3 Deployed like chessmen As was shown in Chapter One, most refugees attempted to survive without the benefit of the assistance programme. The vast majority of those who were allowed to take decisions themselves, only registered for a settlement under conditions of extreme duress. In 1983 about three-quarters of those interviewed who had settled in the border areas during the first three years of the exodus still maintained that they were 'OK here' (see Table 1:10, page 56). The breakdown of security along the border, and the inadequacies of medical services were the main reasons that people were finally forced to move. The main attraction of the settlements was the availability of clinics and primary schools there. Refugees who arrived during the first three years did instigate the building of many self-help primary schools in the border areas, but the lack of any financial assistance, even for books and stationery, together with occasional government interference,[1] made it impossible to provide enough places for the thousands of children who had been attending school in Uganda. Other factors from 1982 onwards influenced the movement of people into settlements. The two most immediate obstacles facing refugees after 1982 were the lack of land on which to establish their own farms and reduced opportunities for casual labour in exchange for food. The drought which struck some parts of the district in April/May, 1983, forced large numbers of self-settled refugees to register (at least temporarily) at the Panyume and Kimbe reception centres.[2] Throughout the entire period, but particularly from mid-July 1982, incursions into the Sudan by the Ugandan army influenced some of those who survived these attacks to move to the security of the settlements. But when Sudanese military personnel and certain local officials colluded with the UNLA in 1983, and again, at Kaya, in late 1984, large numbers of refugee households were again disturbed. In 1983 those refugees who were subject to attacks by the UNLA (and those who were uprooted following the Sudan government's decision to succumb to Uganda's demands that they be removed from the borders) at least had the option of moving to a settlement. But in late 1984 when the problem arose along the Zaire/Uganda border at Kaya, UNHCR had by then determined not to extend its programme by opening new settlements, an(i refugees were left without this option.[3] Could much of the disruption which families suffered in their country of asylum have been avoided? The evidence suggests that it could. The composition of settlement populations and those who remained self-settled on the border and the economic relations which were established between them, suggest that an assistance policy prepared to respond to need on the basis of demographic changes might have avoided a great deal of the disruption families suffered. Medical and educational services could have been provided. When land ran short, information could have been circulated concerning the whereabouts of other uncultivated areas. Even transport to new places of settlement could have been arranged. But the most important impediment faced by refugees in their efforts to maintain economic independence outside the planned settlements was their lack of security. As one refugee put it. People could have survived well on the borders if, and only if ... the Uganda government [had not been allowed] to violate international law and to come in to harass refugees in another country, another sovereign country ... Somebody who has crossed the border and taken asylum somewhere should be safe. But here to be safe is to be safe in inverted commas. It's unfortunate.'
The deployment As one UNHCR consultant also discovered, the refugee population is not divided up into two separate groups of settled and self-settled' people (Day-Thompson 1984.) The reality of the situation became apparent to him when he was responsible for moving the thousands of refugees who had been living in the Otogo and Kaya transit camps - some for up to twelve months and more. He came to the conclusion that the refugee population did not comprise one group of 'broken men accepting charity' with the other, the unassisted. constituting 'those brave individualists maintaining their freedom in the face of adversity'. Instead he found that the refugee community is deployed 'like a set of chess-men across the board'.
Believing that refugees simply represent a 'normal cross-section human community, [sic] probably reflecting much of what it was before it had to go into exile', he appreciates their strategies as confirming their capacity to use their 'wits and muscle' to survive in a 'pretty difficult world.' Refugees, at least some of them, are highly mobile; 45.6 per cent of the self-settled interviewed still lived in the same place as they did on first entering Sudan. Those who remained close enough to the border were able, so long as the opposition remained in control of the area, to slip back into Uganda for food. Up to mid-1982, through binoculars one could see women cultivating on the Uganda side of the Kaya river even though the UNLA was stationed only a few miles away at Oraba. Others were able to slip in and out of Uganda to trade. For example, during 1982-3 all of the fish sold in Yei came from Uganda. Fishmongers travelled through protected corridors from the Kochi and the Nile rivers to the Sudan. They carried receipts proving they had paid the guerillas a tax for this service. Later, when the UNLA made the last push through the north, the fish trade had to be re-routed through Zaire and the supplies in the market declined. Throughout 1982 the town of Moyo was sealed off, with several hundred people living in the mission under guard by the UNLA, but during 1983 trading began between Kajo-Kaji and Moyo. Some refugees particularly women - were able to take advantage of the markets established to serve both sides of the border. A considerable volume of trade also occurs between the Zaire border and Yei. (McGregor in Wilson et al. 1985.) The refugee chess-board in Eastern Equatoria encompasses not only the settlements, the border areas, and Yei town, but also areas across the Zaire border, Juba - 160 kilometres in the other direction - and distant parts of the Sudan. It also includes Uganda and other African countries. We asked the assisted refugees about the location of their 'relatives' and found that, in addition to relatives deployed in Africa, 180, or 8.9 per cent of the sample, reported having relatives living somewhere outside the African continent. In addition to these movements and those back and forth into Uganda for trading purposes or to get food, and quite aside from the official repatriation programme mounted by UNHCR, whenever there was a rumour that life was secure enough to do so, many people attempt to return to their homes in Uganda. Refugees in settlements were asked whether members of their household had recently returned to Uganda. They were not asked the reasons for such returns or whether or not they were thought to have returned to stay. The location of relatives according to responses to questions posed to refugees in settlements is shown in Table 3.1. Fig 3.1. Age distribution of all assisted refugees Unfortunately, however, one cannot assume with Day-Thompson (1984) that the dispersal of relatives is always the result of strategic planing for survival or that 'relatives' make up a mutual support group. Ugandans distinguish between kinsmen who would normally live in the same compound, the household, and those who are more distantly related by blood and marriage. Norms of reciprocal obligations only obtain between members of the 'household'. Unfortunately only one of the questions posed to assisted settlers about the location of their kinsmen made this distinction. The response to it shows that while people include members of their household when asked about kinsmen, the numbers upon whom they might reasonably expect to depend is far smaller than these answers imply. Although 43.8 per cent of the households in settlements had relatives living in Zaire, only 19.4 per cent had members of their intimate family circle living there. The unassisted refugee households interviewed were only asked one question about the location of kinsmen. They were asked whether any members of their household were living in settlements and 31.1 per cent responded 'yes'. TABLE 3.1: Location of relatives (assisted)
