (Bleiker 2000: 35). No longer able to control its citizens with the closed border, the Wall's presence became a farce. Demonstrations in Leipzig and Berlin gained in numbers and force. On the 9th November GDR spokesperson Schabowski announced that citizens could 'cross the border'. As word spread, thousands massed at the Wall, and the bewildered guards could do nothing else but let them through (Baker 1993: 719). Media images of Berliners dancing upon and hacking at the Wall spread around the world. Resistance to the Wall cannot be defined as spatially fixed, but worked both upon the concrete site of power itself, and also found other spaces for expression. Thus while the 'strategy' of the GDR state may have been to control the spaces of domination, the 'tactics' of East and West Germans, and of international actors, sought to create their own spaces within and through this power grid; upon the wall, in the factory, through a thousand and one acts of personal resistance (de Certeau 1984).

The Berlin Wall is often, almost routinely, evoked as the 'symbol of the Cold War'. This image, while speaking loudly to Berliners living in a city divided between communism and capitalism, also reminds us of the way in which the 'local' reality of the Berlin Wall had 'global' significance as a front in a war between two conflicting world systems, demonstrating the supra-local meaning and significance of the Wall. This significance is pointed to by the fact that the Cold War is marked to have ended on the 10th November 1989, the day the Wall 'came down'. Yet on this date the physical Wall was still standing, it was simply that the previously restricted East Berliners were now free to cross the border. The symbolic meaning of the Wall as the closed border and emblem of division was greater than its physical presence as a pile of bricks.

Ironically, this turned out to be doubly true in the months and years after the fall of the Wall, as Easterners and Westerners discovered differences between themselves that they had not anticipated, or had not expected to be socially divisive. As Glaeser has put it, 'the unification of Germany has effectively divided the country' (2000: 323). An anthropology of the Wall must seek to investigate how the Wall has changed the social terrain, even after its fall, as it searches to understand Walls as creating as much as marking existing difference.

Figure 5 - Modern Trabi revival enthusiast. Ironically, he is wearing a t-shirt saying 'Espanya' - a pre-1989 East Berliner could not easily have gone to Spain, and could never have worn a t-shirt with such writing on.

2.4 <u>Remains and Reconstructions</u>

The Wall, hacked to pieces by Berliners, tourists and 'wall-peckers' out to make fast money from the sale of pieces of the Wall, and more systematically destroyed by the new unified German government after 1990, disappeared with amazing speed. In 1993, Baker was already able to comment that 'less is left of the Berlin Wall than of Hadrian's Wall' – the Roman's ancient barrier in Northumberland (1993: 709). Where is the Wall now? Many of the grafiitied sections are on mantelpieces or in art galleries and museums around the world; one section declares 'CHANGE YOUR LIFE' to passers-by of London's Imperial War Museum, for instance. There is perhaps some irony in this, in that people painted the Wall in order to overcome it, yet it is those graffitied sections that have survived. Most of the Wall was ground down and used to build new roads, car parks and children's playgrounds (Moran 2004: 233), thus is in a way still forming part of the fabric of the city, still being used to structure it. In fact, 'the now invisible Wall still plays a key role in the spatial and cultural organisation of the city' (Gresillon 1999: 285) as Berlin continued to have two centres and nearly double the amount of theatres, dance studios, and music clubs than most metropolises.

How, whether, and where to erect memorials to the Wall, or to preserve sections to act as memorials, has been a highly contested process in Berlin (Dolff-Bonekamper 2002). While some argued that the Wall must be destroyed completely due to the suffering it caused to Berliners, others have made a case in favour of preservation of some sections in order to remember that very suffering, bringing to the fore many debates about the nature of the state in the GDR and how a nation is to come to terms with its history. Dolff-Bonekamper writes of the value of *'lieux de discorde'* (sites of dispute); 'a monument's capacity to create dissensus – or to make it visible – as a positive quality, a social value' (2002: 247). Thus the preserved sections of the Wall hold 'discord value', and may serve as ambivalent markers, existing to stimulate debate rather than consensus on the period of the Wall.

The near-invisible presence of the Wall – in the foundations of playgrounds, in the dual structure of the city, in the spaces left by the death strip and now re-worked into the largest promenade and cycle route of the city (see Plate 5), or the still deserted areas down by the old

railway station Güterbahnhof der Nordbahn between Mitte (East) and Wedding (West) – is mirrored by the continuing invisible presence of *der Mauer im kopf*, the Wall in the head. The longed-for unification of Germany brought with it the realisation that differences had developed between Easterners and Westerners. The 1990s even saw the coinage of a new term, *ostalgie*, meaning nostalgia for the *ost* - the East. What has prompted the rise of *ostalgie* and how does it work to recreate a Wall between Germans? How is it manifested? What relations of power and resistance have contributed to the fact that these spatialised identities have turned out to be salient as modes of categorising people in unified Germany? And finally, perhaps the most important question, how and when can the cleavage of German society along geographical lines be mended?

'Embodiment' explored the ways in which Easterners and Westerners developed different habituses due to the different social structures they lived under; the ways in which the Wall thus became embodied in people. These differences became apparent after unification. As one West German police officer said to ethnographer Andrew Glaeser,

> "At first I was simply euphoric about unification. But today? Now there are these deep gorges dividing East and West, it is awful. And I don't know how to get out of that either… the people here [East Germany] have just been programmed differently, and we [Westerners] have been programmed too, and these programs do not harmonize yet. As long as these programs don't harmonize, Germany will remain divided. Only once we will all work from the same basic programming will there be a feeling of unity" (2000: 1)

Reflecting people's growing awareness of division in German society, a veritable 'nostalgia industry' (Berdahl 1999a: 192) has grown up in the former GDR. People can go on 'GDR weekends', that involve drinking Eastern German beer in Eastern German country pubs, wearing old Eastern clothes and singing old socialist songs. People throw GDR parties, where guests come dressed in the uniform of the Free German Youth and drink old Eastern Club Cola in their cocktails, and play board games such as *Kost der Ost* ('Taste the East') and *Ferner Osten* ('Far East'), which require them to answer trivia questions about the old GDR (Berdahl 1999a). Perhaps most indicative is the revival in old Trabants, or 'Trabis'. The old East German car which was such a symbol of the lack of Eastern consumerism, market competition and general slow pace of life and inefficiency, has become a vehicle of cult status. Trendy young Easterners and Westerners alike now drive Trabis with jazzed-up paint jobs and souped-up engines to Trabi rallies on summer weekends (Moran 2004: 228). *Ostalgie* can be seen to rely upon a concept of the East as lagging behind the West, either in tongue-in-cheek Western formulations as the 'land that time forgot' or in more sentimental Eastern recreations of a vanished past.

Ostalgie however, in its material culture form and in more general nostalgic longings, can be seen to have a more bitter aspect than straightforward fashion kitsch. It represents an East German assertion of identity, 'proposing an alternative version of Germanness' (Berdahl 1999a: 204). This in turn is indicative of the 'fundamental asymmetry of unification' (Glaeser 2000: 7). At both the political and the socio-cultural level, the unification process privileged West German identity, law and concepts of the state over East. Unification was achieved through the accession of the 'five new *Lander'* to the FRG, rather than through the creation of a new constitutional assembly (Borneman 1993). This had significant effects for the working of law in the former GDR, as well as an effect on East German identity, as Easterners came to feel 'added on' rather than incorporated. As East German poet Volker Braun wrote, 'I'm still here, but my country's gone West' (via Tate 2001: 8).

The nature in which unification was managed, and the rapid westernisation of much of the East (with chain stores opening up and mass reconstruction work being conducted) reflected the feeling of the West that capitalism had 'won', had proved to be natural, right, rational, and the true course of German history. The effect of this was that it became very difficult for Easterners to assert their 'different' identity and have the positive aspects of life in the GDR, and the legitimacy of East German identity, recognised. The forty-five years of socialist rule in the East, and everything issuing from them, were depicted as an unsuccessful and regrettable deviation from the norm. One East German expressed his feelings post-unification, 'I wanted to show them that I also was somebody, that I knew something too' (Glaeser 2000: 16). In this context, expressions of *ostalgie* can be seen as resistance to Western dominance, and the hegemony of Western cultural forms. Understanding *ostalgie* as such, at least in some contexts, enables us to analyse it as a diagnostic of power, following Foucault's understanding of both power and resistance as multi-sited (1980). This assists us in identifying some of the workings of power at state and individual level in the process of German unification, and in understanding the durability of the *Mauer im kopf*.

