Introduction

While the problems of Uganda have their roots deep in history, the immediate cause of the influx of refugees into the Sudan and other surrounding countries was the overthrow of the government of Idi Amin in 1979. Amin had himself taken power from President Obote through a military coup in 1971. Throughout the Amin period Obote lived in exile in Tanzania. President Nyerere had allowed his country to be the centre of efforts to organize opposition groups.

In retaliation for this provocation, Amin ordered his troops to undertake what has been described by the officer responsible for co-ordinating it from Kampala as 'Amin's war of adventure'. Ugandan forces entered Tanzania. This attack was repelled, but only after loss of life and property. It gave a long awaited opportunity. In 1979 Nyerere directed the invasion of Uganda by the Tanzania Peoples' Defense Force (TPDF) and the Ugandan National Liberation Front. The ultimate objective was the overthrow of Amin's regime and the restoration of the legal government of Milton Obote. Nyerere is against the military in politics: that was his justification. Plans for a provisional government made in exile put Yusuf Lule as President. His rule lasted only 68 days. Godfrey Binaisa took up the office, but the military intervened just a few months before the elections in December 1980.

The wakombozi, the local term for the Tanzanian soldiers, occupied the country up to the period just before the elections, replaced by the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA).

The newly-formed UNLA excluded all former members of the Ugandan military, even those who had been recruited and trained under British rule. Former Ugandan soldiers were disarmed, issued with surrender certificates and advised to go back to farming. Although comprising members of most ethnic groups, the UNLA is dominated by the Acholi and Lango, groups which suffered most under Amin and which had demonstrated an abiding loyalty to Obote. Following the withdrawal of the TPDF, a war of revenge was undertaken by the UNLA, particularly affecting the north-west Nile and Madi districts, the area and people most closely associated with the government of Idi Amin. In response, opposition groups became active in various parts of the country. Since 1981 the history of Uganda has been one of continual bloodshed and violence. Although organized opposition has been reduced in terms of the numbers of active groups, fighting still continued in different parts of the country. 1983-4 saw some disintegration of Obote's support. There were refugees from most parts of Uganda living in all the neighbouring countries and even further afield. The numbers of refugees from Amin's regime were but a handful by comparison. Whereas formerly there were less than 2000 registered refugees in Sudan, in 1984 there were at least 300,000.

The first influx

Although most living in exile in Yei River District reported that they were forced out of their homes in 1979, the majority moved only short distances and returned home once the government had fallen. Among those who came with the intention of remaining, few accepted assistance.

That Sudan, Zaire, and Kenya would receive refugees from Uganda was highly predictable long before anyone crossed borders in mid-1979. Tanzania had made no secret of the fact that it intended to 'liberate' Uganda by overthrowing the Amin regime. Given the degree of international support for this action, success seemed probable. Within Uganda there was also support for the liberation forces, and many were involved in planning the military strategy for the overthrow of Amin. Nevertheless, it took roughly seven months for the Tanzanians to reach Kampala. The President, Idi Amin, did not leave the capital until 11 April, and on 13 April 1979 he was still broadcasting from Soroti.

Despite all the rumours that the liberation army intended to eliminate all the Madi, Alur, Lugbara, and Kakwa because of the association of their home area (the West Nile) with Amin, most Ugandans attempted to remain within the country. The exodus from Uganda into the Sudan and Zaire in 1979 was highly selective, consisting mainly of people who had particular reasons for believing that their lives were in danger.

Upon news of the invasion, such people began leaving Uganda. Of those who came to the Sudan, some took up residence along the border, negotiating access to land with local chiefs. Others found accommodation (or built it) in the border towns of Kaya and Baze, customs posts on the Uganda and Zaire borders. Many settled down in Yei and Juba, others managed to make their way to Khartoum or left the country.

They came in private cars, lorries, buses, and some even escaped by helicopter. They moved with tractors, cattle, and those who had the means made several trips back and forth to bring their property out of Uganda. Others arrived without possessions or transport. The Sudan authorities took the first initiative by arranging provisional accommodation for them in classrooms, free during the school holidays. People were living in temporary shelter in Kaya, Yei, KajoKaji, and Juba. Food was provided by local authorities from their limited resources and by the National Relief Committee. According to the UNHCR office records in Juba, by the end of May 1979, the numbers of refugees 'having crossed the border and in need of help was estimated to range between 20,000 and 25,000 and more keep pouring in'. (Greenfield 1979; 1979a). But it was not until early June that appeals for external assistance were finally forwarded from Juba to the UNHCR office in Khartoum. The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), Juba, later reported that 40,000 people entered the Sudan in 1979. [1]

The Kakwa

Language and occupational background influenced the decisions that the different groups of refugees took in their struggle to survive in exile. The community which fled first, and which was perhaps most able to obtain access to farmland and to integrate in the Sudan, was the Kakwa. Their close identification with Idi Amin, a Kakwa-speaker (said to have been born in Zaire), may be the reason that more Kakwa came in 1979 than in any subsequent year (42 per cent of the self-settled Kakwa refugee households interviewed). Their language is understood by Kakwa-speakers in the Sudan as well as in Zaire. The attitude of local officials may be one measure of their successful integration. When I came to conduct interviews in two areas where the Kakwa refugees had settled, local police fearing that UNHCR, with whom I was identified, would encourage their removal from the area denied any refugees were living there. In one of these areas, where now every inch of land was farmed, refugees found only six Sudanese households when they arrived in 1979. Among those Kakwa interviewed in self-settled areas, just over half reported having formerly been dependent on agriculture in Uganda. Their acceptance by the local Kakwa community is demonstrated by the fact that only 1.9 per cent of the settlement population is Kakwa, compared with 28 per cent of the self-settled households interviewed. It is interesting, moreover, to examine the occupational background of those Kakwa who did opt for the settlement: only 16.4 per cent had farmed for their living in Uganda, 58.7 per cent were dependents with no means of earning an income, and 11.9 per cent were students whose studies were interrupted during the war. Although only one member of each household was interviewed among the self-settled, in 1983, only 5.8 per cent of those interviewed had been students just prior to 1979 and 8.9 per cent were dependents. The Kakwa resistance against moving to settlements is demonstrated by the fact that among the people interviewed, only 6 had registered in a settlement in 1980, 3 in 1981, 73 in 1982 and 119 in 1983.

The Nubi

Another group of refugees who fled Uganda in the early period of the influx into the Sudan are the so-called Nubi people. Their association with Amin may account for their early departure from Uganda. Over half the Nubi community included in this research had entered the Sudan in 1979. By the end of 1980, 93.2 per cent of those Nubi living in assisted settlements were already living in exile. (Among the self-settled Nubi households interviewed, 81.8 per cent also reported that they had crossed the border within this period.)

The Nubi are said to be descendants of Emin Pasha's troops and thus originally 'Sudanese'. (With the fall of Gordon in Khartoum, Emin Pasha, together with his army, was driven out of the Sudan in the 1870s.) The term Nubi has been widened to include those - mainly Lugbara - who have married a Nubi. As a community, the Nubi are Muslims (as are thousands of Lugbara). (Middleton 1965.)

Having earned their living through petty trade and hawking, many benefited from the expulsion of the Asians during Amin's rule; it is said that Amin allowed some of the Nubi simply to take over their vacated businesses. Most of these people entered the Sudan through Kaya. The Arabic dialect which they speak has a limited correspondence with the lingua franca ('Juba Arabic') and it facilitated their resumption of trade. Many moved away from the border to Juba or settled down in Kaya and Yei.

Late 1979 also marked the beginning of the assistance programme. The first agricultural settlement, Tore (now called 'Old Tore' because of the establishment of another settlement directly adjacent), was opened and government officials transported these people from Kaya to Yei and then the long distance to Tore. Refugees report they had no choice but to join the lorries. Given the economic background of the Nubi, the unsuitability of this approach to their assistance could have been foreseen.