Although more people simply walk home or 'repatriate themselves' than those who join official repatriation missions, the movement of these people is related to their reasons for flight. Those households which reported having relatives who recently returned to Uganda were analysed in terms of the year they first entered Sudan and by the year the first member of the household came to the settlement. The results are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. These data demonstrate the relative stability, or determined tenacity, of those who both entered the Sudan and came to settlements during the first two years, compared with those who entered later on. None of those who arrived in 1979 reported having relatives who recently returned to Uganda whereas 23.7 per cent of those who arrived in 1982 report at least someone among their kinsmen having gone back to Uganda. These data support the earlier discussion of the causes of exodus for most of the civilians now in the Sudan; there, I suggested that the most important factor in the exodus was the existence of UNLA. It is the undisciplined soldiery of the UNLA rather than opposition to the present government which has led most people to flee Uganda and it is UNLA's continued vendetta against the civilians which keeps them in exile. Had the transitional government in Uganda not foundered and perhaps had the army been integrated on the lines taken after Zimbabwe's independence, or even had the elections been seen to be free and fair, most of the civilians now living in exile would never have fled. TABLE 3.2: Relatives returned to Uganda by year first entered the Sudan (assisted)
Fig 3.2. Percentage absent in each age group by sex
Absentees: unreliability or mobility? The survey indicates quite clearly that the demographic characteristics of refugee populations vary dramatically. General statements can therefore be misleading. Again, one cannot assume, with Day-Thompson (1984), that all refugees have the same capacity or opportunity to manipulate the advantages of the 'aid system'. All statistical data collected in a social survey must be treated with great caution, but this is particularly the case when studying a refugee population. The analysis of the statistical data included some checks on the internal consistency of informants' responses and some of these will be discussed throughout the book. A reassuring, though very limited, check on the reliability of the data was made by the Oxford team in 1984. They based a more intensive study on the survey sample of households which included if individuals who were 'vulnerable'. They found only seven cases where a year later the same people were not at the same location. However, there was some disparity between the survey data and the estimates of the total population of assisted refugees as made by the UNHCR office. This is not surprising given the difficulties of accounting for numbers under the conditions of an emergency programme and the obvious incentive for refugees to inflate their numbers in order to receive more rations. In addition to this survey, there were three other sources of population estimates. First, in each settlement the settlement officer was expected to keep a register with the names of family members, and his block leaders also had their lists for food distribution. Second, the UNHCR offices kept an estimate of the total population of settlements and transit camps. This estimate was based on the settlement officer's register and on information on numbers of people who were moved by lorry from borders to transit camps or settlements. Third, the World Food Programme also had a population figure for each settlement, but this estimate was 'negotiated' between UNHCR and WFP to determine the food rations for a settlement. My survey results suggest that of those three sources, the Yei UNHCR office figure was usually the more reliable. According to the UNHCR office, the total population of assisted refugees at the time the survey was completed was 95,050. Assuming that our sample was representative, the survey found a total population of 106,750 - a surplus of 11,700 (12 per cent). In the notes on methods I describe the efforts we made to ensure that all members of the household were present for the interview. Despite such precautions, one had to recognise that, given the general lack of food, it would be only logical for refugees to attempt to inflate their numbers.[4] Certainly agencies assumed refugees always exaggerated their numbers. We therefore scrutinised those who were absent from the interview because it seemed the obvious place to look to find the evidence for such deliberate inflation. However, when examining the distribution of age groups for the total population compared with the distribution of those who were absent in each age group (as shown in Figure 3.3), it seems very unlikely that in such a large sample informants could have invented an absent population to correspond so perfectly with the age distribution of those who were present for the interview. Moreover, there was no correlation between the degree of correspondence of survey results with UNHCR's population estimates and the numbers absent from the interviews. While one can draw no firm conclusions from the analysis of the absentees, it does reveal the enormous social dislocation which has occurred. Among those absent were 922 children, (or 39.2 per cent of absentees), who were said to be enrolled in school. In all age groups more men than women were absent, but the differences are not significant. Figure 3.2 shows the numbers and percentage of each age group for both men and women who were absent from the interview. One might suspect that at least some of the men over 15 years were engaged in fighting inside Uganda, but it cannot be assumed all were: on numerous occasions, men who were absent from the interview visited us in our tents in the evening, explaining where they had been. The population of the transit camps was notoriously unstable, with people moving in and out during the long months of waiting for a settlement. If one accepts UNHCR estimates as reliable, the data from the survey of Goli, Otogo, and Kaya transit camps account for 7,371 of these extra numbers recorded by the survey leaving only 4,329 'extra' to account for. The total population for Otogo transit camp alone was 54 per cent higher than UNHCR estimates. Many people who were in transit camps were unwilling recipients of aid, people who had been forced out of the self-settled areas by the drought. Once the rains resumed, many people returned to their self-settled compounds. Movement in and out of settlements was further encouraged after mid-July when, in the absence of full standard rations, extra rations of edible fat and other items such as blankets were given to refugees so that they could sell these to buy staple foods. Two transit camps were close to Yei and I met one refugee whose family was in Kaya who considered himself to be part of this camp's population, although he preferred to remain in Yei, unassisted, until a settlement opened. Given the tendency for the self-settled to send some members of their households - usually the more vulnerable - to settlements, informants in transit camps may have included some of their self-settled relatives as 'absent' members of the household. Informants at Otogo transit reported 225 absentees: 61 of these were aged between 10 and 15; 47 men and 49 women aged 15 and older were also absent. Table 3.4 compares the survey data with UNHCR's population estimate and shows the number and percentage of differences between it and the survey results. It also includes the percentage absent from interview and the average family size for each. The survey found 8 