The grievance felt due to the social and political asymmetry of unification has been compounded by various continuing problems in the former GDR. The imbalance in living standards between the East and the West has continued, as high rates of unemployment followed the dismantling of the huge state apparatus. This particularly affected East German women; in March of 1991, 55% of unemployed were women, and by the following year this had risen to 68%, in some areas even 77%. Among women over 55 years old, unemployment was three times higher than among men (Bleiker 2000: 42). For East Germans, men and women alike, unemployment was shocking, being something they had never suffered, and having been brought up in a socialist system that extolled the glory of work (Berdahl 1999a:

199). The dismantling of the state also resulted in the loss of services such as crèches and subsidies on housing that made life more difficult for East Germans. Yet the general attitude that there had been nothing good about the GDR made these feelings difficult to articulate, as did Easterners' own ambiguity about the state, remembering the repression and the poverty. While many Easterners felt disgruntled by Western arrogance and superiority, and by the loss of identity, social services and guaranteed employment, many Westerners felt that Easterners were ungrateful, helpless, and lazy, gobbling up the billions of marks channelled for aid and reconstruction to the five new *Lander* (Glaeser 2000: 6).

Thus a number of factors have contributed to the maintenance of the *Mauer im kopf*. Shock and surprise at the extent of cultural difference where it was thought that little or none existed, the contrast between the urban and cultural landscape in East and West, and the social, economic, legal and political problems of unification have led to stereotyping, prejudice, and a new Wall between *Ossis* and *Wessis*.   Most of all, perhaps, the spatialisation and heightened expression of German identities can be seen as a result of the imbalance of power between East and West Germany after 1990, as West Germany sought economic and cultural hegemony as the 'winner' of the Cold War.

Tate writes of 'optimism that the unification of German culture is now at last under way' (2001: 12). While Easterners and Westerners may have some striking differences in their 'lifeworld assumptions', it should also be remembered that they share many things in common, such as a language, much cultural heritage and much common taste in aspects of everyday lifestyle such as food or social activities, reminding us of Schneider's description of the still-divided Berlin as 'a city in which the same taste has brought forth the same things twice' (1984: 4). The rise in popularity of East German films such as *Goodbye Lenin!*, and *Am Kurzeren Ende der Sonnenalle*, and the literature of writers such as Christa Wolf, Wolfgand Hilbig and Christoph Hein, represents a growing interest in the individual experience of the East, particularly among the younger generation. One fourteen-year-old said in the first 'German-German Student Conference', 'I believe that the mental Wall is thicker among adults than among us' (Borneman 1998: 182).

Sixteen years after the fall of the physical Wall, and in the context of an improved East German economy, there may be a new willingness to avoid demonising the past, to recognise what was different in each state, and to acknowledge the validity of the other's point of view. At present, as Glaeser writes, 'Germany remains divided in unity. This does not mean that this division could not be overcome by decisive political commitment to equalize life-chances while acknowledging, ironically, that easterners and westerners are different' (2000: 350).

Ultimately, the destruction of the Wall in the head will depend upon the destruction of the economic Wall between the flourishing West and the flagging East, upon breaking down the cultural Wall that has held that East equals backwards, upon dismantling the discursive Wall that writes East German history out of the narrative of 'the nation'; in short, upon inclusion and equality between East and West Germans in all spheres of life.

Figure 6 - Contested meanings - mural of Gandhi and graffito by UK artist Banksy on the Wall are further graffitied on by others (Qalandia, checkpoint between Ramallah and East Jerusalem).

The Wall in Israel and Palestine

It would perhaps surprise many Westerners to know that the border between Israel and the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza was an open and fully permeable boundary, which could be crossed without permit or hindrance, right up until the early 1990s. As anthropologist Avram Bornstein has put it, 'anyone could just go get a job by taking a bus from Nablus to Tel Aviv' (2005: pers. comm.). Today this situation is drastically changed. Roadblocks, checkpoints, trenches, bulldozed roads, and blanket curfews make up a system of 'systematic blockade' (Bucaille 2004: 151). A highly complicated system of entry permits regulates who may cross the Green Line, as the border is known. And of course there is Israel's 'Security Fence', a Wall[5], in places;

> 'three times as thick and twice as wide as the Berlin Wall. It is surrounded at a distance by nests of barbed wire, rolled up like stacks of hay piled high around it. High voltage circuits run through the so-called "smart fences", three metres tall that line the perimeter of the barrier. Between the fence and the Wall is a trench, over two meters deep, studded with piercing metal spikes. Outside the smaller fence, the Israeli military has paved a path of finely ground sand that is groomed to make footprints visible. At certain intervals, there are 10 metre vertical steel poles housing highly powered stadium lights and surveillance cameras' (Rubin 2005: 1).

Like the Berlin Wall, this construction represents the ultimate marker of the spatialisation of identity, not as innate attribute of Israeli and Palestinian, any more than of East and West German, but as the result of a power struggle and of a 'difference-producing set of relations' (Ferguson and Gupta 1992:16). How did this change from open border to closed Wall come about, and what are its effects and implications for Israelis, Palestinians, and the peace process between them? In other words, how did the Wall arise, and how might it lead to or block routes to reconciliation? Answering these questions involves exploration of the social, economic and political process that has led to this point, of the discourses that legitimise separation, and of the practices that prepared for and implemented the mechanisms of segregation that have been installed thus far. However, an emphasis on the Wall as a particular outcome of relations of power demands that attention be given also to the

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[5] While the sematics of whether this should be called a 'Wall' or a 'Fence' are highly politicised (see Parry 2003), I shall use the term 'Wall', following the dictionary '**wall (n.) 1.** An upright structure of masonry, wood, plaster, or other building material serving to enclose, divide, or protect an area, especially a vertical construction forming an inner partition or exterior siding of a building', as opposed to '**fence (n.) 1.** A structure serving as an enclosure, a barrier, or a boundary, usually made of posts of stakes joined together by boards, wire, or rails' (Oxford English Dictionary). While the 'Security Fence' certainly does have sections that look like this, to call it a fence is to ignore the hundreds of kilometres of 8 metre high concrete blocks that make up much of its length.

discourses and practices that resist separation, and how these are *dis-* or *en*abled by the concretisation of division in the shape of the Wall.

Figure 7 - Palestinians carry a stretcher through a bulldozed field.

3.1 <u>Foundations</u>

> *'An anthropology of borders is simultaneously one of a nation's history and a state's frontiers'*
> **Donnan and Wilson 1998: 8**

This is, in some sense, an ethnography of the border between Israel and Palestine; between Israelis and Palestinians; how and where this has shifted, changed, rigidified, or been broken through unexpectedly. This account does, therefore, require a brief summary of Palestinian-Israeli history, contextualising the current situation, while recognising that the highly politicised situation 'on the ground', literally, makes the telling of history itself a political act, according to what narratives and viewpoints are foregrounded, intentionally or unintentionally.

The area known as 'historic Palestine' was under Ottoman rule until the reconfiguration of the Middle East in the aftermath of the First World War, becoming a British Mandate in 1917 (Bowman 2003: 322). Waves of Jewish persecution in Russia from 1881 led to rising Zionist immigration into the area throughout the 1880s and 1890s (Abu-Lughod 1971). In the wake of the Second World War and the horrific tragedy of the Nazi Holocaust, calls for the establishment of a Jewish state resulted in the UN partition plan of 1947 (Kimmerling and Migdal 1993). Between 700,000 and a million Palestinian refugees left the area, either in 1947 or predominantly during the fighting of 1948, and the areas that the UN partition plan had constituted Palestinian were annexed by various state players in the region. Thus when Israel declared itself a new state in 1949, no areas were left 'Palestinian'; the West Bank (of the Jordan River) being held by Jordan, the Gaza Strip by Egypt, and the remaining areas by Israel itself (Smith 2004). The 150,000 Palestinians remaining in Israel were given Israeli citizenship (they and their descendents now number approximately one million people, 20% of Israel's population [Said 2003: 48]).