By 1983 Nubis made up only one per cent of all the settlement population and appeared in the sample of interviews in only four settlements. Altogether 103 Nubis were interviewed and 60 of these were still living in Old Tore. Only 20 of these had been gainfully employed in Uganda; the remainder were students or other dependents, with a high proportion of elderly widows. Of those who had worked in Uganda, only six were men, and only one of these had been a farmer. The self-settled Nubi households had similar occupational backgrounds and were unsuited to agriculture as a way of earning a living. Of those interviewed only eight of the adults had any previous experience in agriculture or fishing. The Nubi response to the settlement programme demonstrates the aptness of a comment made by one refugee from Limbe settlement: 'To be a refugee, you have to learn to lie.' By 1982, the population of Tore had become notorious for its ability to subvert relief aid. Without adequate staff to monitor the programme, the settlement committee was providing the UNHCR office with the 'statistics'. Relief food was being supplied for a population of over 2,000, while the actual numbers were certainly less than half. With the surplus, some of the settlers were reconstructing their lives around their normal occupation of petty trade and hawking. Scarcely any of the first settlers had planted a seed since their arrival. In 1982 it was concluded that people in Old Tore had been there long enough to have reached self-sufficiency; food rations were cut drastically. By 1983 the residents were receiving no rations. Only 17 of those interviewed, or 14.5 per cent of the population of Old Tore, had been there from 1979. All the others, transported and settled at such enormous cost, had simply disappeared. Most of those who remained behind were the very elderly, the sick and the disabled, or the very young. These are the particularly vulnerable categories of people about which I shall have much more to say later. Among the original settlers was an elderly man, who, being completely alone and unable to fend for himself, was forced to beg each day's meal from either the local Sudanese or from settlers who could afford to share some food with him.

The military

Members of the Uganda military also entered with the first influx in 1979. Most officers who entered the Sudan (many also went to Zaire) took up residence in Juba. The formation of the Uganda National Rescue Front in 1979, under the temporary leadership of Moses Ali, was conducted with at least the informal permission of the Juba government and the security forces. Those who accepted assistance at that time are likely to have concealed their identity, as did most in the course of this research. Less than one per cent of the sample of assisted refugees indicated that the military was their former occupation, and among the self-settled none were so identified. The tendency was for former Ugandan soldiers to claim to have been 'only cultivators' which accounts for the relatively literate population of farmers. The overall average number of years of schooling reported by those giving farming as their occupation in Uganda was 1.52 years. But, among the men in this group, 20.2 per cent reported having spent three or more years in school. Moreover, 8.6 per cent of those with more than ten years in school said they were 'only cultivators' in Uganda.

The Sudan, particularly the south, lacks technically trained personnel in almost all fields and the arrival of qualified Ugandans was rightly seen by the Sudanese authorities as an opportunity for the southern economy. A considerable number of educated Ugandans got employment. While the Sudan Asylum Act 1974 allows for the employment of refugees who have acquired a work permit, there was general ignorance among the locals and the agencies of the existence of this legislation. Instead, most refugees who have jobs acquired their Sudanese nationality certificates by irregular means. Early on, some officials in Juba were encouraging this absorption of refugees into the workforce. Later - as tensions between locals and Ugandans increased refugees were forced to hide their real identity to get employment. Employed Ugandans began to fear that their lack of knowledge of the Arabic lingua franca might be discovered. Most Ugandans who obtained employment other than that provided by agencies had to lie about their nationality. This had serious repercussions on their relationships with their compatriots. In some cases when Ugandans lost their jobs, it was necessary to resume 'refugee' identity to obtain assistance or employment with agencies. When copies of the law were finally distributed in Yei River District, tensions between the communities were too high to implement it. For example, most of the professional staff of the National Tobacco Company (NTC) were 'ex-Ugandans', but in 1983 when NTC attempted to employ a Ugandan mechanic, the Sudanese employees threatened to go on strike.

Sudanese returnees

The first group entering the Sudan in 1979 also included Sudanese who had sought refuge in Uganda during the Sudan's civil war, and who had not returned home after 1972. By 1981 the Sudan government estimated that it had received some 60,000 of its nationals from Uganda. According to their local connections, occupational background, and wealth, they settled down in various parts of the region. For example, a few kilometres outside of KajoKaji, towards the Uganda border, is a market area where all the shops are owned by newly-returned Sudanese. At least a few returnees were peasant farmers and those interviewed near Panyume claimed to have returned to family land. Others returned with sufficient funds to establish larger businesses; the hotel in Yei was built by a man who returned in 1979. Up until 1983 he owned the only means of public transport between Yei and Juba, using buses formerly owned by private bus companies in Uganda. Later another bus company operated in the district, owned by a refugee who escaped in 1982 from Mbale, Uganda. Formerly he operated within Uganda and between Kampala and Nairobi. He managed to move with his buses into the Sudan.

Within Equatoria the return of many Sudanese professionals had an important impact upon Sudan's political developments. They supported Nemeiry's 1983 abrogation of the 1972 Addis agreement which dissolved the southern regional government and instituted a policy of decentralization. The change allowed some of them to take up vacancies in the civil service on the departure of those who were forced to return to their own home areas. Their influence accounts in part for the lack of enthusiasm in Equatoria in 1983-5 for joining the rebellion against the Khartoum government. (Malwal 1985.)

Although it is generally assumed that those Sudanese who returned in 1979 and after, did so with sufficient education or capital to re-establish themselves, this was not always the case. At the beginning, when there was no assistance programme, both Sudanese and Ugandans relied mainly on their own resources to survive. Later however, as the trickle of Sudanese continued, the programme discriminated in favour of Ugandans, or more accurately - non-Sudanese. In 1982 a wave of refugees included a Sudanese woman whose Ugandan husband had just been killed. She and her children were in a miserable condition, but when asked for blankets for this family, UNHCR said she did not qualify even for such limited assistance - the family was a Sudanese problem!

Similarly, a Sudanese returnee with his Kenyan wife and ten children lived in absolute poverty in Yei from 1979. Even after he died in 1982, there was considerable confusion as to whether his widow could be assisted through the refugee aid programme. When she had first presented herself to the UNHCR office in Yei for help, she claimed that her husband had died one year previously and that she was alone with ten children. Was she a refugee? The UNHCR office could not decide. Anyway, there was no budget for 'urban refugees' as the programme was restricted to helping refugees who agreed to go to settlements. She would not agree to go to a settlement because it meant withdrawing her children from school in Yei. She was employed as a domestic servant. Five days later she came to work totally distraught, saying that her child had died. A UNHCR consultant drove her home to find her husband lying dead on the floor of the house, his body not yet cold.

After his burial (paid for by personal contributions of the staff) had been arranged, one suggestion was that the only solution was to contact the Kenyan embassy in Khartoum, asking them to assume responsibility. But even if this had been done, the husband's Sudanese family would not have agreed to parting with their deceased relative's children. Later the woman lost her job because of alleged theft.

Among the returnees were a number of the more notorious henchmen of Idi Amin, Sudanese who had been specially recruited to serve the regime. One of the less well-known facts about the Amin regime is the role played by foreigners from Kenya, Zaire, and the Sudan in carrying out some of the worst atrocities. Lacking any personal links with the local people which might have restrained them from excessive violence, they were ideally suited to protect Amin's position. As one Ugandan explained,

Amin recruited people who had nothing by way of military training and he uplifted them from virtually nobody to very high ranks in the army, specifically to keep a watch on his staff college trained officers whom he feared would overthrow him, like Brigadier Taban Lopayi [a Sudanese], a former houseboy. Some of these people couldn't even hold a map the right way up.

Taban now lives near Yei. His living room is decorated with photographs which record major events in Amin's career.

Such individuals, and many other Sudanese who enjoyed the higher standard of living in Uganda, would like to return there. Some have given support to two opposition groups which were fighting against the Ugandan government troops. Such solidarity with the Ugandans who opposed Amin's overthrow (or were fighting to overthrow Obote) doubtless facilitated the reception of many who arrived in the first wave of refugees in 1979.