settlements with a smaller total population than that estimated by UNHCR. In 14 settlements the variation (whether higher or lower) between the sample results and UNHCR's estimate was between 0.4 and 11 per cent. There were 5 settlements which had only recently opened - Wonduruba, Dororolili, Dukuni, Adio, and Katigiri. It may be that the progress towards filling Adio and Dororolili had not been regularly recorded in the Yei office, accounting for the higher population according to the survey. According to our survey, Mondikolo population is greater than UNHCR's estimate by 317 people. This difference is partly explained by the fact that there were a number of people who were ostensibly living in a transit camp, but who, for several months, had been removed from the assistance list. They had moved into the Sudan in early 1983 and, as some had cattle, at first they had been told they could remain at Mondikolo, a settlement established for herdsmen. Later the policy changed and they were asked to move on to another transit camp further inland, in preparation for moving to a settlement when one became available, but they refused even though by this time all their cattle were gone. After warning them several times that unless they agreed to move their food rations would be cut off, the programme officer finally took this action. In Mondikolo, I found more than 100 of these people still living in tents or under hastily constructed shelters, most of whom were in an appalling state of health.[5] Table 3.4: A comparison of survey and UNHCR population estimates, average household size, and percentage absent at time of interview
New and Old Tore are adjacent. The UNHCR population estimates for the combined population of these settlements was 4,431; the survey found a combined population of 4,430. However, these two settlements were separately surveyed. While the Old Tore count came to 519 more than UNHCR believed were living there, there were 520 less people than expected living in New Tore! Wudabi settlement, according to the survey, had 1,623 more residents than UNHCR believed to be there. Wudabi is only 6 kilometres from the Zaire border and about 40 kilometres by foot from the Ugandan border. Just over a range of high hills to the south is an area where many self-settled refugees live - a half day's walk away. Inside Zaire there is a large 'international' market which attracts refugees engaged in petty trade. It might be assumed that some self-settled refugees, perhaps even including some from the Zaire side of the border, had unofficially moved into this settlement, but they would have had to compete for the rations which were based on UNHCR and WFP lower estimates. It was this settlement in which violence erupted when the supply of food was interrupted. The settlers took up pangas against their settlement officer and accused the local Sudanese officials of having diverted food. Throughout 1983, Wudabi was a difficult settlement to manage. Wudabi had other attractions besides rations and its accessibility to the Zaire border. It was near a tea plantation which employed a large number of workers, and refugees - mainly children aged 12 and upwards - could be seen congregated at the roadside every morning awaiting transport to work. Just before dark, streams of weary children returned to pick their way across the log bridge over the Yei River and walk home to the settlement. Of those absent from the interviews in Wudabi, 49.3 per cent were between 10 and 19 years of age; 39.9 per cent were below the age of 10. Doubtless some of these children were attending schools, held at that time under the trees. Even while recognizing that refugees send a disproportionate number of children to the settlements because there are schools available, (see Figure 3.1) and that there is a bias in favour of educating boys, there are still problems in interpreting the data concerning children in the 5 to 9 age group. In 1969, according to the West Nile census, there were 171 children per 1,000 in this age group: 86 boys and 85 girls. According to our survey, there were 236 children per 1,000 in this age group: 127 boys and 109 girls. Were all the absent children in this age group attending school at the time of the interview? Ugandans put a high premium on educating their children. Early in the interview informants were asked how many children in the households were 'able' to go to school. According to the sample, the total was 36,440. They were then asked how many were actually going to school. The total number reportedly in school was 19,950. As only primary schools (and four intermediate schools) were available for children in settlements, we assumed informants were defining 'able to go to school' in terms of the numbers of 5 to 14 year olds in the household. But later on in the interview, when questions were addressed to each individual, the results show there were 24,200 of the 44,960 children between 5 and 14 years of age who said they were attending school, or 4,250 more children than the number earlier reported as being in school. About half of these were 5 to 9 year olds, and 11,530 were said to be enrolled in school. Of these, 3,210 were absent at the time of the interview. It is difficult to invent the description of an individual required by the interview. These children were born before the civil war began. Their numbers do not therefore reflect either the effects of malnutrition or the hardships of flight on the fertility of their mothers, although both these factors affect children in the under 5 age group who are much more vulnerable to malnutrition and disease. But one might assume that some children in the 5 to 9 age group would also succumb to the perils of flight. A separate examination of even the poor records of deaths available in the settlements showed that large numbers of this age group had indeed died. The nutritional survey carried out in 1984 revealed a very high rate of severe malnourishment among children 5 to 9 years of age (Wilson et al. 1985) The question of whether absenteeism of this age group reflected unreliability or mobility cannot be finally answered from these data. It is even possible that in some cases the numbers of children in the 5 to 9 age group were inflated by descriptions of dead children. However, one must remember that while the survey of unassisted households did not discriminate comparable age groups, there were only about half as many children in the 6 to 16 age group living in unassisted households.
The deployment of households It may not be assumed that even members of a household form an interdependent support group. As is true everywhere, the norms of family responsibility as well as the actual behaviour of individual members of the so-called extended family within Ugandan society vary according to the closeness of the relationships as well as by the idiosyncrasies of individuals. In this study household types were categorized according to the characteristics of the persons registered as the head of the plot in the settlement. 'Normal' families included those where both a husband and a wife were present, and those married women whose polygamous husbands were living in the same settlement. The heads of other household groups in settlements not constituting 'normal' families in these terms were distinguished by age, sex or marital status. These data are compared with responses about the location of their relatives and shown in Table 3.5. In the case of the unassisted refugees, data describing type of household in these terms were collected for only 598 cases. In Table 3.6 I have distinguished only the 'normal' families from those headed by single men and women, separating the 18 cases which were headed by young people 16 years or younger. The other families included men and women who were divorced, separated, widowed, and ten were very elderly widows or widowers. This table also gives the average size of the different types of households. TABLE 3.5: Location of kinsmen by type of family (assisted)*
* The percentages are based on those who answered the question 'yes' or 'no'.