Anderson (1981) has pointed out that 'nation' and 'nationality' are constructed concepts, 'imagined communities' created by territorialisation of group identities. For both Palestinians and Israelis, the following period is one of nation-building, ironically in the Palestinian case, as 'it was after the destruction of any shared 'Palestinian' existence that the idea of a Palestinian identity *per se* came into play' (Bowman 2003: 325). The construction of an innate and natural link to the land was vital in the nation-building discourse of both communities; the 'Zionist transformation of the land.. as national duty and privilege to

'redeem' the land' (Rabinowitz 1998: 155); and the memories of the Palestinian village and ancient agricultural tillage, a bucolic image used 'in the construction of a more self-conscious relationship to place and an attempt to reconcretize a connection to the land that had been violently sundered' (Bisharat 1999: 217; on the peasant as national signifier, see also Swedenburg 1990).

Israel's defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war resulted in a reconfiguration of the territory. The West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights were taken by Israel from Jordan, Egypt and Syria respectively (Buehrig 1971). International law deems these areas to be illegally occupied (Smith 2004: 197). It was during this period after 1967 and during the 1970s that Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) started to generate mass popular support, by providing 'a space of identification for all those who felt that their lives had been violated, disrupted and displaced as a result of Zionism's successes, by presenting its project as the inverse of that of the Zionist state builders' (Bowman 2003: 326).

The Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza strip did not gain Israeli citizenship in 1967, as had those of the conquered lands of 1948, but were issued with identification cards, resulting in 'a colour-coded bureaucracy that distinguished citizens from non-citizen residents' (Bornstein 2002: 206). Despite this distinction, Palestinians from the West Bank and from Gaza were soon able to enter Israel freely under 'General Entry Permits' that gave permission for classes of people (rather than individuals) to travel without individual permission. By the 1970s, as Selwyn reminds us, 'closure of the border remained only as a formal legal potential' (2000: 233).

'The geopolitical border is a uniquely modern form of social and economic control'
Bornstein 2002: 201

Edward Said described Israelis and Palestinians in 1999 as 'irrevocably intertwined demographically' (2005: 5). As indicated above, from 1968 the Israeli Defence Minister of the time, Moshe Dayan, pursued a policy of 'Open Bridges' for a permeable border between the territories and Israel (Kimmerling and Migdal 1993: 242). There were benefits of this policy for both Israel and Palestinians; Palestinians provided a cheap, reliable labour force for the Israeli economy, while themselves gaining much needed extra income as wages were higher than in the Territories. By 1987, approximately two-thirds of the Palestinian labour force commuted daily or weekly to employment in Israel; about 120,000 to 189,000 people (Selwyn 2000: 233). Due to the open border, this sector of the population learned to speak Hebrew and often formed and maintained good contacts within Israeli society.

In the twenty years after the 1967 war and before the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, there was a continual process of uneven development between Israel and the territories. While

> 'the inhabitants of the Territories were, at once, a pool of cheap labour, the second largest market for Israeli goods, and a source of resources… movement of goods and people was on strictly unequal terms, with Palestinian independence and control of resources strictly curtailed' (Selwyn 2000: 233).

A situation of Palestinian economic dependence on work in Israel was thus cultivated by the use of the border to control flows of goods and people. Further, since Israel held the Green Line, and indeed all land, sea and air ports in the land, Palestinian access to overseas markets was also under Israeli control. The border also provided a useful way of controlling workers through forcing them to go home at night – as Palestinians were forbidden to stay in Israel after a set time – and this contributed to their political exclusion as members of the polity (Bornstein 2002: 214). While the Green Line may be presented as an open border during this period, it still very much marked the division between Israeli citizens and non-citizens, and both defined and reproduced the difference in rights and status that this entails. Maintenance of the Green Line in this way enabled Israel to preserve its identity as a Jewish state, despite its large number of (disenfranchised) non-Jewish residents.

A social 'Wall' was maintained throughout this time, even while the geopolitical boundary was open and relatively permeable. Bucaille records the story of Ghassan, a young teacher from the Jabalya camp in the Gaza strip. Despite the drop in social status, he decided to seek work in a supermarket in Israel because the wages were higher, and the extra money would make it possible for him to marry;

> His boss provided lodgings, a small apartment that he shared with three other Palestinians from Gaza. They lived and ate together, with no women and no family anywhere near. They naked pinups on the walls bore witness to their sudden freedom. Ghassan assumed a new first name, with the full knowledge and encouragement of his Israeli co-workers. It was a typically Jewish name "so that the customers wouldn't be alarmed", he says. (2004: 81).

Ghassan's tale is standard; it tells of the increasing reliance of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories upon the Israeli economy, yet simultaneously of the lack of equality and social respect afforded to Palestinians and Palestinian culture within that society. More metaphorically, one can even read into Ghassan's name change a symbolic giving-up of the right for a non-Jew to be working and living in Israel, repressing Palestinian rights and privileging the Israeli.

'Walls' were created and maintained through social, legal and political barriers. Rabinowitz has explored the segregation of Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews in social organisation, even down to the level of nursery schools, in his ethnographies of the town of Natzerat Illit in central Israel (1997, 1998). While freedom of movement was generally unrestrained, a Palestinian of the Occupied Territories could not permanently relocate to live outside of the crowded centres of habitation of Gaza and the West Bank. He or she had the right to vote in municipal elections of the Occupied Territories, but not in the national ones of the Israeli state, constituting an exclusion from democratic representation within the 'democratic' state (Bucaille 2004: 21). Other measures introduced new distinctions between Israelis and Palestinians, in particular the policies of the new Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, who 'placed new burdens on economic life in the Occupied Territories in 1982, including restrictions on the entry of money from abroad, limitation on the acceptance of loans for public institutions, and the imposition of new taxes' (Bornstein 2002: 206). The taxes were a particularly sore point, as reflected in one of the slogans of the first Intifada; 'no taxation without representation!' (Bucaille 2004: 21).

In this context of uneven development and social stigmatisation, both symbolically and bureaucratically created through the use of the Green Line, antagonisms between Israel and the Palestinians increased. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 incited much anger, but perhaps the greatest source of grievance to the Palestinians was the continuing appropriation of land in the Occupied Territories to build Israeli settlements, annexing vast amounts of Palestinian land for houses and roads, and bringing with it increased military presence (Bornstein 2002: 206). It was in the context of the expansion of the settlements, the pressures on Palestinian life, and the uneven development taking place, that the *Intifada* broke out in December 1987.

As fear created a partial border along the Green Line, Israelis' approaches to the Territories became more cautious. Settlers and soldiers who continued to have an active presence were forced to withdraw behind security fences and armoured tanks as they became targets for stone throwers and worse. The civic aspect of the Intifada involved strikes and mass protests on the part of shopkeepers and the merchant class, thus a boycott refusing Israeli goods recreated an economic border also. Finally, there was an effort to create an internal unity through patriotism and the preservation of Palestinian culture (Bornstein 2002: 207). The violence of the repression of the Intifada worked to increase Palestinian 'othering' of Israelis, and rigidify the social boundary.

As Selwyn notes, 'many of the expressions of Palestinian resistance and Israeli response to it involved mobility and regulation of movement within the Territories' (2000: 233). The 'closure regime' consisted of an interrelated system of physical, legal and political measures. Between 1989 and 1991 a new permit system was set up to regulate Palestinian comings and goings on Israeli soil. Work permits, in particular, became stricter. However, the reduction of mobility affected all aspects of life, from education, to medical care, to family visits. Such measures were backed up by a system of road blocks and checkpoints, by trenches dug and roads bulldozed so that Palestinian access to the outside world was restricted to the roads governed by the Israeli army, or to illicit travel over fields and hillsides (see Plate 3, which shows Palestinians carrying a sick person on a stretcher across a bulldozed field near Nablus, as the road to hospital has been closed). Palestinians were forbidden to use the extensive network of by-pass roads built to connect the settlements to Israel, essentially implementing a system of total segregation in the Occupied Territories.

Jerusalem and Tel Aviv were first shocked by the terrible violence of suicide bombs in the early 1990s. However, the system of 'closure' was introduced before this, as Israeli journalist Amira Hass has researched; 'the closure regime was imposed on all Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank and has continued, without release, since January 1991. That's before Oslo, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and the suicide bombings in Israeli cities' (2003: 1). Yet, as restrictions on Palestinians mounted, and as violence against Israelis did too, 'open borders and free movement came to be associated in Israel with feelings of terror and vulnerability' (Selwyn 2000: 233).