The problem of the mixed loyalties of the returnees and their association with Ugandans directly linked with Amin is highly complicated. For example, the connection with the Sudanese security and other top government officials in the Sudan of one notorious figure, Juma Oris, facilitated the formation in 1979 of the Uganda National Rescue Front. This ex-minister in Amin's government grew up in Nimule, the Sudanese border town on the east bank of the Nile. He had built a house in Juba which he rented to the British Council representative. When in 1981 the refugees wanted to form a humanitarian group he introduced them to the Minister of Interior in Khartoum. Later, when he discovered they planned to exclude all the ex-military, particularly anyone associated with Amin, he allegedly persuaded the Security to arrest John Yebuga, one of the leaders. Unaware of Oris's background (he was said to be wanted to answer a charge of murder in Uganda), he gave evidence to UNHCR of Yebuga's political' activities. Fortunately due to Amnesty's interventions, the latter was released from prison after a year. [2]

While some of the Amin supporters brought sufficient wealth (Ugandans would describe it as 'loot') to set up businesses, others found their way into the employment of aid agencies. Some have even managed to get jobs within refugee administration, others were drivers. Ironically, mostly through ignorance, they have been legitimised by such employment; their presence was a source of confusion, and in some cases, a threat to the security of refugees. Others have been reduced to poverty. One such returnee, formerly a governor of a region, now sells sambosa (beans, rice or meat fried in pastry), to the UNHCR staff in Juba. This food was first introduced to Uganda by Indians.

The liberation

Since most Ugandans welcomed the overthrow of Amin, they did not think of seeking asylum outside their home country. But from 1979 onwards people have found themselves forced out of their homes, buffeted about by a power struggle which had little meaning for them. They moved in response to immediate physical danger and to the need for food. These movements back and forth amidst the ferment of the anarchical power struggles of Uganda have since 1979, taken a shocking toll of human life; the consequences for Ugandan society are immeasurable.

It took nearly two months from the fall of Kampala in April 1979 for the liberation army to reach Koboko. The northern part of Uganda west of the Nile was not occupied until June. When the war began, people moved out of their compounds and into the bush. Those who were near the Zaire or Sudan border crossed it. Heads down, everybody waited.

But already any semblance of normal society had been severely disrupted by the march northwards and the subsequent occupation of the area. John Avruida describes this.

The liberators moved north to Koboko. Here they found nearly no living soul, for this was the place for more destruction. But the people were aware of this beforehand and had fled. In the course of moving to Koboko via a small county on the West Nile called Maracha, they left no hut, granary, chicken hut unburned. All food crops from the fields were either slashed or uprooted.

Once the occupying army was in control, people began moving back to their homesteads. While conditions could hardly be described as peaceful, the people had hopes that they would soon be left to resume their normal lives. Relationships with the Tanzanians are described by Ariartre Simon:

... the Tanzanian Army, who were said to have come to liberate Ugandans, made life hard for the citizens. They looted us proper. They snatched our watches, radios, television sets, bicycles, clothes, motorcars, lorries, machinery in factories ... We did not care ... after all, they would leave the country ... Good enough, they didn't kill.

But there were many cases of indiscriminate killing. Already the failure of President Lule to control the troops was taken by many west Nilers as evidence that they were to become the scapegoats for the crimes of Amin. This fear led many people to give up employment in other parts of the country and return home. As one informant explained, 'My first disturbance was from the Tanzanians in 1979. That year I was working in the Uganda Spinning Mill at Lira. From there I ran home to Moyo District. By then they didn't do anything bad to me.'

Still another reported:

I was first disturbed in 1979. We ran to Sudan but found it hard to stay because of lack of food. When I learnt that the Tanzanians were OK, I returned home with my family in November 1979. I went to Kampala to see my belongings which I left because of the war. l was working with the Ministry of Defence as a clerk. l found all my property looted. In December, I came back home.

But a war of attrition against the people of the area with which Amin was identified had already begun. Again, in Simon's words:

While the Tanzanians were busy looting, the Luo group was busy killing.... These immoral activities became encouraged when a military spokesman ordered the disarmament of what they called 'Idi Amin's soldiers' in July 1979. Many returned their guns to the new government and went to fill in surrender forms. They expected to be returned to the army because they were trained for Uganda~~s national army. What happened in those days was very sad. Many soldiers who went to fill in the surrender forms at their various army headquarters in their respective districts never returned to their homes. A good many never reached the prison yards. Their whereabouts are not known up to now. All soldiers became 'Amin's soldiers'. This is ironic. It is the irony of soldiers being owned by people. The soldiers couldn't be Amin's - after all, they had served the British and Obote.

Although there is evidence that a good proportion of the men in uniform surrendered their weapons and received the surrender certificates, it must have been a galling experience for them to be told to 'go and dig'. Moreover, they continued to be harassed even though they held a surrender form. According to Avrudia, 'Their lives were not secure, so many fled to the Sudan or Zaire.... Many civilians were mistaken to be soldiers and these either faced death or endless imprisonment in Luzira.' This period marked the forcible repatriation of refugees encamped inside Kenya. They included civilians as well as military and they were all returned to Uganda by the Kenyan government. 'Some of these faced death, others were miserably tortured and their whereabouts remain unknown.' Still, after Binaisa took over the presidency, there was considerable determination to resume normal life and to rebuild the country. In 1979 in the West Nile alone there had been some 8000 students enrolled in senior secondary schools or other post-primary educational institutions. One of these students who returned to his books, Joago Aligo Brani, relates his experience which reflects the general appreciation West Nilers feel towards Binaisa. During his short rule he at least voiced the need to reconcile the disparate groups in the country.

By 1979 I was in Senior Four. We were interrupted by the liberation ... on 11 April 1979 we had our first term holidays as well. It was the time when Kampala was captured by the liberators. We in the extreme north had very little to worry about. There was the rumour that the liberators were coming to kill all the Madi, Alur, Lugbara, and the Kakwa, but nothing of that happened. In order to protect or secure our lives, some - mostly Kakwas - that year took off into the surrounding countries, namely Zaire and Sudan. During Binaisa's regime things were rather cool [calm]. Trucks were moving freely. But our college (Koboko S.S.) was thoroughly looted by the natives, the Ugandan soldiers and the liberators. So during Binaisa's regime there was reconstruction at the college... After the reconstruction we, the Senior Fours ...

and the Senior Six ... were called ... for our final exams. Results were out. I was taken to Mvara Secondary School ... to study biology, chemistry, and geography.

The relative calm of the period under Binaisa began to break in April 1980, when the Tanzanian occupying forces were gradually replaced by the newly-recruited Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) led by officers who had defected to Tanzania and elsewhere during Amin's rule. The further deterioration of conditions was marked by the late May military takeover of Binaisa's government. People relate how they had been warned by the Tanzanians that things would not go well for them after their departure. The bitter reality was soon to become apparent. It was the disturbances of this period which most affected the Moyo districts, the Madi's homeland. Among those living in settlements, 17.8 per cent of the Madi entered the Sudan in 1979 and 56.6 per cent in 1980.

In response to the rise in the number of atrocities against civilians, resistance groups developed spontaneously in many parts of the west Nile, and these culminated in the 'invasion' of Arua by opposition forces in October 1980.

Joago reports his experience at this time:

... the guerrilla war of 7 October interrupted my education. It got me when I was still in Arua. So I had to foot from Arua to our home which is 60 miles for two days. And I arrived home at night when people had gone for sleep. Parents were very happy and excited when they saw me. They thought I was by then killed. After the guerrilla war we stayed in Uganda hiding ourselves in the bush until the time we were forced out by the threat of Obote's army. In July 1982 we then pushed into the Sudan and lost plenty of our property. l also had four orphans with whom I escaped, and they are still with me.

Following this invasion, and before the 1980 elections, between 25 October and 2 November 1980, the government organized a fact-finding tour of Nebbi, Arua and Moyo districts. At Gulu, the five-man team was informed that 'things in West Nile were very bad. Many people have left their homes... Currently there are daily ambushes between [i.e. alongside] Moyo-Yumbe-Koboko road... There is a great deal of misbehavior by soldiers who are doing excessive looting. [3]

The indiscipline of the UNLA soldiers was exacerbated by their living conditions which were described in this report as 'appalling'. Among the atrocities which the UNLA soldiers had committed was the killing of six people at a mission at Ediofe, 'including one nun'. The general deterioration of relations between civilians and the UNLA which had occurred before the invasion are described in the report.