TABLE 3.6 Type of household by size of household (self settled)
In settlements, 54 per cent of the households constituted 'normal' families (as I defined them), while among the self-settled interviewed where such information is available, in 73.9 per cent of the households both spouses were present. In terms of the deployment of kinsmen of the refugees in settlements, these data show that households headed by women generally have fewer relatives elsewhere. This pattern of family dispersal among the self-settled refugees is shown in Table 3:7. More 'normal' families had relatives in settlements than the others. This highly differentiated deployment of households and kinsmen had significant implications for the success of the programme as will be shown in Chapter Six when vulnerable groups are discussed. There are other discreet variations in dispersal patterns which suggest how difficult it is to generalize about refugees' behaviour. Large differences were found between camps. More people living in New Tore, Otogo Transit, Katigiri, Adio, Gumbari, and Wudabi have close relatives in Zaire than do people in other settlements: the percentages by camps ranged from 0 per cent to 61.8 per cent. Replies to other questions about the deployment of relatives revealed similar differences between camps. These are shown in Appendix III, Table III. I, page 398. For example, no one in Mogiri had a relative who had returned to Uganda, while 40.3 per cent of the sample of Goli indicated that one or more relatives had recently returned there. These differences between the behaviour of people in different settlements can partly be explained in terms of the distances between the camp and the border, or between the camp and the area within Uganda from which people have originally moved. (For example, those who came from lower Terego or Maracha, i.e. further away, were less widely 'deployed' than those who came from Aringa County, just across Sudan's border.) TABLE 3.7: Are members of household now in assisted settlements?' by type of family (self-settled)*
* Note that data describing the
sex or marital status of household head were collected in only a small number of
interviews of the self-settled. The deployment of ethnic groups Ethnicity is also a factor which is related to the dispersal of relatives. Of the 1,027 Kakwa households interviewed in self-settled areas, only 13.8 per cent had close relatives in a settlement, and only 18.2 per cent of the Nubi had sent a relative to a settlement. It will be recalled that these two groups entered the Sudan more or less en masse during the first two years of the crisis and had the advantage of a shared language in mixing with the locals. Many also spoke Swahili, a language some Sudanese acquired while in exile in Uganda. It is interesting to compare this ethnic variable with the reasons the assisted refugees gave for coming to the settlements. Almost half the Nubi reported that before coming to a settlement they had been harassed or had run out of money, and 42.3 per cent of the (very few) Kakwa in settlements gave such reasons for moving to a settlement. Only 10.4 per cent of the Kakwa had come because they 'heard the settlements were better'. It has already been noted that when asked why they did not go to a settlement, most of the unassisted refugees said that they were 'OK here', but apparently the Nubi, with 94.5 per cent giving this response, were the most 'OK'. Perhaps this reflects their relative success in trading in the self-settled areas. Almost all of Uganda's ethnic groups were represented in the refugee population of the district, but the vast majority were Lugbara-speakers. The ethnic composition of the settlements and of the households of the unassisted refugees interviewed are shown in Table 1.1, page 50, Chapter One. The interviews of the self-settled were conducted in five different areas. The ethnic composition of these households by area and by year of settling at the place interviewed, are shown in Appendix III, Table III.2, page 399. The overall number of Kakwa and Madi appears to be about the same, but by 1983, the majority of the Madi were living in settlements while most of the Kakwa had managed to remain independent. Most of the Madi entering the Sudan went to live on the east bank of the Nile. It is very likely that the numbers of Nubi are grossly under-represented in these data. Given their predisposition towards trading as a means of livelihood, most Nubi would have been found in centres of market activity and our interviews were mainly conducted in remote rural areas. The pattern of Nubi settlement shows up in the few (170) interviews conducted in Yei town where about one-third of those included were Nubi. The group of people who have been combined under the category 'others' comprise 9 different ethnic communities from Uganda. (Among the self-settled refugees there were 14 different ethnic groups represented as 'others'.) Although their numbers were small, constituting only 2.4 per cent of the total settlement population, they had a disproportionate impact on social relations. There were, according to the sample, 0.5 per cent or 540 Baganda living in settlements. Coming as they did from a relatively privileged class in Uganda, as a group they had more difficulty adjusting to life in the agricultural settlements.[6] Some of these were women, spouses of members of the Ugandan military. Most were ex-airforce trained as pilots, radar, and radio operators. Some were students who were driven out by the war. A few of the more highly educated men were employed in settlement administration. One, a relative of the Kabaka, the King of Buganda, was first employed as a settlement foreman, and later became head of the Red Cross family tracing service. One young single Muganda living at Wudabi was rapidly sinking into serious depression. He knew his family was in Kenya, but had no way of joining them. Among the self-settled refugees 14 Luganda-speaking householders were interviewed, 35.7 per cent of whom lived alone. Within the refugee community there were individuals who came from areas associated with Obote's own ethnic group. One woman said she was Obote's 'sister' and reported that he had even attended her marriage to a wealthy Nubi merchant. Despite her family connections and his having formerly supported the UPC, the two of them now live quietly in Wonduruba. On the other hand, many such individuals were suspected by the others as being spies for the present government. There were a number of defections from the UNLA and on occasion these individuals were beaten by their fellow refugees or had to be removed from the settlements to safeguard their lives. Lugbara and Madi comprised 94.8 per cent of the settlement populations. The ethnic composition of each settlement and the three transit camps is presented in Figure 111.1 in Appendix III, pages 4045. Most settlements were predominantly Madi or Lugbara, but in six settlements one or other of these two groups represented a significant minority. In Old Tore over 50 per cent of the population was made up of 'others'; with Lugbara and Madi combined representing the minority. Even where the population was overwhelmingly of one group or the other, the fact of their shared language did not necessarily promote harmonious relations. The Lugbara were particularly a divided group. They originate from different parts of the West Nile, they have a history of strong clan divisions, and are further factionalized by religion. For example, in Goli settlement, where nearly everyone speaks Lugbara, the population was divided rather evenly on religious grounds. (See Figure III.2, Appendix III, pages 406 7.)