By the early 1990s therefore, it can be argued that the socio-cultural, legal and political, and physical foundations of the Wall were already in place. Cultural differences between Jews and Arabs were marshalled and became salient due to competing claims on the land from the 1880s onwards, intensifying from 1948 and again from 1967. Pre-existing (but not therefore innate) cultural animosity was aggravated by the systematic inequality between Israelis and non-Jews leading to the first Intifada. The Wall's socio-cultural foundations thus lie both in pre-existing feelings of difference and in the development of the importance of difference due to the inequality of power and voice. Legally-politically, the origins of the Wall go back to the way in which the Green Line functioned to create uneven development and socio-political exclusion. Physically, the foundation's of today's Wall are rooted in the roadblocks and checkpoints of the closure system, and the ban on Palestinian use of Israeli roads, established as a reaction to the Intifada. Events since have been a continuation and an escalation of these policies. However, this is not to say that the Wall was already inevitable by the early 1990s. Progression since then must be analysed also.

It was upon this terrain of closure that, as a result of peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was created in the 1994 Oslo agreements. The Israeli army, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) withdrew from six major towns of the West Bank (3% of the land area), and cooperative Israeli-Palestinian control was established over a further 27% of the land area (Smith 2004: 403). However, the Palestinian areas were not contiguous; even apart from the physical separation of Gaza and the West Bank, the areas of Palestinian control in the West Bank itself were fragmented by the presence of the Israeli settlements established there over the past twenty years, and, not to be underestimated, by the network of huge concrete by-pass roads that connected the settlements to Israel (Smith 2004: 197). While the new system was presented as a move towards Palestinian autonomy, the non-contiguity of the PA areas, compounded by the fact that the Israeli army continued to control the borders of Palestine, fundamentally undermined the sovereignty of the nascent state. It still could not then, as now, hold responsibility for the movement of goods or people into or out of its areas.[6]

After the establishment of the PA, and the end of the Intifada, the system of 'closure' remained. In 1994, a fence was erected around Gaza, 'a precedent in the international history of territorial engineering that has gone surprisingly unremarked' (Selwyn 2000: 233), and an early manifestation of the Wall in the West Bank which has received so much international attention.

The system of 'closure' in the West Bank in the 1990s worked to put Palestinians in a position of vulnerability in the Israeli work market, as they were forced to cross illegally. In the early 1990s, while it was almost impossible for a Palestinian worker to obtain a permit to work in Israel, it was still relatively easy to cross the Green Line clandestinely in the hours before dawn. Nevertheless, the lack of a work permit meant that Palestinian labourers could be employed for the lowest wages, without a contract, and without guarantee of work rights, as they had no recourse to legal assistance or protection.

Under such conditions the border became gradually more permeable (illegally) throughout the 1990s. Bornstein describes two checkpoints near his fieldsite town of Tulkarm in the West

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[6] Most presciently, in 1994 a fence was erected around the entire Gaza strip. While obviously constituting an early manifestation of the Wall in the West Bank, developments in Gaza have (partly because of this very fence) been rather different to those of the West Bank. Deserving a dissertation of its own, the social and security situation in Gaza is not discussed in depth here, except so far as it has contributed to increasing anger against Israelis on the part of Palestinians.

Bank. One road connected a settlement and Israel, and was used predominantly by Israelis, while the other connected Tulkarm with an Arab Israeli town on the other side of the Green Line. It was common knowledge that you could not pass through the settlers' checkpoint without a permit, yet in full view of the soldiers Palestinians could pass around the side of the other. Bornstein uses this observation to conclude that

> 'anti-terrorism efforts were, at least before the new uprising, partly a performance for the Israeli public. The militarization of the border cannot always be explained by the super-exploitation of workers… border procedures are often the result of popular panic, encouraged by opportunistic politicians who turn rhetoric into real bureaucracies of violence.' (2002: 214-5).

In the West Bank, even today, checkpoints, roadblocks and the Wall do not prevent a determined suicide bomber from getting into Israel. But they do contribute to the further exploitation and undermining of Palestinians in the economy, and to a resulting growth in Palestinian poverty, despair and animosity towards Israelis. For Israelis, one effect of the fences was (as it is) to 'stir the imagination towards ever more elaboration notions of the 'persecuting other' and the desirability of permanent separation' (Selwyn 2000: 234). The symbolic security of the checkpoint reminds us of Taussig's observation that violence, especially at borders, works to conjure up the authorial power of the state (1992: 137-8); in this case, the protection of Zion.

A vicious cycle is created between exclusion of Palestinians from democratic and social inclusion in Israel, growing Palestinian anger and animosity reflected in rising attacks and violence towards Israelis, and mounting Israeli fear of the 'other' reflected in a determination to maintain Israel as a Jewish state. Bowman writes that 'every Palestinian has a border inscribed around him or her' (2004: 13). The maintenance and rigidification of the border, be it the political Green Line, a social boundary, or the gradual manifestation of the physical Wall must be understood as designed to 'protect' Israel, in two ways; through maintaining its existence as an exclusivist Jewish state by preventing the inclusion of several million Palestinians in the state; and by providing personal security to individual Israelis.

In this case, the border has not worked to create hybridities, but has followed a different pattern. While legitimising separation in order to protect the Zionist state against an other that made rival claims on the land, it has underwritten difference, inequality and the conflict between peoples. As Bisharat points out, 'it is precisely under conditions of challenge and threat that identities are most vehemently, even lethally, spatialized' (1999: 204).

It is upon these foundations that construction of the Wall in the West Bank was started in June 2002, two years after the outbreak of the second Intifada, in the context of the Israeli violence of military occupation and the Palestinian violence of uprising. This week there was another attempted suicide attack in Israel. I was browsing through the Israeli left wing newspaper *Ha'aretz* online, and came across a readers' comments page. The conversations were illuminating. 'Build that fence higher and stronger!' said one commentator. 'It is a disgrace that the fence has not been finished in this area', wrote another. 'When Israel kills five Palestinians last week, what do you expect?' countered a third. Supposedly the concretisation of the border in the shape of the Wall should be making everyone feel safer, but this does not seem to be the case. In the next section, I explore how the social blockades and physical boundaries of the Green Line around 'every Palestinian' have become concretised in the Wall.

Figure 8 - A Palestinian woman climbs around the Wall through Jerusalem at Abu Dis.

Legend:

- Intensely cultivated Palestinian land
- Intensely cultivated Palestinian land to be *de facto* annexed by Israel
- Palestinian towns and villages
- Palestinian villages to be *de facto* annexed by Israel
- Green Line / 1967 Border
- Israeli wall currently under construction
- Israeli colonies / Projected expansion

The Palestinian city of Qalqilya will be isolated by the wall and illegal Israeli colonies. Approximately 750 acres of Palestinian land will be de facto annexed by Israel.

Figure 9 - Map of West Bank

3.2 <u>Embodiment</u>

'Violence gives birth to itself..'
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2002: 1

Construction of the Wall in the West Bank was started in June 2002. The Israeli government's official justification and motivation in building the Wall is that of security; 'it cannot be clearly stated that the Palestinians' right to freedom of movement must take precedence over the right of Israelis to live: Saving lives must always come first!' (Israeli government website 2005). The concept of 'security' is thus inherently linked to that of violence in that one is meant to preclude and defend against the other. Violence is a lack of security; two sides of the same coin, perhaps. In the introduction to the *Anthropology of Policy* Shore and Wright ask 'how are normative claims used to present a particular way of defining a problem and its solution, as if these were the only ones possible, while enforcing closure or silence on other ways of thinking or talking?' (1997: 3). In this ethnographic account of the Wall I wish to investigate the discourse of security as manifested in the Security Anti-Terrorist Fence as a 'normative claim', and explore other concepts of security and violence as ways of thinking about the Wall.