The senior army officers in the District were always drunk, involved in magendo [smuggling], had lacked command, harassed civilians, and in one or two places, it is alleged that they murdered some people. They also associated freely with Amin's henchmen residing in Zaire and Uganda, giving chance for the men to know exactly their behavior. In one instance, a County Chief from Koboko who came to report that Amin's men were going to invade, was arrested by Captain Olong and later this chief was killed.

The invading guerilla forces were described as having met with no resistance and having taken Arua with 'virtually nothing, apart from small firearms (pistols, hand grenades, rifles, pangas, spears, and bows and arrows)'. Their motives, according to the team, were:

1. Destabilization of the Uganda Government and disruption of the general elections.

2. Revenge for the humiliation suffered in the 1979-80 war and revenge for mistreatment of their relations by the UNLA.

3. Looting.

4. Military adventurism (craziness).

The team learned how, following the invasion, and 'out of anger', the UNLA had carried out a campaign of revenge against the people which resulted in the wholesale destruction of factories, government buildings, and missions and the burning of houses in which 'many people died'. The result: 'Now civilians run away when they see any soldier in uniform.'

Sophie Abdullah, a Ugandan nurse, living and working in Pakula settlement in the Sudan, was working in Arua hospital at that time.

The army came in very suddenly on 9 October. They began by shooting into the air and then killed a student. Almost all the girls in the hostel were raped. They pillaged and looted. l left with one bag containing a few clothes and my toothbrush. I was one of the lucky ones to manage to escape into Zaire by car. There I joined my seven brothers and my father who had fled to Zaire the previous year. At first we hid in the bush, never knowing when the army would raid. We slept under trees. I am afraid of snakes .

The official report continues: 'There is nobody to be seen along the MadiOkollo-Arua route. There are less than 1,000 people in Arua staying at the missions... Bishop Tarantino said that he has been reliably informed that 200,000 to 300,000 people have taken refuge in Zaire.' In this section of the report a significant point is underlined: 'We were prevented from visiting Koboko and Yumbe towns. We have learnt that there are no people in these towns.'

As the team travelled through the area, they saw one scene of horror after another. In Moyo they found that 'The soldiers had been left uncontrolled. They have killed, looted and damaged property at will. They have occupied all the government and commercial buildings in Moyo. They harass those who have taken refuge in Moyo Mission.'

Registrations for voting in the December elections were undertaken and many students living in exile had been involved in this process. Although most of the people were hiding in the bush, great effort was made to find and register them. Some registrars even crossed into Zaire to register Ugandans who had sought safety there. Alleged verbal attacks and threats against the people of the West Nile on Obote's part in his pre-election campaign, did not improve the situation . When he came to Koboko there was an attempt to kill him and he only narrowly escaped. By voting time, l 2 December, the UNLA was on the rampage throughout the area, undoubtedly facilitating the 'unopposed' return of Obote's UPC candidates.

One refugee who finally registered for settlement in 1983 describes his family's experiences during that time.

When the war was at its maximum in 1980, we started running from Arua through the bush. When I came to Lodonga, we started collecting cows and goats and other small food stuff for the journey to Sudan. In Keri, two of my brothers (Safi and Kasim) were shot dead. They were assigned the duty of caring for the goats during the escape. When they got killed by the UNLA the goats got lost as well. I was in charge of the cattle. I came to Keyi and then to Cakulia. There my mother decided to go [back] to Lodonga to get cassava. She was shot dead by the UNLA at Rube, near the Kochi River. My father, Fodimola, was also a victim. My mother was called Sura. When my parents were shot, l, with my four brothers, crossed the Kaya River and came and settled in Uniga [Sudan]. We stayed there for one year. We got word that our brothers Brani and Swadiki, were shot at Lodonga Trading Centre by the UNLA.

Still living on the border inside Sudan, he explains what finally led to their decision to come to a settlement.

When our 55 cows were used for purchasing food, we had no other alternative but to come to an assisted settlement. I am fed up of packing people in one tent. I feel I am suffocating, especially when it is hot. East or west, home is better, but I am not going to Uganda if the civil war goes on. I sold our sewing machine to send Habibu to school and to give us at least a day or so to use the balance to release us from the daily casual labour. To start petty trade is difficult for I have no bike to move from place to place. [4]

After the elections, with the Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) declared the victor, violence escalated throughout Uganda, but especially in the north-western region. Ariatre Simon describes the attack on Augurua Market, just one of many such incidents which prompted the emergence of more organized resistance throughout the area:

This small market is located by the bank of the river Anyau in Terrego County. 18 miles from Arua town. I was an eye-witness of these happenings. At about 5:00 p.m. East African standard time, when the market was at its highest capacity with about 2000 people in the market square it was surrounded by ... Obote's wicked soldiers. All of a sudden, there was a flow of bullets over the crowd from the western side of the market. These soldiers were led by the UPC youth. What a tragedy! Women threw away babies they nourished, fishmongers, blacksmiths, beer-sellers and many other categories of sellers and buyers sped for their lives. Money, goods, bicycles, and the abandoned babies were left to their misery. Alas! The river had flooded - those who took the river direction jumped into the river no matter whether they knew how to swim or not. Very few of them were saved. A horrible sight it was, hundreds floating drowned.... One brother ... was shot dead on the spot with more than one hundred of the group. Those corpses remained there. unburied, for weeks ...

Despite the wholesale slaughter of civilians by UNLA (usually in revenge after an attack by one of the bands of opposition groups who, from the time of the elections, were attempting to 'liberate' the West Nile), most civilians still did not leave the country. Families would move a few kilometers away from their compounds and build a shelter, only to be disturbed again and forced to rebuild. Some refugees report having built as many as eight shelters or more inside Uganda before crossing the border.

I started suffering in the year 1980 when the UNLA took over the government. I ran to Iwanga with my family. There I stayed two years. In 1982, the army reached Iwanga. That was in February 1982. They started to kill our people and collect our properties such as cattle, bicycles, clothes.... I moved up to Lodonga which is in Aringa County. There my father was shot.

An informant living at the Koya transit centre during September 1983, Mr Alahayi Korubuga, who did not enter the Sudan until 1983, describes his movements:

In 1979 I was in Kampala and left all my property, including my own tractor. We used a taxi from Kampala to our village in Aringa. I stayed for one month at home. During the second month, the Tanzanian soldiers arrived, stationed at Midigo ... my elder brother was shot by the Kombozi [Tanzanian soldiers] who brought a truck to collect our things. Fifty cows, one landrover, one generator, and one pick-up (Peugeot) were all looted. They continued coming to our home so often. Oseni, my brother, was arrested by them. Up to now he is in Luzira prison. After one week, Ismail, a brother of mine, was shot by the Tanzanian forces in 1979. All the incidents which occurred scared us. We came to Puree, on the Uganda-Sudan border. We stayed in Puree for two years. When the UNLA came, they forced us out. Seima and Bako ... were killed in one spot at Puree in 1983. We came to Mangalotore [inside Sudan] and we stayed for two months. Problems like food, medicine and education were beyond our tolerance. In June we started for an assisted settlement.

The determination of the UNLA to avenge past sufferings for which the people of the West Nile were held responsible was made explicit through inscriptions on walls and trees; for example, 'The Lugbara killed our people, now it must be our turn to kill them.' Civilians took to sleeping away from their homesteads and returning during the morning hours to tend their farms. Markets functioned only in the morning hours.

... in the afternoon one would only meet soldiers in the streets. During this time, the safest person was a concubine, the only neighbour [friend] of the Acholi or Langi. The death toll went very high so that everyone nearly forgot Amin's lawlessness. Death statistics reminded one of Obote's [supposed] statement that Arua or West Nile shall not be spared, but must be turned into a modern national park. [5]

All vestiges of order began breaking down. As people started spending more time hiding in the bush, agriculture was neglected. With property unguarded, civilians joined the soldiers in looting. James Appe (1983) describes the situation:

The state of confusion proved to be beneficial to many people in many ways. Ben, for example, had gathered around himself a group of youths. They made it a point to eat at least three chickens every day in the dead of night. The poor birds were abandoned and the boys went and gathered these and ate them.... Little children were now being turned into gangs of dangerous people. Some went and ambushed their own brothers en route and looted them. Human conscience was again being destroyed in them.