Where are the bells? The arrival of so many thousands of Ugandan refugees into the district has introduced a new mix of religious affiliations which is likely to have long term political effects on the community as a whole. Religion also has some immediate consequences for the adaptation of the Ugandans and local people to one another. Table 3.8 shows the religious affiliation of the assisted and self-settled refugees. The most important outside religious influence on the indigenous population of Yei River District was that of Protestant missionaries. This is not the case for all of southern Sudan. Most of the Muslims in the district are traders who originate in the north, and only a few of the locals have converted to Islam. During Sudan's civil war, many of the Sudanese who fled the country were educated and converted in Catholic institutions in Uganda and Zaire, some children were even sent to Rome for study. Following the return of the Sudanese from Uganda, a Catholic centre was established in Yei, and its cathedral is the largest building in the town. With the funds from his congregation, earnings from a pineapple farm, and some outside support, Father Peter Dada, the priest in charge of this centre, has opened a non-sectarian kindergarten with an enrolment of 150 children. At Lutaya, just a few kilometres outside Yei, another cathedral has been constructed. He and two other priests serve the district. All three were refugees and educated in Zaire or Uganda. Religion has long been an important variable in the politics of Uganda. Obote himself is a Protestant and his opposition, the Democratic party, is identified mainly with the Catholic religion. During Amin's rule, although representing only a minority of Uganda's population as a whole, the Muslim community gained great prominence. The northern part of the west Nile, the area where most of the refugees lived, was one part of Uganda where Islam had taken root. TABLE 3.8: The religious affiliation of refugees
For at least some refugees, religion sustained them through the perils of their existence in exile (de Waal in Wilson et al. 1985.) And for one at least, the church symbolized everything which meant Uganda. One night by the light of my kerosene lantern, I listened to refugees talk about their experiences. One desperately homesick man began to weep. 'Where are the bells?' he asked. Poetically, he went on to describe his longing to hear the chiming of the bells which the priests had brought (from Italy, he said), and installed in the missions in Uganda. Just under half of the refugees in Yei River District are followers of Islam. Conversion to Islam during Amin's rule was often a strategic decision. The Catholic priest in Yei took pleasure in pointing out certain prominent Ugandans, now Muslim, whose time of baptism as a Catholic he could remember. One of these, for example, was the ex-vice president, Mustapha Idrissi. On the other hand, it should be remembered that conversion to Catholicism was often a requirement for entrance into a Catholic mission school. The arrival of so many thousands of Ugandan Catholics has given a new impetus to the Sudanese congregations. The influx included numbers of trained catechists and dozens of chapels have been built in the settlements and throughout the areas where the self-settled refugees live. Regular monthly meetings of religious leaders are held in Yei at the Catholic Centre. Long before I began this research these priests had acquired an intimate knowledge of the conditions along the borders and had compiled lists of the heads of many of the unassisted households. The growth of his congregation prompted Father Peter to undertake an expanded building programme at the Yei Centre: a residence for the Ugandan nuns who teach at the kindergarten, and rest houses for visitors. Plans were underway to build a primary school for the children who graduate from the kindergarten. The carpentry shop on the site employs refugees. A seminary has also been opened at Tore which includes both refugees and Sudanese in its student body. Sudanaid, an indigenous voluntary agency, has appointed a community development worker to start income-generating projects in rural areas where self-settled refugees live. In 1983 Father Peter responded to an initiative which came from refugees to build a senior secondary school. He allocated land for the school which was to be built by refugees and Sudanese working together. (Myers in Wilson et al. 1985.) This self-help project met with many problems, the foremost being to find a source of food for the students who came from the settlements to build the school. Members of the congregation brought cassava and cobs of corn to the church services to feed the young people building the Lutaya school. Another problem was the cynicism of the agency workers concerning the capabilities of the refugees to help themselves. Some viewed the project as 'elitist'; one asking the students what they would do when the school was completed, build a university? It was very difficult to mobilize workers from the settlements. Communication within settlements was almost non-existent so few even heard of the project until a Catholic lay worker and a member of my team made a special round of settlements to inform them. Nevertheless, in just 14 months Lutaya school opened, with an enrolment of 180 students.[7] Already in 1982, Father Peter was encouraging his congregation to adopt the traditional music associated with the Ugandans of the west Nile. This adungu music is played on hand-made wooden string instruments called by the same name, which range in size to produce a range of tones from base to treble. The choirs and instrumentalists include only children and young people. He brought musicians from one settlement to live at the Centre to teach their art to the Sudanese. He arranged to have a hymn book printed for distribution in the chapels throughout the district. He installed a number of young Ugandan children in his household and paid their school fees so that they could attend local schools in Yei.[8] The Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), which has an office in Nairobi, sent a priest to Yei. He was employed locally by the UNHCR office as its education officer. The priest also took an active role in supporting the activities of the Catholic community. He played a crucial role in the building of Lutaya secondary school. It was his connection with the agencies which encouraged some of them to give material assistance to the self-help school project. Although he left the district in late 1984, the JRS sent another priest who took up pastoral duties in the Kajo-Kaji sub-district. Although the number of Protestants among the Ugandan refugees were far fewer, the local Protestant church also responded to the arrival of refugees. By 1982 they were already including religious leaders from the settlements in the training sessions and Bible classes held in Yei. The Yei Protestant church became more closely linked with the assistance programme with the arrival of the US-based agency, SSRAP. One reason for this was that the agency's policy was to employ Sudanese and these were mainly recruited through the Protestant church. Although very few of the indigenous people practise Islam, there were mosques at Kaya and Yei where both northern Sudanese and southerners prayed together. In keeping with Islam's tradition of charity, these followers of the prophet were active in assisting individual refugees. Mosques were built in the self-settled areas and in the settlements. Moreover, in most settlements where there was a significant number, Muslims started a madrasa (Koranic school). In some settlements the children attended the madrasa every day; in others, the class schedule deferred to that of the primary schools which were built and supported by the assistance programme. Despite their numerical superiority in some of the settlements (Dokuni, Morsak, Katigiri, Gumbari, and Wudabi), Muslims generally felt disadvantaged. As in most ex-British colonies, many Ugandans tended to despise Muslim education and although some children go to the recognized schools after receiving their basic religious education, they suffer the disadvantage of having started their English studies much later than others. In eastern Sudan the Islamic African Relief Agency has given some assistance to refugees and some projects are funded through donations from Arab states. There was no such organized programme of assistance through a Muslim agency in the south, where all of UNHCR's partner agencies were 'western' and most were linked with Christian religious organizations. It is understandable that although aid reached the settlements through agencies and programmes which ostensibly did not take account of religious differences, Muslims perceived the programmes as being biased in favour of the Christians. Perhaps it was because of this that when medicines were supplied to Otogo through a Muslim group, the leaders of the local mosque insisted that they were only to be distributed to their members. Northern Sudanese Muslims who live in the south are generally alienated from the local community because of their dominance of the economy. (McGregor in Wilson et al. 1985.) Although they attend prayers with the indigenous Muslims, when the mosque at Otogo settlement held a formal opening, a number of Muslims from Yei attended, but northerners did not join them. The Sudan government has maintained friendly relations with Obote's Uganda, but sympathy among local officials for the Muslim members of Amin's government who fled to the Sudan had some immediate political consequences. For example, as was discussed in Chapter One, Juma Oris, Amin's Minister of Foreign Affairs, was able to establish strong relations with the state's security forces and with a former Minister of Interior in Khartoum. The imposition of Sharia law (September 1983) occurred too late in my research to observe its effect upon relations between northerners and local Muslims, either refugees or indigenous people, but it is unlikely to have created any greater solidarity among them. Very few Sudanese in any part of the country supported this effort by Nemeiry to consolidate his power.[9] Moreover, Nemeiry's government felt ambivalent about the Ugandan refugees because among the returnees were Sudanese members of the Anyanya movement who had fought in the civil war and had not returned home after the 1972 Addis agreement.[10] All Ugandan refugees, whether Muslim or not, suffer the effects of the control which the northern Sudanese merchant class holds over the local economy. In 1984, for example, hoping to fetch the higher prices paid there, a refugee cooperative at Limbe managed to get sacks of potatoes to the Juba market. The northern Sudanese merchants offered to buy the potatoes at a low price but would not permit them to be sold on the open market. After several days, with the potatoes spoiling, the refugees were forced to capitulate. (McGregor in Wilson et al . 1985.) Northern Sudanese traders have maintained businesses in Uganda and facilitate the illegal coffee trade into Sudan. That these interests override any religious solidarity based on shared religion was graphically demonstrated in December 1982. Some northern Sudanese traders were murdered inside Uganda and merchants in Kaya blamed the Ugandan guerillas for their deaths. They razed the town wounding both refugees and indigenous Sudanese as well, and at least one of the latter died. Given their numerical superiority, it is a wonder the Ugandans did not react. Although arrests and charges were made, the cases against the traders have never been dealt with by the court.