The Israeli government's website has a section on the Anti-Terrorist Security Fence. This announces that 'Israel recognises the imperative of finding an appropriate balance between the imperative need to prevent terrorism and defend its citizens and the humanitarian needs of Palestinians' (Israeli government website 2005). Under the link, 'Impact on Palestinians', it states that the Security Anti-Terrorist Fence '<u>will not</u> prevent Palestinians from going about their lives'; that Palestinians will have access to their land through gates constructed in the Wall; that trees destroyed will be replanted; and that lands needed for the construction of the Wall will be 'requisitioned not confiscated' – they will remain the legal property of the owner, who will be provided with compensation if he or she applies for it. It also tells us that the fence 'will not create permanent facts on the ground'. The only pictures are of the *fence*, the barbed wire sections, except for one diagram of the *Wall*, standing opposite a building with a silhouetted gunman on the roof, whose bullets cannot reach the cars on the other side. Under the link 'Impact on Israelis', photographs of about twenty people; babies, children, men and women, Jewish clerics, stare at you above the reminder that 'Over 900 Israelis – men, women and children – have been murdered by Palestinian terrorists during the past three years.' The Anti-Terrorist fence will ensure that 'Hundreds of innocent lives will be spared. What other realistic alternative is there in the absence of Palestinian action against terrorism?' (Israeli government website 2005).

The rational, considered language of the government constructs an argument with which it seems difficult to disagree. How could one try to claim that 'saving lives' must not always 'come first'? The Israeli government has thought of the 'humanitarian needs' of Palestinians, and will ensure that they are protected, through freedom to access land and employment and through compensation of trees and land destroyed in the necessary task of protecting lives from terrorism. Through pointing out the 'absence of Palestinian action against terrorism' and leaving the rhetorical question of what 'other realistic alternative' there might be, the argument presents no room for any other way of conceptualising the situation, other than through the categories of Palestinian aggression and Israeli defence. Finally, it seems to force upon the reader a choice between the protection of two different human rights; 'it cannot be clearly stated that the Palestinians' right to freedom of movement must take precedence over the right of Israelis' to live', in a theoretical equation in which life will always be more important. As Shore and Wright point out, 'policies have a legitimising function. Not only do they outline the course of action to be taken, they also serve to fix that course within the framework of a wider and more universal set of goals and principles' (1997: 11). Thus here, the construction of the Wall is located within the perhaps most persuasive and widely held of all universal principles: the right to life.

The statements of the Israeli government website are part of a wider discourse that links Israeli security with the cordoning off of the Palestinian threat. As Seidel has put it, 'discourse is a site of struggle, it is a terrain, a dynamic linguistic and, above all, semantic space in which social meanings are produced or challenged.' (Seidel, via Grillo 1997: 12). Thus discourse cannot be treated as something which operates without physical effects. In this case, the physical effect of this political (and social) discourse is, most obviously, the Anti Terrorist Security Fence. How may an investigation of the real 'facts on the ground' (to borrow a phrase from the Israeli Government) and their comparison with this discourse of security allow us to find different ways of questioning the normative perspective that is used to rationalise and explain this situation?

The government states that Palestinians will have access to their land through gates constructed in the Wall, and that the restrictions placed by the Wall, and by checkpoints, roadblocks and the like, will not impinge upon Palestinians ability to work and earn a living. However, as Amnesty International point out, 'The fact that soldiers enjoy broad, individual discretion to permit or prevent Palestinians' movement undermines the Israeli authorities' contention that the internal closure is a rational system of control, based strictly on security

needs' (2003: 19). The impact of the Wall on the Palestinian economy after its first year on construction was summarised by the International Labour Office (ILO) in May 2003;

> The period from June 2002 to May 2003 was marked by a deepening of the economic and social crisis in the Occupied Territories and its likely stabilization at a very low level. The severe restriction on movements of persons and goods within the Occupied Territories and between these and Israel have resulted in a dramatic decline in consumption, income and employment levels, and unprecedented contraction of economic activity. (ILO 2003: 1)

The lack of access to paid labour has meant that many Palestinian communities have come to rely further on their crops, including the trees which the Israeli government says will be replanted if destroyed. Amnesty International records the case of the village of Qafin;

> In 2002 the IDF informed landowners in Qafin, a village in Jenin governorate with a population of about 9500, that 600 dunums of land was to be seized for five years on grounds of military necessity in order to build the security barrier. In September 2002, bulldozers began to clear the land, tearing down most of the olive trees before their owners had been able to harvest the crop… Nearly all of the 90% of the active population in Qafin who used to work in Israel have now lost their jobs. The income from the olive harvest has become crucial for many residents… (2003: 29).

While the Israeli government website may claim that there will be compensation for those whose land is eaten by the Wall, there is no history yet of any compensation being paid either to Palestinians who have lost land to the Security Fence or to the Israeli settlements and bypass roads in the Occupied Territories (Amnesty International 2003: 29). Neither would any theoretic compensation arrive in time to save people from the dire consequences of the destruction of crops. Also, as Bornstein records, a Palestinian must place a large deposit in any court case in case he loses, while Israelis are not required to do this (2002: 205). As many Palestinians are poor, this acts as a blockade to legal justice. Moreover, it constitutes an institutionalisation of inequality.

The discursive assertion that Security Anti-Terrorist Fence 'will not prevent Palestinians from going about their lives' is belied by the evidence of those living in the Occupied Territories, and those who record their stories – Human Rights Organisations, Israeli and international activists, journalists, and, not least, anthropologists. Anthropologist Glen Bowman writes that;

> The ghettoisation of these cities was not only preventing their inhabitants from working either in Israel or the West Bank but was as well depriving those living in satellite villages of access to markets for selling their produce and labour and buying goods and cutting them off from basic services such as medical care and education… it is indisputable that life within Palestinian 'gated communities' is being etiolated by an intentional crippling of the economy, the strangling of access to food, water, medicine, and education, and the imposition of a sense of isolation and political impotence. (2004: 15)

That the Wall cuts people off from more than land and employment is evident. There are numerous reports of the Wall preventing access to health care, in many cases resulting in unnecessary deaths. For instance, Amnesty records the case of Rula Ashtiay, who was forced to give birth on a dirt road by the Beit Furik checkpoint in the West Bank, after Israeli soldiers refused her passage from her village to the nearby town of Nablus. 'I crawled behind a concrete block by the checkpoint to have some privacy and gave birth there, in the dust, like an animal. I held the baby… she moved a little but after a few minutes she died in my arms.' (2005: 28). Similar stories, tragically, abound, as do reports of deaths due to ambulances being held up while collecting those suffering fatal injuries, heart attacks, or even for lack of dialysis (Hass 2005, Amnesty 2003, Across Borders 2005).

Many Palestinian communities are divided in half by the Wall, which does not follow the Green line (see Figure 1.) but cuts into the West Bank, crippling communities, and making the most innocuous and everyday social activities – from visiting friends or family to going to school – difficult, time-consuming, humiliating, and even potentially dangerous. This underscores the point that the Wall does not merely prevent potential terrorists from accessing Israel, but prevents the continuation of normal life for every Palestinian resident of the Occupied Territories.

However, to talk about 'the Wall' in the singular is misleading. There are many Walls. Firstly, as demonstrated in the previous section, the systematic closure of Palestinian movement through roadblocks, checkpoints and the bulldozing of Palestinian roads has the same effect as the concrete or wire structures of the Wall. Also, there are also areas encircled by a secondary barrier as well as the main fence, such as Rummana and Tulkarm on the north and west edges of the West Bank. Situated on the Palestinian side of the barrier itself, the latter are blocked from access to Arab areas by the secondary barrier that encloses them (Smith 2004: 509). In other areas, the Wall totally surrounds Palestinian land. The town of Qalqilya is completely isolated from the rest of the West Bank, with only one gate for access. In October 2003, the checkpoint at Qalqilya was completely closed for a period that lasted several weeks, shutting off Palestinian access to health services, markets, schools, and the outside world in general (Rubin 2005). Other Palestinian towns and villages are similarly 'closed'; Rubin records the opening times of the checkpoint at Jayyus; 'An Israeli military sign in Arabic announces the checkpoint is open from 7: 40 to 8am, 2:00 to 2: 15, and 18: 45 to 19:00, only fifty minutes a day' (2005: 2). Hass narrates;

> Israelis are convinced the checkpoints are meant to prevent terrorists from reaching the country. Nobody asks how the checkpoints between village and village or city and village serve the purpose, even when the villages and towns are far from the Green Line or even a

settlement. A checkpoint harms more than the economy. Its purpose is to harass and humiliate, on a daily basis. It means constant conflict with soldiers. (2003: 2).