Amid the chaos, people were rapidly abandoning other social values, as evident in another incident this author relates. Hiding in the bush with his family, he walked, 'just a few smokes away', to visit his friend Ben, who had just erected a rough shelter for himself and his mother. When Appe arrived, Ben was eating a piece of pumpkin that his mother had rescued from their homestead some distance away. They talked about where next they would hide.

... Ben's mother entered the small cleared place where we sat. She greeted me, but her voice sounded distant. She quickly covered up the cooked pumpkin in the cooking pot, grunted and sat down, looking away from us. I knew her thoughts and I was angry. I looked at Ben. He looked down, and I knew he was angry or ashamed at his mother's action.... Here was Ben's mother, a woman who could call, and who indeed did call me her 'son' on many occasions, suddenly transformed into something quite different. Ben's mother was kind and loving. She had always asked me to stay for every meal I found her preparing. But now she had to cover up the cooked pumpkin for the same person she had so adored. I did not blame her. The forces of nature and the activities of men could thus change charity into hatred and love into war.... Ben's mother had previously had commitment to a larger community and lived and shared things with them. Now, when her life was threatened, she had as her community only herself and Ben, her son. Next, when we have to run and hide, when gunshots scatter us, she will only have herself to think about - not even Ben. (ibid.)

Early 1981 had seen the spontaneous emergence of fighting all over the area. Peasants joined ex-soldiers attempting to protect people and property from the undisciplined guns of the UNLA and others. Initially impressive successes were scored against the government troops in many parts of the West Nile. Although there was no overall organization to this fighting, throughout most of 1981 the region was more or less under local control. A skeletal civilian administrative structure began functioning and some military assistance was coming from outside the country.

While indiscipline characterized the conduct of almost all who carried a gun, the anti-government fighters were, on the whole, better trained than Obote's troops. Many of the anti-government troops were career soldiers whose recruitment pre-dated Amin's rise to power, and they were skilled guerrilla fighters. People who had been displaced by the trouble following the withdrawal of the Tanzanian troops gradually began returning to their homes.

Most of the anti-government fighting was organized under the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF). Moses Ali, a Minister of Finance under Amin, was temporarily designated as its leader. He was believed to have funds in Europe and, being Muslim, also had connections in Libya. He had also satisfied those fighting in the bush that he had no desire to bring back an Amin government. [6]

The initial success against Obote's forces encouraged some of Amin's officers who were living (comfortably) in Zaire and the Sudan to return to Uganda. One was Colonel Elly Hassan, who had been living in Zaire and he arrived on the scene after the taking of Arua. Announcing that he had direct contact with Amin, who would supply arms, he demanded recognition as the highest ranking officer. He called his movement the Ugandan Army (UA) and designated Koboko as the central command headquarters. According to refugees who were present, his men commandeered transport to haul television sets and other valuables out of the country, even neglecting to secure the heavy arms and ammunition which had been captured at the Arua barracks. Introducing further division into the loosely organized antigovernment forces, Hassan is said to have announced that Koboko would belong only to Kakwa-speakers. Instead of fighting, however, again according to men involved in the fighting at the time, Hassan's men began smuggling coffee out of Uganda to Zaire and the Sudan, and became notorious for their atrocities against the civilian population.

Eventually UNRF coalesced and managed to push the UA out of Uganda, but with heavy losses. This internal fighting weakened the anti-government forces, however, and allowed UNLA gradually to take control. In Arua, some degree of normality had returned by July 1982 and some refugees were returning to the district from Zaire. The military positions in mid-July 1982, are shown on the sketch map (Figure 1:1). Although the UNLA had penetrated the entire area they were tied down to the towns.

Elly Hassan settled down as a refugee near the border town of Kaya in the Sudan. It is said that his 60 or so men concentrated on coffee-smuggling activities with the complicity of locals on both sides of the Zaire-Sudan border. Reports that these guerrillas set up roadblocks and looted civilians who tried to pass into Zaire were so frequently brought to the attention of UNHCR that is was difficult not to believe they had basis in fact. They even circulated in the town of Kaya, collecting taxes from refugees on Sudan's territory! Such lack of discipline among the guerrillas led more people to opt for the settlements.

Within Uganda the main victims of violence were civilians. UNLA soldiers, unable to confront the guerrillas in the bush, challenged every civilian who moved outside his homestead or village. Those captured were forced to reveal the whereabouts of others. At one point, many of the captured civilians - including women - were dressed in UNLA uniforms and their commander reported that, after a long battle in March 1982 they found to their horror - that they had killed their own people.

Dr Umar, the only medical doctor working inside the guerrilla-controlled area, wrote a report on conditions inside Uganda. His report is a graphic description of the inordinate sufferings of the people who remained. After enumerating the population still trapped there and describing the appalling health conditions, he notes,

Death is so common it is no longer a bereavement. Life has lost its meaning. The dead are not even given their due respect. Many are unburied, especially those who perish from the barrel [of a gun]. Those who get buried are wrapped in banana leaves, for burial cloth has become a treasure hard to come by.

By 1982 the UNRF had no other source of arms other than that which they could capture. Internal factionalism increased. As one man who had commanded anti-UNLA fighters near Obongi explained at an interview in Nairobi, any officer who had money or cigarettes could bribe the men of another officer to turn against him.

The soldiers of UNLA had problems of a similar nature. First, it was nearly impossible for the government in Kampala to supply the troops in north-west Uganda, and the guerrillas were frequently successful attacking convoys carrying food and arms. Standing by the UNHCR reception office at the Kaya border in 1982, one could watch UNLA soldiers digging cassava, and there were incidents when these men sold their arms to Sudanese in exchange for food. A number of UNLA men defected to UNRF. Secondly, ethnic and religious tensions sometimes led to violence in the barracks and contributed to the general lack of discipline. A report on September 8, 1982 informed the UNHCR office of a battle which took place inside the barracks at Oraba, the border post just inside Uganda and within site of the UNHCR centre for receiving refugees. 'A lot of guns were shot in the barracks that night but the end result is not known.'

In September, the UNRF held a meeting inside Uganda in an attempt to improve their fighting force. Officers who were 'causing confusion' were discredited and Moses Ali's leadership was repudiated. Efforts were made to contact Major C. Mondo, another officer with a long career in the military who had earned the respect of the troops. It was hoped that Mondo, a Christian, would agree to take command of UNRF forces. He refused. In November, at another meeting in Chei, Arua District, the UNRF approved a civilian political wing. Given the lack of new supplies of ammunition, the efforts to change the character of the UNRF organization were futile.

In October 1982 military information filtered into the Sudan that the UNLA planned to strengthen its forces stationed in the north-west Nile. It was reliably reported to UNHCR that 80,000 civilians were still trapped inside Uganda and were at risk once the dry season allowed the UNLA to burn the grass and expose their hiding places. In December when the Obote government made its big push northward towards the Sudan border, it met with little resistance and thousands more refugees fled into the Sudan.

{DIAGRAM: FIG-1-1}

Fig. 1.1. Sketch map of the military positions in the north-west Nile, July 1982

Obote's 'Christmas exercise' was described as 'particularly brutal'; 14,000 new refugees entered the country in December and after 4 January the rate of entry increased dramatically. With no food available (to say nothing of blankets, tents, or medicines), OXFAM found the weekly ration in one settlement was one kilogram of unground dura (sorghum) and half a cup of fish powder. While children under five need a very minimum of 1000 Kcal for survival, they were receiving only 533 Kcal.