Some other characteristics of the refugee population Refugees living in planned settlements are expected to become self- sufficient through agriculture. The plan drawn up was based upon the assumption of an average family size of five persons, which would include three children, two of whom are of primary age. (Land 1981.) The overall average size of households in settlements was 5.29, but they ranged in size from one-person households to one which appeared in the sample at Wudabi in which 26 persons were living in one plot. The average size of households also varied greatly between settlements with the newer ones having the smaller average size (e.g. Katigiri: 2.86, and see Table 3.4). This reflects the practice of the refugees, to first send only a few members of their household to a settlement, sometimes only one person, to build the house; or, as was also very common, to send either the very ill or the children on their own. The plan (Land 1981) for self-sufficiency also assumed that each household would have three persons who were able to cultivate. Table 3.8 shows the numbers of different sized households in the settlement population and the numbers that were reported to be 'able to cultivate'. The households of the unassisted refugees were larger: on average 7.15 persons. Their households also ranged in size from one person to those having sixteen or more. Unlike the large families in the settlements who were confined to a plot of either 25 metres or 50 metres square, unassisted refugees were able to build enough houses to accommodate their families and some of those which I observed counted several scattered huts as their 'household'. Table 3.10 shows the number and range of household sizes which were interviewed. The average age of the settlement population was sixteen years. As is discussed in the notes on methods in Appendix II, information concerning the unassisted refugees only distinguish three broad age and sex groups. Table 3.11 compares these with the same breakdown for the settlements. The population data describing refugees demonstrate the high mortality rates of the youngest children, the lowered fertility of refugee women, and the selective dispersal of different age and sex groups between settlements and the areas where the unassisted are living. As noted, data collected from the unassisted households recorded the numbers of children aged five and under, and then only distinguished adolescents and adults.[11] Among the assisted refugees there were 198 per I ,000 children of five years and under; among the unassisted, the rate was 271 per 1,000. Figure 3.3 shows the age and sex distribution of the total population of the settlements according to standard age group divisions and compares these with the 1969 census of the West Nile.[12] The number of children under five years of age in the settlements is 150 per 1,000, while in Uganda in 1969 there were 197 per 1,000. For nonstatisticians this comparison may appear to indicate that infant mortality ratios have not drastically deteriorated. However, it should be remembered that the overall distribution of age groups per thousand is affected by fewer people in the age groups over 30 years of age among the refugees as compared with the population of the West Nile. Restricting examination to just those under the age of 30, it is found that the 0-4 year olds in settlements comprise 173 per 1,000, while in Uganda in 1969, the comparable figure was 266 per 1,000. It is interesting to observe that the ratio of men to women in the settlements is higher than it was in the West Nile at the time of the 1969 census. Since colonial times, opportunities for employment in other parts of Uganda had drawn men from this area; women were responsible for maintaining the family left behind. In Uganda,55.7 per cent of the age group between 15 and 44 were women, while in 1983 in settlements they represented only 48 per cent of the population in this age group. Among the self-settled the percentage of women 17 years and over is 54.3. If those women aged 15 and 16 could be separated from the data and included with the others, probably the percentage of women among the population of the unassisted refugees would be found to be about the same or even greater than that of the West Nile in 1969. TABLE 3.9: 'Number normally in household' by percentage of household 'able to cultivate' (assisted)
TABLE 3.10: Number of people in households (unassisted)
TABLE 3.11: A comparison of age and sex groups of assisted and self-settled refugees
It has already been suggested in Chapter One that occupational background influenced men in arriving at the decision to accept assistance in a settlement. The only systematic information collected by UNHCR was whether a family came from an 'urban' or 'rural' background. Although it was true that 80.1 per cent of the assisted refugees did originate from rural areas, it was a mistake to have assumed that most of these had made their living through farming. When refugees were asked their occupation in Uganda, only 20.1 per cent reported they had earned their living through agriculture and of these 61.4 per cent were women ! And, as far as the men were concerned, this 20.1 per cent may constitute an over estimate since, as has already been noted, many ex-soldiers disguised their former occupation by claiming to have been farmers. This is further confirmed by the fact that nine 'farmers' spoke Russian, Korean, or French. The other Russian-speakers claimed to have made their living in Uganda as labourers, brewers of local beer, or as drivers; four said they had been students. Seventeen others who spoke Korean, Russian, or French failed to answer the question concerning their previous occupation. And, among those claiming to have been 'only cultivators' in Uganda, 16.8 per cent spoke English. In contrast to the adult men in the settlements, 57.6 per cent of the unassisted refugees said that in Uganda they had been cultivators or herdsmen. Had these men really been farmers, more of them might have been using their skills in the self-settled areas. That a main attraction of the settlements was the availability of school is dramatically portrayed by the distribution of the children, both by age and by sex. As is shown in Table 3.11 there was 7.4 per cent more children between the ages of 0-5 in the households of the unassisted than there were in the settlements, but the ratio of sexes was not significantly different. On the other hand, there were 18.3 per cent more children in the age group 6-16 living in the settlements and more of these were boys. In Figure 3.3 this male bias in the population of children is further demonstrated for each age group between 5 and 19 years of age. Any study which concentrates on overall statistical comparisons between two different groups of refugees, between the assisted and the unassisted, has one major flaw. This is that it fails to describe the enormous variation between the settlement populations. Figure III.3, Appendix III, shows the detail and the extent of this variation. These are the populations the aid programme aims to help, the human resources which aid programmes attempt to develop. The extreme differences which exist between the settlements will inevitably confound any policy which is imposed uniformly upon all of them.