To state that the Wall does not 'change facts on the ground' (Israeli government website 2005) seems to be pure sophistry. A concrete Wall is a physical fact, that changes the terrain and the daily life of millions of people. If the Israeli government intends to suggest that the Wall does not change the political situation, this seems to be equally unlikely, just as the appropriation of vast amounts of Palestinian land for the construction of permanent settlements and settlers roads has changed the political situation. This is why the fact that the Wall diverges greatly from the route of the Green Line is so highly contentious, as much of the best agricultural land and water resources have been cut off from their Palestinian owners, annexed *de facto* by the Israeli side;

> It meandered through the countryside in what appeared to be an aimless and extravagant manner (extravagant insofar as it costs on average US$2.27 million per kilometre) until I recognised that it ran right along the edge of the inhabited sectors of Beit Sahour and neighbouring Bethlehem and Beit Jala, gathering behind it nearly all of the vineyards, the olive groves, the orchards and other agricultural lands of the local people. (Bowman 2004: 14)

As Bucaille comments, 'the territorial strategy applied to the West Bank and East Jerusalem reveal a will to conquer and control' (2004: 155).

Analysis of the effects of the Wall upon Palestinians seems to suggest, therefore, that the Israeli government's claims to have considered and to be protecting the humanitarian needs of Palestinians are without proper substance, as Palestinian lives are debilitated in every quarter. Simultaneously, however, through the presentation of a seemingly rational argument, and the location of this discourse within universal principles such as the right to life, the Governmental discourse claims legitimacy for itself and for its actions.

> This capacity to stimulate and channel activity derives largely from the objectification of policy – that process through which policies acquire a seemingly tangible existence and legitimacy. However, the objectification of policy often proceeds hand in hand with the objectification of the subjects of policy… the objectified person "is seen but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication" (Foucault 1977: 200)' (Shore and Wright 1997: 5).

This process, the objectification of the subjects of policy, may be seen both in the discourse and in the treatment of the Palestinian subject. While the faces of Israelis appear on the Governmental website, the only representation of a Palestinian is the black silhouette of a gunman in a diagram, shooting bullets at Israeli cars that are protected by the Wall (Israeli government website). While it is stated that 'Over 900 Israelis – men, women and children – have been murdered by Palestinian terrorists during the past three years', the number of Palestinian deaths, killed by soldiers, crushed by bulldozers as their houses are destroyed, or

blown up as the targets or the 'collateral damage' in Israeli army 'targeted liquidations' (Hass 2005: 1) goes unrepresented. In the years between 2000 and 2003, Amnesty records this number at more than 2,100 people, some 380 of them children (2003: 39). This 'invisibilisation' is reflected in the exclusion of Palestinians from Israeli society; from democratic rights, from using the same roads, and now hidden behind a concrete Wall. It also enables the maintenance of a system and the building of a Wall which hides difference between Palestinians themselves. By condensing all Palestinians into the figure of the terrorist, it is possible to impose blanket curfews and other group restrictions on a whole population as punishment for the actions of a few.

Tragically, it has become almost routine to count casualties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But, as one letter to the *Guardian* recently pointed out, 'it is not just how people die, but how they live that we should care about' (Pope 2005), and it is in the light of this that we must look at the Wall and its effect on populations.

The opposition between the official account of the Israeli Security Fence and the alternative one of the Wall rests upon the dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate violence. 'What constitutes violence is always mediated by an expressed or implicit dichotomy between legitimate/illegitimate, permissible or sanctioned acts, as when the 'legitimate' violence of the militarized state is differentiated from the unruly, illicit violence of the mob or of revolutionaries' (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 2). Weber has pointed out that one of the characteristics of the state is its monopoly on legitimate violence (1918). Thus, in this case the violence exerted by the child or adolescent who throws stones at the soldier, or more shockingly – but part of the same continuum – the suicide bomber who blows himself up along with the civilians around him, are labelled illicit violence. Yet the violence of the soldier who delays and humiliates the civilian at the checkpoint, or the violence that means that children and civilians are killed by Israeli tanks is legitimised as part of the state's fight to repress terrorism. This supports the assertion that 'most violence is not deviant behaviour, not disapproved of, but to the contrary is defined as virtuous action in the service of generally applauded conventional social, economic and political norms' (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 5).

To further contest the meaning of violence however, one must recognise that it is not only located in physical acts. Nordstrom and Martin draw our attention to the existence of,

"apart from the physical and manifest violence, .. social and economic violence. Stimulated by the stormy transformation of the international scene in the wake of anticolonial revolution, peace research became conscious of the fact that far more human life on the globe is

destroyed by widespread poverty, hunger, avoidable diseases and socioeconomic deprivation than by the overt use of arms.. such conditions reflect a violence embedded in the socioeconomic structure of society – structural violence" (1992: 8, referencing Thee 1980).

The Wall must be seen as a concretisation – literally – of the structural violence of poverty, unemployment and social inequality explored in 'Foundations'. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois write of an old man who went to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission for compensation for the destruction of an orchard, and was treated as a 'sweet distraction… but the old man spoke to the very heart of apartheid's darkness and to the more inclusive meanings of state and political violence' (2004: 2). This old man cannot help but remind us of the villagers of Qafin who lost their olive trees, or the lands lost from Beit Sahour and Bethlehem described by Bowman (2004: 14). While for the Israeli state the Wall may be held to provide 'security', for these Palestinians it constitutes pure violence. 'The term *violence*, like *terrorism*, is very much a political designation: both are avoided by perpetrators and the state while being employed by victims who have suffered their consequences' (Nordstrom and Martin 1992: 7). Upon these grounds, it becomes impossible to state that 'hundreds of innocent lives will be spared' (Israeli government website 2005), as the ethnographic investigation of the actual effects of the Wall, as concretisation of the discourse of segregation, demonstrates that in fact lives are being destroyed; both through being actually ended, and through being made unbearable through poverty, humiliation and social exclusion.

Finally we must assess the very claims to security upon which the Israeli government's justification of the Wall stand, and question whether the Wall even saves Israeli lives. According to Human Rights Watch

> 'the number of Israeli and Palestinian victims of suicide bombings and other attacks has continued to grow in the past three years… the increasingly sweeping and stringent restrictions imposed indiscriminately on all Palestinians have not put a stop to the attacks. On the contrary, attacks intensified as restrictions on the movement of Palestinians increased, calling into question the effectiveness of indiscriminate restrictions that treat every Palestinian as a security threat and punish entire communities for the crimes committed by a few people.' (2005: 27).

As Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois write, 'Violence gives birth to itself'. The violence of a system of inequality translates into the violence of the Intifada, which is itself reconstituted in the violence of a discourse that relates security to the total restriction of Palestinian movement, rigidified in the Wall, which, in turn, increases anger, frustration and hatred, and the inevitable escalation of viciousness and conflict. Is it too much to suggest that this violence even goes right back to the awful violence of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews,

confirming a long-founded fear of persecution and a sense that the Jewish nation state of Zion is to be protected at all costs, in order that it may protect its citizens?

Our deconstruction of the discourse of the Israeli government not only enables us to see outside of the normative model in which the Wall constitutes security, but requires us to fundamentally reconceptualise the workings of violence. In this recognition, it is possible to see the way that the power of the dominant group, represented in the government elected by the dominant, enfranchised, society, is projected upon the social terrain in the form of the Wall and upon the bodies of individuals through the social life they experience. Thus our section title of 'embodiment' comes to mean more than simply the embodiment of the system in the shape of the Wall, but the way in which that system is inscribed upon the bodies of those who live within it. The bodies upon which this violence works become Foucaultian sites of the inscription of discourse, 'invested with relations of power' (Foucault 1979: 25). As with the development of distinct habituses in East and West Berliners, the differential social structures of Israeli and Palestinian society create different habituses in individuals of the two groups. Berdahl writes,

> 'As symbolic entities constituted in human action and interaction, boundaries are constructed out of pre-existing differences, which they, in their turn, act not only to reinforce but also to create; the sense of difference they mark is as important as the cultural forms and practices they enclose' (Berdahl 1999: 5).

If this is true of borders, it is doubly so of Walls.

We have assessed the Wall as a site of power, created in discourse but with very bodily effects. But for Foucault, as power is multi-sited, then resistance must be also, and while power is often repressive, it also produces desire, knowledge and discourse (1980). In the next section I explore ways in which the concretisation of power in the Wall changes the spaces for resistance to the system it supports.