The situation is 'fluid'

Throughout 1981 there had been no peace for the civilians. The fortunes of opposing armies changed from day to day, and civilians moved in response. While some moved into UNHCR settlements, most waited on the border or hid in the bush in Uganda, attempting to keep within reach of food supplies. By the beginning of 1982, thousands of refugee families had established compounds along the entire length of the border. Because there were few Sudanese living there, they were able to get land. Staying on the border not only allowed the refugees to maintain their independence, they were also able to keep in touch with events inside Uganda. Many fighters kept their families in the relative safety of this area. Farming was extensive on both sides of the border at those points where the resistance was still in control. The lack of cohesion and order among anti-Obote forces, together with the general chaos and frequent guerrilla attacks on civilians, gradually led to a loss of confidence in the UNRF. Mounting shortages of food affected soldiers from both sides, as well as the civilians who kept risking their lives by returning to Uganda for food. Civilians were required to pay a modest 'tax' to guerrilla leaders or the local administrators whom they had appointed. In return, a permit was issued which guaranteed safe movement in and out of Uganda. Civilians apprehended by anti-Obote fighters, if without such a permit, were suspected of being UNLA collaborators. While they could be released, usually a relative had to pay several head of cattle; in the absence of such resources some captured civilians were killed. While almost every ethnic group indigenous to Uganda is represented in the refugee population of Yei River District, the majority come from those groups whose homes were in the West Nile and Moyo Districts: Madi, Lugbara, Kakwa, and the Nubi. The ethnic composition of the groups interviewed is shown in Table 1:1. The numbers who entered each year reflect the rise and fall of hostilities.

That many Ugandans fled first to Zaire has been noted. Although UNHCR had mounted an assistance programme there and had set up agricultural settlements away from the border, most refugees did not settle in them. Zaireois soldiers are not noted for their discipline and conditions were compounded by the fact that, at various times, their complicity with the Ugandan government permitted UNLA soldiers to enter Zaireois territory and attack refugees who were living there. The head of a family which was waiting for settlement at the Otogo transit centre in 1983 relates their experience:

We were first disturbed in the year 1979. We escaped to Zaire. As conditions improved afterwards, we returned to Uganda. During the 1980 disturbances, we ran back to Zaire. The Zairean soldiers became so aggressive we decided to come to Sudan. We settled around Kaya where we have stayed three years.

 

TABLE 1.1: The ethnic composition of refugees in settlements and of households of self-settled interviewed.*

* The totals in this and all other tables in this hook do not always reflect the total number interviewed. This discrepancy is due to errors or to the fact that one or other question was not answered

TABLE 1.2: Number of households entering the Sudan by year

TABLE 1.3: 'What is your mother tongue ?' by 'When did you settle here' (self-settled)

TABLE 1.4: 'Mother tongue' by 'year first entered the Sudan' (assisted)

Refugees tried to remain near the border so that they could slip back into Uganda for food. But security conditions deteriorated in Zaire. In April 1983, soldiers gave self-settled refugees 'notice to quit'; that is, they had a choice of returning to Uganda or entering the Sudan. In June 1983 10,000 refugees registered for settlements at the reception centres along the border. Some came directly from Uganda, many were forced out of the self-settled areas by drought, but most entered from Zaire. Table 1.5 gives the numbers of assisted refugees in Sudan who first fled to Zaire by the year first disturbed in Uganda. The table shows a dramatic reduction in that flight direction; interviews and statements such as the following provide the reason for the change in numbers who first went to Zaire.

I was first disturbed in 1979 and we ran to Zaire. We stayed there for four years until April 1983.1 decided to seek for further asylum in the Sudan. I left Zaire due to the mistreatment and inhuman behaviour of the Zairean army. Every household item, ranging from a needle up to the human being is very much wanted - dead or alive.

TABLE 1.5: 'Did you first run to Zaire?' by year first disturbed in Uganda (assisted)

It reveals how the behaviour of the soldiers increasingly discouraged Ugandans from seeking asylum there.

After Old Tore had been opened in 1979, it was not necessary to open another settlement, Kala, until October 1980. Two other settlements were established at about the same time, all three in response to the influx following escalating violence in the Moyo districts of Uganda. When a Ugandan leprosy inspector entered the Sudan with about fifty of his patients, they were settled just across the road from a Sudanese leprosy colony, Mogiri, a few miles inland from Kajo-Kaji. The early influx had also brought thousands of cattle. As, further inland, their cattle would be threatened by tsetse fly, local officials arranged for the owners to settle eleven kilometres from Kajo-Kaji. Even before entering the Sudan, many of the cattle had already been lost to raiding UNLA and guerrilla fighters who looted civilians in flight. Other cattle owners remained on the border with their cows, living on this resource until all were either consumed or sold. Two per cent of the sample of settlements reported bringing cattle - most of these were living in Mondikolo. These people reported having had 3,900 cattle on their arrival, but by 1983 only 520 head were left. Although some cattle were sold or consumed, disease accounted for the loss of 73 per cent. Of those households who arrived with cattle, only 140 households still had any cows at the time of the interviews and of these only 2.4 per cent could report a net increase in their herds. The failure to provide veterinary services to save these thousands of cattle has meant an incalculable loss to the local economy. Some cattle owners still living outside settlements, aware of the lack of a veterinary service, resisted moving to settlements on this account alone.

After Tore, Mogiri, Mondikolo and Kala settlements, it was not necessary to open another settlement until July 1981, when Limbe settlement, located on the Yei-Juba road, was established. Of the present population of these five communities only 31.7 per cent now living there registered in the first year they were opened. This suggests that not only have most of the original settlers in Old Tore abandoned their new homes, but many others have also found alternatives to living in the assisted settlements established for them.

Why did you wait so long?

Early in 1982, when the influx of Ugandans reached 'emergency' proportions, three reception centres were set up along the border. Later in May a fourth, at Nyori, was established, simply because one day the programme officer and I found hundreds of people sitting under a thatched roof (a local church) quietly starving to death. The condition of the Ugandans who came to these reception centres from May through to August was appalling. Still believing that settlement was the better solution for all refugees, I could not fathom the logic of people allowing themselves to die when relief was thought to be available. [7] I could not repress the question 'Why did you wait so long?' as I watched the hundreds of people - not only children but also adults - swollen with kwashiorkor or other nutrition-related diseases, crawl off the lorries. Hundreds were too far gone to be saved by food or medicine, as is confirmed by the death rates collected in the 1983 survey. But resistance to accepting the 'UNHCR umbrella' is clearly demonstrated by the pattern of registration for settlement. Only 20.1 per cent of all those entering the country from 1979 to September 1983 immediately sought (or accepted) assistance on arrival. Table 1.6 demonstrates this preference for remaining independent. And, according to the statements of the 9.4 per cent who registered in 1979 - that the decision to go to a settlement was imposed on them - less than one-fifth of all refugees living in assisted settlements, actually wished to be there.

All other refugees attempted to remain self-settled but conditions along the border made this increasingly difficult. First, there was the shortage of land. Those who entered the Sudan after 1981 found it difficult to acquire agricultural land and later, by 1982, many of them were too weak to undertake farming. There were also great shortages of seeds and tools. And, despite the growth in the number of people living in these border areas, there had not been corresponding growth in medical provision.

TABLE 1.6: 'Where did you go next upon entering the Sudan?' (assisted)

People in the assisted settlements were asked how many years they had lived on their own, independent of the aid programme. Table 1.7 shows the number of years self-settled by the year of their entering the Sudan. (Some of these had counted their time in Zaire before entering the Sudan.) These data support the argument that increasing pressures, including economic decline, have gradually forced formerly unassisted refugees finally to move to a settlement.

TABLE 1.7: Number of years self-settled by year of first entry into the Sudan (assisted)

* Some were reporting the number of years self-settled in Zaire

TABLE 1.8: 'Why did you come to the settlement?' by year of arrival in settlement of first member of household (assisted)

Refugees living in assisted settlements were asked why they had opted to come, and those living as self-settled were similarly questioned as to why, especially given the obvious suffering of many, they did not go.

Although when asked why they had come to a settlement informants would give one answer or another, the main reasons, the lack of medical facilities and education, affected everyone in the self-settled areas. The shortage of land in 1982-3 meant that latecomers were under the greatest economic stress. The difficulties of survival in the self-settled areas which host so many refugees and yet have received no assistance, are demonstrated by the movements of these people. Note the steady increase in the percentages by year of refugees who have had to leave one self-settled area for another. 'If conditions are so difficult, why don't you register for an assisted settlement?' Table 1.10 gives the replies of informants to this question.