The collection of comprehensive fertility data was beyond the scope of this study. However, the number of infants 'born here' was recorded for both the assisted and unassisted refugees (Table 3.12). As the numbers of adult women (that is, all those 17 years or older) are known, it is possible to make some crude comparisons of the relative fertility of both communities. According to the survey sample, a total of 2,810 births had occurred in the settlements. Among the 3,814 self-settled households interviewed, 2,343 children had been born since 'settling here'. The overall average of births of unassisted households was 0.61 while among the assisted refugees it was only 0.14 births per household. The households of the unassisted or self-settled refugees included an overall average of 1.8 adult women per household: among the assisted,0.97. As noted earlier, in 53 per cent of the households of the assisted refugees, both husband and wife were present in the settlement and while comparative data for the unassisted is available for 598 households, 73.9 per cent constituted such 'normal' households. Figure 3.4 compares the number of births per adult woman for both assisted and unassisted by the year of her settling 'here'. These data suggest that with the exception of those settling 'here' in 1981, the fertility of women in settlements appears to be lower than among the unassisted. Moreover, fertility among the unassisted refugee women has remained fairly constant over the years while birth rates appear to have been much more irregular in the settlements. TABLE 3.12: Average number of births by women aged 16-49 by year of settling 'here' (assisted)
According to the sample, the total number of adult women in settlements was 19,550 and among the unassisted, 7,054. As data gathered from the unassisted refugees did not distinguish the ages of women over 17 it is not possible to make comparisons of the fertility of women of child-bearing age. Among the assisted refugees, however, 14 per cent of the women were 45 years or older. Presuming that women over the age of 50 have entered menopause, the average number of births for women as compared with the year of settling 'here' are shown in Table 3.12. Fertility rates are related to nutritional standards. As will be shown later when discussing the delivery of food aid, the unassisted refugees appear to have a slightly more healthy diet than those living in settlements who are primarily dependent upon the irregular supply of rations from the World Food Programme and their own earnings from casual labour. The data also suggest that more of the 'normal' families remain outside settlements. All of the evidence points to the general view that those who are least able to care for themselves opt for living in settlements. The fact that segments of families are sent to the settlements may also have a further disruptive effect upon conjugal behaviour. It would not be surprising to find that the stress of life in exile also affects normal family life. Extra-marital and pre-marital relations result in considerable social upheaval. In Uganda, pre-marital sex was traditionally avoided by early marriage. Marriages require the full agreement of the relatives of both spouses and the payment of 'dowry', (the term introduced during British rule to describe the transfer of wealth from the husband's family to that of the wife). 'Elopement' was also institutionalised in Uganda; by consummating a relationship, a young couple could present their relatives with a fait accompli. Elopements cause disputes, but usually the woman's family is forced to accept a lower amount of dowry. Strong social norms against extra-marital sexual relations lead to some uncertainty concerning the actual marital status of some of the cohabiting couples we interviewed. For example, when asked if, since coming to Sudan, anyone from the household had married, only 6.3 per cent said yes. But, when a more open-ended question was posed concerning how such marriages had been made 'acceptable' to the relatives, 7.6 per cent of the households gave account of their difficulties in getting relatives to agree to a union under the conditions of refugee life. According to the survey sample, only 70 of the marriages had been regularised through dowry payment; of the others, 610 husbands had made a token gift to their wife's parents, and 290 had not paid anything, but the wife's parents had accepted the financial constraints of the husband. In 330 cases the couple had eloped and the matter had not been settled. Their insecurity would have increased if they knew that in 230 other cases the wife's family had already reclaimed their daughter! There was a general and understandable tendency for refugees to exploit every possible source of revenue to its absolute limit. Data are not available on the amounts of dowry paid in Uganda, and no doubt the realities of refugee life in the Sudan have forced many families to accept much lower amounts. But there is some evidence that families would prefer their daughters to marry Sudanese who can pay 'large' dowries. Adultery disputes, according to some Ugandans, were not so common in Uganda as they are today in the Sudan. It is now not only very difficult to control the sexual behaviour of women, but the very conditions of exile may make their extra-marital sex life advantageous to the household (see page 328, Chapter Seven). Women move freely throughout the district, and back and forth between Zaire and the Sudan. Following the informal opening of the border between KajoKaji and Moyo in 1983, women also moved in that direction to trade. They are more successful in appealing to lorry drivers to allow them to travel without payment - at least in cash. It would appear that most of the 'undisputed' cases of prostitution occur between Ugandan women and Sudanese men - as refugees can rarely afford to pay for such services. Husbands may be fully aware of their wives' extra-marital affairs, but since women may earn soap or sugar for the family, they cannot afford to object. Moreover, refugees are always the weakest party in a dispute, and it must be very unusual for a refugee to take a Sudanese to court on any charge.[13] But, if both parties to an extra-marital sexual relationship are Ugandans, husbands do not show the same tolerance and are likely to use any evidence of a wife's unfaithfulness for monetary gain. Adultery cases are heard in a number of fora. Among the self-settled, women are charged in Sudanese courts; in settlements they may be heard by the refugee dispute committee, by the settlement officer, or by the local court. Charges awarded may go as high as £S100. Payment forces the guilty to sell their property, and in some cases, settlement officers have withheld rations, and sold them to pay the husband. The fact that in theory rations were distributed on a per capita basis also had an effect on the stability of marriages. Women often taunted their husbands that they no longer had any authority over them now that 'Shoodie' was feeding them! (This was the name the refugees called the UNHCR programme officer.) Other features of life in settlements are said to be not conducive to normal conjugal relations. Often, when informants were asked whether children had been born since the household came to the settlement, the response would include an aggressive remark on the conditions in which people had to sleep, which provided no privacy. Informants were adamant that Ugandans would never consider having sexual relations in the same room in which children over seven or eight years old were sleeping. Although many of the self-settled compounds had more than one hut and a kitchen, refugees in settlements rarely had more than one. Altogether, 92.8 per cent of the households had access to only one sleeping shelter; 43.5 per cent were still living in one tent (regardless of the numbers in the family); and only 7 per cent of households had two huts or more to accommodate members. But 15.3 per cent had built kitchens and sometimes these also doubled as sleeping quarters. When available, UNHCR distributed one tent to each plot in the settlements. Refugees were urged to build their houses quickly so the tents could be re-issued to the new arrivals. The desire for some privacy may explain why refugees were so reluctant to give up their temporary tents long after they had finished building a house. It was often necessary to employ coercion. On one occasion at least, the programme officer took an armed policeman with him and they resorted to pulling up the tent pegs.