Figure 10 - Villagers from the Palestinian village of Bi'lin, and 'Anarchists Against the Wall' protest by pinning themselves under models of the Wall - the soldiers had to break down the Wall in order to stop them (May 2005, ref. www.electronicintiada.net)

Figure 11- 'To exist is to resist' A Palestinian boy adds finishing touches to a mural on the West Bank Wall (ref www.electronicintifada.net)

3.3 Deconstructions

'Maybe resistance is already a place on the map, but – more likely – maybe it is about throwing away imposed maps, unfolding new spaces, making alternative places, creating new geographies of resistance'
Steve Pile 1997: 30

Walls are sites of power, the discourses of the dominant group made concrete. Just as discourses work to restrict and control people through defining the categories of thought, so Walls work both to restrain the physical possibilities of movement *and* the mental categories available. The Wall in the West Bank homogenises all Palestinians into the figure of the terrorist, and all Israelis into the person of the victim through its blanket categorisation. This is in direct opposition to anthropological approaches to the study of communities, which seek to give space to different standpoints and representations, recognising that to homogenise is most often to silence the voice of the disempowered and privilege the dominant. Thus the first task of anthropology in the study of the Wall is to recognise that not all members of a social group or category are the same, and to open up new ways of thinking about the groups involved. Such an approach is anthropologically the only ethical one in that it attempts to be inclusive in representation and give voice to the silenced. It is also the next vital step in the deconstruction of the Wall, whose *raison d'être* of security has been shown to be misplaced, through disputing its hegemony on meaning and categorisation. If the first two chapters written on Israelis and Palestinians have focused on the 'construction of difference in historical process' (Ferguson and Gupta 1992: 16), this section challenges the assumption that this must, inevitably, lead to conflict. As we look at the relations between actors, investigating the spatialities of power and resistance, we realise that, as with the Berlin Wall, the dichotomy between 'local' and 'global' is reductionist.

Obviously, the tradition of violent protest in Israel and Palestinian is strong, and frightening. The political descendents of the suicide bombers that started their awful tradition in Israel in the early 1990s are still at work, as are those who advocate other forms of violent protest. I do not ignore the fact that this is occurring. However, it was argued in 'Embodiment' that 'violence gives birth to itself' (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2001: 1). Therefore, while I recognise that violent protest has been formative in the creation of the Wall and in the current political struggle, I cannot and do not argue that it is a form of resistance that will lead to the deconstruction of the Wall. I do not discuss violent resurrection here, except in so far as to say that the rise in violence and in attempted suicide bombings since the construction of the Wall was started may be understood as a reaction to the increasingly stringent, humiliating and debilitating conditions under which Palestinians live.

The British media have recently been showing an interest in the graffiti upon the Wall in the West Bank. One of the primary motivations for this has been the work of Bristol graffiti artist Banksy, who travelled to Palestine in early August and created nine of his distinctive pieces upon the Wall. With a loose theme of escape and freedom, the pictures are political without being directly polemical (see Plate 4). When I searched the English-language internet at the end of June for photographs of graffiti upon the Wall in the West Bank, I could find none (although I did find a site about an American project to start a community art project graffiting the Wall). However, now the Google Images search 'Palestine Graffiti' finds a large number of hits, a number of them depicting Banksy's work, but a large number more displaying the work of local Palestinian graffiti artists and slogan writers, a Mexican-collaborated project that has written in red 'To exist is to resist' under a pair of Hijab-shrouded eyes (a symbol of resistance themselves; for a further discussion of veiling and resistance see Fanon 1959, Abu-Lughod 1990), and numerous other murals that have brought together 'locals' with 'internationals'.

This is not to suggest that meanings or attitudes to graffiting the Wall are consistent. Like the East German dissidents who symbolically erased and condemned the Berlin Wall graffiti, many Palestinians feel that to paint the Wall is to accept its presence, to make it permanent, and to make it a tourist attraction. On Banksy's website he records the words of an old Palestinian man; 'You paint the Wall, you make it look beautiful'. 'Thank you' replies the artist. 'We do not want it to be beautiful. We hate this Wall. Go home', the man tells him (Banksy 2005). Banksy, while announcing his condemnation of the Wall on humanitarian grounds, also called it 'the ultimate tourist destination for graffiti artists', thus suggesting that the meanings of graffiti are not necessarily reducible to simple acts of resistance, and warning the anthropologist to be cautious of attributing all acts to those of protest, reminding us of Abu-Lughod's note that anthropologists have a tendency to romanticise resistance (1990). As Peteet writes of the graffiti of the first Palestinian Intifada;

> Graffiti should be contextualized in sets of power relations and structures and the forms of resistance these entail. The meaning and potency of graffiti for its various readerships were located in a nexus that simultaneously enabled, sustained, and legitimized their production and yet constrained and delegitimized them. It was in the spaces where these competing, yet highly unbalanced, systems of power interfaced that meaning was constructed. These relationships and structures, and their creative and constricting possibilities, were encoded in graffiti as practice and in each graffito (1996: 139)

The Wall may be seen as a space where 'competing, yet highly unbalanced, systems of power interface' (ibid.). Thus resistance may take place upon the body of the Wall, or through the act of breaching it. Bornstein writes that 'I would estimate that thousands, if not tens of

thousands, of West Bankers are still sneaking in. They just can't do it between Tulkarem and Netanya, or Jenin and Afula. They have to travel all the way down to the Ramallah-Jerusalem metropolitan area.' (Bornstein 2005, pers. comm.). The fact that those who breach the Wall do so for the vital need of earning a living should again make us pause before assuming that crossing the Wall is always an act of rebellion. However, that thousands of West Bankers continue to have working relationships with Israelis points us in the direction of co-operation and collaboration as a form of resistance (in some cases, not all, in which Palestinians are employed in Israel) against the discourse of separation and against the image of all Palestinians as terrorists and all Israelis as victims. In fact, Bucaille (2004) and Bornstein (2002, 2005 pers. comm..) have both written of the damaging effects of 'closure' upon Israeli businesses; 'We should also remember that relations of dependency are not only between Israeli capital and Palestinian labour, but also between merchants on both sides. The Wall retards, restricts and structures these relationships' (Bornstein 2005 pers. comm.).

Israeli merchants and businesspeople are not the only groups within Israeli society to have objected to the Wall. The Israeli human rights centre B'Tselem has been vocal in phrasing objections on a humanitarian, legal and political level. Physicians for Human Rights is an Israeli organisation that works to assist transport and mobility for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, particularly in order to facilitate medical access (Amnesty International 2005). The women's group Makhsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch) sends monitors to observe and take notes at checkpoints. Sometimes their presence brings a measure of human judgement into the frequently changing rules and interpretations of the rules at checkpoints where the soldier's word is law. Israeli journalist Hass writes that

> Many activists in Makhsom Watch emphasize their purpose is not to make the occupation more bearable, but to make Israelis aware of it and of the fact that the checkpoints and blockades don't prevent suicide bombers from reaching Jerusalem, but do increase the sense of outrage and disgust against Israelis in the general Palestinian population. But often their presence, and sometimes their intervention, moderates the brutal scenes and shorten the hours of humiliation. Apparently, more than they manage to reach the Israeli public, they enable Palestinians to find out that there are 'other Israelis'. (2003).

Groups such as these, for reasons of interest or of humanitarianism, work to deconstruct the divisions between Palestinians and Israelis. Much of their work revolves around the Wall, firstly in that it presents one of the main restrictions on Palestinian mobility in the West Bank, but also in that it has provided a concrete symbol around which protest and solidarity can unite.

Protests such as the one at Bilin, where Palestinians, Israelis and internationals gathered to protest against the Wall, building a fake Wall which the Israeli soldiers symbolically had to

tear down before they could break up the demonstration, show the symbolic capital of the Wall as a symbol of oppression, and therefore as an emblem around which activists can gather (electronicintifada 1 June 2005). As a product of power, the Wall makes this particular asymmetrical relation of power visible, and in making it visible, makes it easier to protest against. For instance, in our own Sussex student union newspaper *The Badger*, an article about the student Palestinian society's upcoming annual visit to the Occupied Territories started talking about the Wall in the second paragraph, and used much of the article on that subject (University of Sussex Palestinian Society 2005). This process of making visible the inequalities of the situation, and the escalation of human rights abuses that the Wall has set in motion, has made it harder for the international community to miss or ignore the occupation of the West Bank, and makes it easier for activists to raise awareness about the situation.