Table 1.9: 'When did you settle here ?' and 'Where did you settle before?' (self-settled)

Table 1.10: 'Why not register for an assisted settlement?' and 'When did you settle here?' (self-settled)

Table 1.11: 'What are your main problems here? and why not register for assisted settlement?' (unassisted)

Unassisted refugees were asked what were their main problems 'here'. Interviewers recorded several answers, but presuming the most salient to be the most important, only the first answer was coded. Table I .11 shows their responses by their answers to the question, 'Why not register for an assisteci settlement?' According to informants who answered the question, their most serious problem was access to food, and then medicine; 65.7 reported having no access to a dispensary or even a dressing station. But, interestingly, tools ranked as the next most serious problem. That the need for cash and education were mentioned by an equal number of the respondents suggests that although 74.5 per cent said the children did not go to school, it is likely that many of those who were determined that their children should be educated, had already sent them to a settlement. Of those self-settled children who were attending school, 76.7 per cent were going to government schools, 22.2 per cent were attending schools (or madaris) built by refugees, and 1.1 per cent were in schools outside Sudan (probably in Zaire or Uganda).

Insecurity

All refugees who remained self-settled were vulnerable to the conditions of insecurity. Among those who first went to Zaire, 17.0 per cent said they had come to a settlement because of Harassment', while 28.5 per cent of those who moved directly to the Sudan report harassment as their reason for registering for settlement. This is not to suggest that the Sudanese were even less hospitable to refugees than were the Zaireois. A number of forces were responsible for the buffeting of the self-settled refugees. Early on, those who did not come with sufficient money or property to disappear into the local community camped in abandoned buildings. Officials responsible for the refugee programme at the time, keenly aware of the constraints of international aid, were periodically imposing the settlement policy on those refugees who could be located. [8]

Other factors that influenced the reception of refugees by locals will be discussed when considering the problems of protection and integration in more detail. But certainly, as the Kakwa example demonstrates, a shared language and ethnic background was important, and in the case of many Lugbara from Aringa County, occupation was also a major cause of their victimisation by locals. By 1983, for example, the notion that 'all Aringas are thieves' was widely accepted. The Lugbara had come late and most men were traders by occupation. It is likely that this stereotype grew more out of their ability to drive a hard bargain than to an actual rise in the number of crimes they committed.

Official 'policy' also changed from time to time with personnel changes in the government office in Yei. On one occasion in 1982, for example, the 'A' Commissioner went on tour of the Kajo-Kaji region. Infuriated by the behaviour of one refugee who, among other things, had signed a letter as 'ADC (assistant district commissioner) Kampala', a position he had held under Amin, the Commissioner called meetings of the chiefs and local people throughout the densely populated border area and ordered that all refugees be given notice to quit. The method then chosen by some locals to evict refugees was to loot their crops and other property. Many self-settled refugees forced out at this time went to Kansuk, the nearest new settlement at the time of this expulsion. They had, as a group, the longest experience of being self-settled.

The major source of insecurity, however, was not the Sudanese but incursions by the UNLA into the Sudan where they killed refugees (and Sudanese), burned houses, and looted property. These incursions happened less frequently while the UNRF held most of the area south of the border, but from September 1982 there were regular UNLA forays into the Sudan. These have continued throughout 1984. Even had the Sudan had the political will, the few soldiers stationed along this border would have been insufficient to repel such attacks. My data include details of dozens of incursions, but the following account is typical of what caused many refugees to give up their compounds in self-settled areas.

On 2.11.83 the army crossed into Nambiri village in the Sudan (Ojiga area) in pursuit of the so-called guerrillas. However there were no casualties because all the refugees self-settled there ran away inland. On 2.12.83 the army also crossed into Kangai and Pure villages in the Kajo-Kaji area, to cut off the self-settled refugees into Uganda. In the incident, six people were killed and twenty-three abducted, together with seven Sudanese later released from Arua when they produced tickets [tax receipts]. On 18.12.83 there was heavy fighting between Lissa and Keri at the borders.

It may be that differences in the experiences of death and violence account for the decisions of some households to give up independence and go to the settlements. There was considerable debate among refugees as to whether death rates are higher in settlements or among unassisted refugees. We asked both groups of people to list those who had died in their households from the time they were first disturbed by the war in Uganda in 1979 until they 'settled here'. People were then asked to list those whom they had buried 'here'. For the assisted, 'here' meant the settlement and for the unassisted their present compound. Great care was taken to insist that family members named each person who had died and gave the cause of their death - malnutrition, shot by guerrillas or the UNLA, 'natural causes', etc. (The data were coded as a total of deaths and did not distinguish the causes.)

Analysis of the responses suggests that the death rate in settlements is lower than among the unassisted. The average household size in settlements was 5.29 and the overall average deaths per household since arrival was 0.41. The average household size among the unassisted refugees was 7.15, with an overall average of 0.90 deaths per household since settling at the place interviewed. To put it another way: one in every fourteen persons died in the assisted settlements, while one in nine died among the unassisted.

However, the question concerning the number of deaths since the war began in April 1979 and before arriving 'here', revealed a staggering contrast between the two groups. Unassisted refugees reported an overall average loss of 1.80 family members per household, while assisted refugees reported an average number of 5.70 family members per household who had died during their flight from Uganda or in Sudan or Zaire. While the recorded data did not distinguish where these people had died, verbatim accounts suggest that many were killed in the Sudan as a result of incursions by the UNLA. The following are typical statements. The household comprised an old woman living with her son and his three children. He was the spokesman.

We came to Sudan in January 1983 and settled at Kala on the border. That month there was an army incursion which we saw with our own eyes. The UNLA soldiers came to the house and found my two brothers and they were killed on the spot. Their names are Amin Gorobe and Hasin Yakobo. Their two wives and six children were then captured. [Informant lists all their names] ... I returned and buried my two brothers. The rest of the family are still missing.

In the course of this interview, which included details of the death of another daughter in the settlement, the old woman's son said that the family would Xhang themselves' rather than return to Uganda. He went on to say 'I used to be a UPC member. If there was no safety for me, who was safe?'

Another household head in the same settlement, Wonduruba, reported the names of his wife and sister-in-law who were shot together in 1982 by the UNLA 'askari' (soldiers) inside the Sudan. Yet another 'family' of seven boys (the eldest being 22 years old) reported a similar incident inside the Sudan near Kajo-Kaji. This self-settled family comprised their parents, three sisters, and a 'step-mother and step-father' (i.e. his uncle and aunt). In March 1982, about fifty UNLA soldiers came to the house at six in the morning. Luckily the boys were outside and heard someone inside the house shouting a warning to them. They hid, and saw their step-parents being shot in front of the house, their parents and sisters being marched away at gunpoint, the family's animals (which included 82 cows, 20 goats, 60 sheep, and 48 chickens) being collected by the soldiers, and the house set alight. The boys now live in Wonduruba, a settlement opened in March 1983.

An interviewer recorded the following case in Morsak settlement.

This couple stayed inside Uganda until 1982. Between 1979 and 1982 they say they have built shelters or houses, together with other members of their family, a total of 25 times. During this time, four women in the family were ambushed while collecting water from a stream. Government troops caught them and demanded to know the names of any local members of 'Amin's army'. The women were unable to give any names and were killed. A small boy escaped to relate the story to the others hiding in the bush. In April, this couple, together with their parents, moved into the Sudan. They lived in a separate hut from their father. In April 1983, a group of huts were surrounded by government troops [UNLA], including their father's hut. Eighteen people were killed, including him, the father. This event, compounded by the drought in the area, was enough to convince them that the border area was not safe. They moved to Otogo transit and then on to Morsak on 29 June 1983. Two days later their mother died. Their brother has two wives on the border and has returned to visit them. He has not returned. This young couple are now on their own with their baby which was born in the Ugandan bush. The child is seriously malnourished. The boy has two other brothers who escaped to Zaire and they have no word from them. Their seven goats and twelve chickens were taken by the Askari.

The vulnerability of this young couple was emphasized in the remarks of the interviewer. 'It is worth remembering that this young couple are still only aged 19 and 17. Back in Uganda they were dependent on the boy's father, who even allowed him [though married] to go to school.'