A normal human community? Given the wide differences in the demographic characteristics of refugee populations such as household size, age, sex, ethnic and religious affiliation both within settlements and in the self-settled areas - one may not assume, with Day-Thompson (1984), that all refugees have more or less the same capacity to manipulate the advantages of the 'aid system'. There are also great variations in education and occupation within these communities. Perhaps more importantly, there is some evidence to suggest that the experience of exile and the availability of the aid programme have combined to erode normative social behaviour, in particular, the respect for reciprocal family obligations which were observed prior to exodus. Since individual reactions to life in exile vary almost infinitely, it is difficult to predict where the intervention of aid will be most required. Giving assistance on a per capita basis does not seem the most useful approach. As noted earlier, in 1982 I circulated an essay to refugees in settlements which raised questions about the causes of the so-called 'dependency syndrome . Some refugees replied, also in essay form. As one wrote, 'I have a few points to mention':
Another refugee, Raphael Aar Onzima, wrote an essay which was particularly concerned about the breakdown of social norms. He compares the traditional values of the Lugbara, which he refers to as 'our-ism'. He defines 'our-ism' as follows:
Once war struck, however,
The problem for the refugees is that like chess-men, some pieces have greater defences against adversity than others. Day-Thompson's stereotyped view of the African family as 'infinitely flexible', and therefore able to deploy its members in strategic places to take fullest advantage of whatever resources are available has some basis in fact. It does not, however, take into sufficient account the extent to which sickness, loss of property, and death have left segments of families lacking the 'pieces to deploy'. In addition, local and very specific economic and political factors limit the options open to each household and family. To view family structures as 'infinitely flexible' is to ignore the existence of a point at which flexibility leads to rupture. It is argued that the rupture of family structures results not only from flight and dispossession, but also from the encounter of the refugee with the institutional structures of humanitarian aid programmes. Where kin groups are no longer able to enforce social norms, many refugees have used the aid system as an excuse for abandoning social responsibility. This is the point of rupture, and aid policies which assume that families are flexing rather than breaking, will continue to underestimate the pressures facing individuals. _____________________ [1] Sudan's educational policy for the south requires parents to build a school before the government assumes responsibility for staffing it. Most of the refugee teachers who were employed in schools recognised by government were paid as Volunteers (i.e. £S5 per month). When, together with locals. refugees began to build schools, the government was unable to afford to recognize them in this way. In the Kajo-Kaji area we discovered only one such unofficial school still operating. Any refugee children who were being educated in the subdistrict had to attend the Sudanese schools. In a very small area near Kaya there were 12 stich unofficial schools. In one of these nearly 500 children, including Sudanese are enrolled The educational authorities have tried to close these schools, but since the Sudanese also benefit, local pressure kept them open. [2] For security reasons the reception centres first established at Kaya and Nyori had to be moved inland to these locations. The reception centres at Kajo-Kaji and Livolo were closed and Mondikolo became the reception point for this area. [3] In early 1984 when COMREF officials visited the area demanding that the self settled be moved from Kajo-Kaji to settlements, UNHCR pointed out the millions of dollars required to accommodate so many self-settled refugees. The donors, they said, would be unwilling to come forward with these amounts. Although six new settlements were opened in Maradi District for the thousands who were uprooted during the following months, UNHCR gradually reduced their assistance to any who registered at the Mondikolo reception centre. This policy was aimed at stopping the local officials from disturbing yet more households. [4] One must stress again as is detailed in the notes on methods. we were asking people to stay home from work in their fields from labouring to earn food when there were no rations and from clinics when they were ill etc. [5] The refusal of these people to move to another location where they would receive food, medical and other assistance cannot be explained in terms of mere is stubbornness'. I called an emergency meeting of the heads of these households. Pointing out that murder and suicide are forbidden by all religions, I suggested they were committing both sins' by remaining where they and their children would certainly all starve to death. Very few were still strong enough to do piecework for the locals. One family agreed they would leave for a transit camp with the next transport. Another family was willing to move, but the two daughters, their children, and their mother had to wait until their father died. He lay, in their tent, a living skeleton, too weak to be moved. Some eight months earlier he had been diagnosed as suffering from internal parasites but no medication was ever administered. The remaining families were adamant; they would die in Mondikolo. UNHCR had broken its promise that they could remain there; they now refused to accept any other arrangement. [6] The relationship of the Baganda to the other ethnic communities in Uganda is not just a matter of educational or financial position. There are many poor, uneducated Baganda. Like the Creole of Sierra Leone. whatever their economic and social status within their own community, the Baganda consider themselves superior to most other communities. (Harrell-Bond et al. 1977.) These attitudes began to break down during Amin's rule when some West Nilers began to gain prominence. Like the Creoles, politics affected their relationships and some inter-marriage began to take place between them and the Baganda. (Harrell-Bond 1975) [7] The students built the school with only a few days of professional help, they fired 50,000 bricks and even taught themselves enough carpentry to produce desks. Oxford students, members of the Third World First Society, supplied cash, about £3,000. The agencies, particularly UNHCR, helped by giving cement and roofing materials The Sudan project management office provided transport for building materials from settlements. [8] One of these children, a small girl of about nine years of age, had been living on the border with her relatives. Father Peter found her directing a choir of admngu singers. Her education had been interrupted for three years. Struck by her intelligence, he asked permission of her relatives to educate her. This remarkable little girl could speak Kakwa, Madi, Lugbara, Juba Arabic, English, and some Swahili. Walking along with a consultant for UNHCR, Susan Goodwillie and me, she asked us whether we lived on the same continent or on different ones. [9] A few Muslims, ex-Ugandan soldiers, interviewed near Panyume did express the hope for more assistance to them in the new climate. They asked a member of the Oxford team to carry a letter to Juba and Khartoum requesting assistance for their mosque and expressing a wish for copies of the Koran. (Pankhurst in Wilson et al. 1985.) [10] Charles Meynell, the editor of Africa Confidential, contributed to keeping alive the fears of the Sudan government. With no evidence which I could find to substantiate it, he repeatedly made the claim that some Ugandans have links with the Anyanya, and some of the Atlyanya soldiers are now fighting against the central government. See Africa Now, November 1983 and Africa Confidential, Vol. 24, November 1984. [11] Although the analysts of the distribution of age groups discusses them as though one could have absolute confidence in their accuracy, there are difficulties in collecting such data especially where a large proportion of the population is not literate. Interviewers were experienced in using the method of asking the elderly informants to recall important historical events as a way of judging their age. With the children such methods were inapplicable, but there were few families which did not include one or more educated individuals. [12] Most of the refugees originate from that area. These are the latest population data available as no census was conducted during Amin's rule and the results of the 1980 Census are not yet available. Moreover, given the disturbances which affected this area from 1979, even if available, the results are likely to be highly unreliable. [13] In only a few of the cases collected from trial courts was the plaintiff a refugee.
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