In 2004 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the Wall was illegal in all respects and in its existing dimensions and that it must be removed. This is due to its location in territory occupied in war, and due to the human rights laws that it violates. While the ICJ ruling does not hold Israel to any course of action, it does fulfil two important functions. Firstly, it entails *erga omnes* obligations that require that other signatories to the ICJ's charter enforce and compel Israel's compliance with its decisions; namely international agreements such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Conventions on the Rights of the Child, and so on. This provides a legal framework for pressure at the state level for Israel to both dismantle the Wall and to protect the humanitarian rights of Palestinians (Rubin 2005). Secondly, it channels attention and debate on the illegality of the Wall and opens possibilities for private or commercial protest such as divestment, boycotts and sanctions. For example, there is a growing movement to boycott the United States firm Caterpillar, that supplies earth-moving machinery to the Israeli army.

All of the forms of protest discussed above work to collapse the distinction between 'local' and 'global', and show that power is both internal and external to any situation. As Foucault writes,

> Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. (1980: 98)

The implication is that neither is resistance localised 'here or there' but must respond to the workings of power where it is manifested, such as in a Wall but also in the extra-local networks and relations of power that support that Wall (such as the commercial investment of

groups such as Caterpillar, or indeed the United States government). Thus the 'geographies of resistance' (Pile 1997) may perhaps sometimes be spatially mapped, as in the inscription of graffiti on the face of the Wall, or the demonstrations at the village of Bilin. Equally often however, they involve spaces such as the internet through the blogging of Palestinians living under occupation that reaches readers all over the world, or geographical spaces far removed and dispersed from the Wall, recognising that our actions as actors operating in a 'global world' (as if there's any other sort) have 'local' manifestations. If power seeks to control and dominate through the ordering of space (de Certeau 1984), the Wall is the ultimate signal of this. It is obvious that a map, like a boundary does not represent a 'spatial fact with sociological effects but a sociological fact which forms space' (Gerog Simmel 1908: 623, via Berdahl 1999: 7). This is perhaps particularly pertinent in Israel and Palestine, where the demarcations on maps and the control over land have been the cause of so much suffering. Thus 'throwing away imposed maps, unfolding new spaces, making alternative places' (Pile 1997: 30) – of resistance but also of co-operation and of communication – must be a vital aspect of working towards peace.

Figure 12 - UK Bristol-based artist Banksy's work on the Palestine Wall. Banksy condemned the wall but described it as "the ultimate activity holiday destination for graffiti writers".

<u>Conclusions</u>

> *'I know that the Wall is an ugly thing. It will also disappear. But only when the reasons*
> *for its construction have gone'*
> **Khrushchev 1961 (via Baker 1993: 719).**

One of the reasons for the selection of the particular case studies of Berlin and Israel and Palestine, is that people often compare the two when reporting on or writing about the Wall in the West Bank, for example;

> 'The most obvious historical parallel to the barrier is the Berlin Wall, which was 96 miles long (155 kilometres). Israel's barrier, still under construction, is expected to reach at least 403 miles in length (650 kilometres). The average height of the Berlin Wall was 11.8 feet (3.6 metres), compared with the maximum current height of Israel's Wall – 25 feet (8 metres) (Parry 2003: 1)

It seemed important to me to assess the extent to which the two Walls really were comparable, where their similarities and differences lie. While the Berlin Wall was built by a state to keep its own people in, the West Bank Wall is being built to keep an 'other' out. The former divided a people who considered themselves one nation, while the latter divides people who identify very differently. And while the Berlin Wall created much suffering for the people of Berlin and Germany (and East Germans in particular), it did not bring with it the total debilitation of all aspects of life that the Wall in the West Bank inflicts upon the Palestinians.

Yet the comparison between the two structures does hold, in that they are both built by the powerful in order to protect their vision or version of the world, and both were designed as a means of controlling people and restricting their movement. The forms of resistance to the Walls have also been similar, involving a host of 'tactics' (de Certeau 1984) that rat run through and around the space delimited by the 'strategy' of the Wall. The Berlin Wall and the Palestine Wall both divide people territorially, yet along totally different criteria; the former ideologically (the socialist state from the capitalist), the latter along ethno-religious (Jew from Muslim and Christian Arab) lines. Rather than undermining the comparison however, this allows one to see that Walls, as symbols of 'difference' between people, can be constructed according to any criteria, and that the 'politics of difference' (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: x) is a conflict played out over power and resources.

When Khrushchev referred to the 'reasons' for the Wall's construction (see heading), he most likely had in mind the abatement of the flow of refugees from East to West, the economic

'catching up' of the socialist states, and the general success of socialism, making a Wall dividing populations no longer necessary as people would no longer wish to escape to the West. However, Khrushchev's words turned out to be more prophetic than he probably intended. In the end, the Wall did fall because the 'reasons for its construction' had disappeared – but in the larger, more general sense of the détente of the Cold War, due to the failure of the socialist experiment as it was attempted under the USSR. 'The Berlin Wall was the symbol of the Cold War, its destruction a symbol of its end' (Baker 1993; 721).

The Cold War, and the division of the world into socialist East and capitalist West may be seen as the defining conflict, indeed the defining world order, of most of the second half of the twentieth century. The Berlin Wall stood at the heart of this conflict. In today's world, the labels or classifications 'socialist' and 'capitalist' no longer hold much resonance for most younger people; they certainly do not drag up the fear of the 'other' that characterised post-Second World War relations. Sadly however, we cannot say that we live in a world without conflict. Especially since the "9/11" 2001 terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most recently the first suicide bombers' target of the London underground, many people feel that there is a growing conflict between two different global alignments of power blocs; often referred to as 'the West' and 'Islam'. This week saw the release of a piece of film, recorded at some point before the London attacks and featuring one of the bombers; he states that we are in a state of war, and that he is a soldier. He declares that his actions are motivated by the West's abuse of his 'Muslim brothers and sisters', immediately calling to our minds the shocking situation in Iraq. However, more so than many people in the West realise perhaps, Palestine is also at the heart of this sense of grievance and therefore also at the root of this conflict.

Once put within this frame, the Wall in Palestine takes on an even greater significance than that which the average Westerner might at first assume. Perhaps the Wall in Palestine is not merely about 'cultural difference' between Palestinians and Israelis, but also about a meeting of two global power blocs that serve to underwrite the conflict. While a massive imbalance of power between Israelis and Palestinians is clearly one reason for the fact that it was possible to build a Wall in the West Bank, only thirteen years after the world celebrated the destruction of the Berlin Wall, perhaps it is partly the global alignment and refusal to back down that allows the dire humanitarian situation in Palestine to continue (this argument seems especially persuasive when it is considered how much money some actors must be making out of a Wall that costs on average US$2.27 million per kilometre).

Finally, what does an anthropology of 'the Wall' tell us? Walls are formed in processes of connection and disconnection; they are founded on existing difference ('cultural', 'political' etc.), but this difference becomes salient in conflict over land, resources, populations and meaning. Once built, the lack of communication that Walls enforce and the different social structures that they create, can construct new differences among people, even those who consider themselves the same. Yet Walls can work against themselves too…

It is clear that Walls arise at the centre of conflicts that go beyond the 'local' context, and represent the ultimate refusal to listen, communicate or concede. The fall of the Berlin Wall deconstructed the division between 'local' and 'global' at the same time as it deconstructed the division between East and West. While being cautious of romanticising resistance (c.f. Abu-Lughod 1990), acknowledging the difficulty of recognising what constitutes an act of resistance, and admitting that many people are too busy simply trying to survive to actively resist, it may be said that resistance to the Wall in the West Bank has followed the same pattern. The capacity of Walls to provoke international action truly works to deny the concept of distinct, discrete communities, even as Walls seek to disconnect people in order to maintain the inequalities of power cemented into them.

We know that while Walls themselves are structures of violence, that serve to control and restrain people, yet they also, through concretising discourse, serve to define and make visible the conflict, and thus make it easier to work against. Foucault writes of discourses that they;

> are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (1981: 100-1).

The same argument may be made for Walls. While Walls are built as an attempt to impose power over others through the restriction of their mobility, in the end, Walls also make discourses fragile through making them physical, just a pile of bricks, capable of being knocked down.

Figure 13 - The Berlin Wall today.

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Figure 14 - 2000 years old, Hadrian's Wall, built by the Romans to mark the northernmost extent of their territory in England.