The fluidity of the security situation for the self-settled refugees is illustrated by the alarming turn of events in September 1983, and afterwards. With the north-west corner of Uganda cleared of most of its human population, the UNLA stationed at Moyo initiated friendly contacts with the military and civil servants stationed at Kajo-Kaji. Officially the border was closed. Whisky began pouring into the market inside Sudan in exchange for food which was unavailable in that part of Uganda. The military even held a football match in Kajo-Kaji. A delegation of UPC officials entered the Sudan and went as far as Mondikolo and Mogiri settlement. One was said to have carried a handgun. They walked into the settlements and informed people they would be returning with lorries to transport them home.

One local chief reported the matter, sending messages as far as Khartoum, and he angrily confronted the UNHCR officer in Yei, pointing out that if UNHCR refused to protect the refugees in his area, it should then send lorries and remove them to settlements far away. Later in 1984 the local Sudanese officials were persuaded to allow Ugandan intelligence to spend several weeks inside the country. Satisfied that there were no guerrilla bases, they still believed self-settled refugees were supplying the opposition with food. The Ugandan government insisted that Sudan move all the self-settled refugees away from the border.

While earlier UNHCR had contended that altogether there were only 20,000 self-settled refugees in Yei River District, they suddenly became aware of the scale of the proposed operation. The Commissioner for Refugees office was informed in no uncertain terms that UNHCR could not cope with what they now realized would involve moving up to 40,000 people from this subdistrict alone. Nevertheless, for those evicted, six new settlements were opened in Mundri District, far away from the border. In June some 10,000 refugees were still waiting in transit camps near Yei. UNHCR had no food to distribute, they were living on the food they had grown and carried with them. As one refugee wrote, 'It is indeed a sorrowful sight.'

As a strategy to prevent the Sudanese from continuing any further forced movement of these self-settled refugees near Kajo-Kaji, UNHCR refused to provide them with any assistance. Nevertheless, the population of refugees at the Mondikolo transit camp rose from 980 in October 1984 to 13,000. Even these people were, it was reported, being 'deliberately under-supplied with food so as to discourage any more coming'. The rise in the numbers of people forced to seek UNHCR assistance in October was the response to yet another UNLA incursion into the Sudan at Kajo-Kaji with '40 refugees abducted'.

At Kaya the situation flared up in November. On 21 November 1984, UNHCR found 'The situation at the border ... very fluid indeed with many families in a state of pandemonium.~~ Once again it had all begun as it had at Kajo-Kaji, with members of the UNLA making overtures to the military commander stationed at Kaya. Already deeply embroiled in commercial affairs with members of the military from both Uganda and Zaire, this commander visited Arua. On 15 November there was an UNLA incursion at Araba Miju, killing three refugees and abducting four others 'who were carried [away] with looted property.' The next day another such incursion left a refugee, Mr Ajuga, dead and his wife abducted, a three week old infant abandoned.

Officially these incidents were blamed on refugees and the Sudanese proceeded to arrest and detain large numbers of Ugandans. These arrests were highly selective, involving only the Lugbara speakers. Several deaths were reported and Saidi Abiriga, a retired Ugandan major and his seventeen year old daughter were both shot in cold blood inside their house near Poki. As was reported, 'There is every indication there was collaboration with the Ugandan army at Oraba, because after he was shot dead, the body was collected and shown to Ugandan army officers who were called from their side [of the border] before it was released for burial.' Two lorry loads of refugees were rounded up from Bazi on 20 November 1984 and 'dispatched to Goli transit'. UNHCR decided however that no food would be issued as hopefully 'they are "vagabonds" who will disappear after a few days to their respective places'. As one observer wrote, 'Each had to make his own way out. '

But now faced with the threat of the forcible removal of up to 50,000 refugees residing in this small triangle (about 25 by 32 kilometres) between the Zaire and Uganda borders, the UNHCR office had 'a) No tents; b) Transport difficulties; c) Not enough food. [There is] food in the store for less than 600 persons for one month, and there is no possibility that WFP [World Food Programme] would send any food in the near future'. UNHCR's message to the Sudanese authorities was that it 'would not be prepared to receive any refugees at this time. Therefore, no lorries should be sent to the border. Should they decide to do so, then nothing much in the way of assistance will be forthcoming from the UNHCR.' At an internal meeting of staff, the head of Yei UNHCR office commented, 'The situation is so bad that it warrants reporting, but since the persons affected are self-settled refugees they are outside UNHCR's protection, not much can be done'. [9]

The self-settled refugees had turned what had been virtually unpopulated bush in one of Yei River District's most fertile areas into highly productive agricultural land. There were, no doubt, many reasons why, since 1979, the Sudan government did not take a tougher line with Uganda concerning these incursions or did not bolster its military capacity to protect the border. But the removal of the self-settled refugees represents a regrettable and unnecessary loss of food production for the Sudan, to say nothing of the additional suffering which such uprootings cause. Most important in terms of the role of UNHCR in protecting refugees, there is no evidence to suggest that the order to carry out these atrocities came from Khartoum. Quite to the contrary, the evidence suggests that it has been the actions of undisciplined individuals, in conspiracy with the UNLA. Some have benefited from the illegal trade which followed from the displacement of much of the Ugandan economy across the border to Zaire. Had the activities of the soldiers at Kaya been reported earlier, they might well have been disciplined. Whether or not the UNHCR office in Yei informed its superiors in Khartoum is not known but in mid-December 1984, UNHCR Geneva still had not the slightest inkling of any disturbances in southern Sudan affecting refugees. Just before Christmas 1984, word was received that a military clash had occurred at Obongi, a market town inside Uganda, and that once again large numbers of refugees had fled into Sudan at Kajo-Kaji. Indeed, in mid-1985, the situation remained very fluid.

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[1] As this study is based on data collected in Yei River District which lies on the west bank of the Nile in Eastern Equatoria, it does not include those who settled on the east bank or went directly to Juba or elsewhere. Refugees settled on the east bank from 1979 with the major influx in 1980-1. By 1983 there were 70,000 refugees there living in assisted settlements and agency workers have the impression that most of these are Madi. Those who are familiar with the area believe there are as many or more refugees living outside settlements, a pattern similar to that found in Yei River District.

[2] It was surprising that anyone would rely on Oris for confirmation that John Yebuga fell outside the ambit of their protection role because he had engaged in 'political' activities Oris might be assumed to have had good reasons for wanting to be sure that the prisoner was not released Oris had been recruiting Ugandan refugees on the grounds that they would he going to Saudi Arabia to train and would return to overthrow Obote. In fact, he was recruiting for the Sudan government who had agreed to send soldiers to fight in Iraq Yebuga discovered this plot and warned refugees not to Sign up. It was only after these details were published in Africa Confidential (2 November, 1983) and Amnesty presented the case to Nemeiry on the occasion of a visit to Washington that Yebuga was released.

[3] This quotation and the following are taken from Report to the Military Commission by the Team on a Fact-Finding Tour of the Three War-Affected Districts of Nebbi, Arua and Moyo from the 25 October to the 22 November 1980.

[4] This is just one example of a family which came with sufficient property to maintain economic independence Even marginal assistance might have allowed them to avoid the total economic collapse which brought them to the relief programme.

[5] Every Ugandan refugee believes Obote uttered this threat while still in exile in Tanzania. Ironically, the Ugandan government in its submissions presented for funds to the ICARA II conference in Geneva, July, 1984, included a comment to the effect that now that peace had returned to Uganda, the northwest Nile was ripe for tourism.

[6] See my unsigned report of an interview with Moses Ali, 'Uganda: UNRF awakens from its slumber', Africa Now, August 1984.

[7] In actual fact, relief was not available; why, is another story. We gave a Ugandan catechist £S 50 ($US 38: The official rate then was £S 1.31 = $US 1.00.) He kept most of this group alive by buying cassava. Two weeks later he sent word he had run out of money. There was still no food in UNHCR's stores; more money was sent.

[8] One woman described how she got to Tore settlement Living nearby with her small children, she had gone to the market at Kaya. Armed police forced her on to the lorry leaving for the settlement. Months later she found her children.

[9] This apparent 'evolution' in UNHCR's interpretation of the limits of its responsibility for protection of refugees is discussed in Crisp 1984 and Harrell-Bond 1985.